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The new History of ideas research Centre was found-
ed on the conviction that the history of ideas is of 
great importance not only for all academic fields, but 
first and foremost for culture and society. The history 
of ideas enables a better understanding of our present, 
whose culture and manners of thinking result from 
certain traditions and therefore are not self-
explanatory. We are not Europeans neither because of 
the territory we inhabit nor in virtue of recently con-
cluded European treaties, but because European cul-
ture has been shaped by particular basic ideas and 
attitudes. They can only be clearly comprehended and 
commented on via an examination of their history, 
which can only be explicitly appropriated and evalu-
ated against their historical background. The history 
of ideas explains our mental and cultural presupposi-
tions and thereby may lead to justified affirmation 
and critique – not only a critique of traditional ideas, 
but also a critique of our present situation that often 
reveals its deficiencies only in the light of prior con-
victions and keynotes. The increasing specialization 
of historical studies needs to be counterbalanced by 
other types of research that focus on common presup-
positions and thoughts, and thereby promote interdis-
ciplinary work. This is precisely the scope of the 
studies of the history of ideas, where many academic 
fields overlap. In order to foster fruitful research dis-
cussion in the domain of the history of ideas, the re-
search centre decided to launch the online magazine 
Orbis Idearum. European Journal of the History of 
Ideas, and the book series Vestigia Idearum Histori-
ca. Beiträge zur Ideengeschichte Europas by mentis 
Verlag in Münster. The concept of the history of ide-
as has admittedly lost its semantic outlines. Since his-
torical research has disproved rather than confirmed 
Lovejoy’s research program that was based on the 
supposition of constant unit-ideas, the concept of the 
history of ideas can be applied to any inquiry in the 





































By contrast, the new History of Ideas Research 
Centre attempts to restore the distinctive profile of 
the history of ideas. For the Centre, ideas are 
thoughts, representations and fantasy images that 
may be expressed in various forms. Ideas mani-
fest themselves first and foremost in language, but 
also in nonlinguistic media, and even in activities, 
rites and practices. In the latter case, they do not 
always manifest themselves directly, but are 
sometimes at the basis of certain cultural phe-
nomena before eventually receiving linguistic ex-
pression. For this reason, the history of ideas 
coincides neither with the history of concepts 
(Begriffsgeschichte) nor with intellectual history 
(allgemeine Geistesgeschichte). While the former 
is oriented towards thoughts that are expressed 
linguistically, and, therefore, elaborates only a 
part of the history of ideas, the latter is devoted to 
the whole mental life of humankind, which may 
involve even religious systems and fundamental 
convictions of a whole epoch. By contrast, the 
history of ideas always focuses on particular ele-
ments that are recognizable in thought or in cul-
ture, and whose transformation or constancy can 
be explored over a certain period of time by de-
scribing, analyzing, and interpreting their appear-
ance, function, and effect. Taken in this sense, the 
history of ideas occupies an intermediate position: 
it covers a broader field than the history of con-
cepts that could be understood as one of its subar-
eas, but it has a more specific task than 
intellectual history (allgemeine Geistesgeschich-
te). Even more than in the case of the history of 
concepts (Begriffsgeschichte), one must resist the 
temptation to mistake the historian’s interpreta-
tions for historical ideas. 
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ABSTRACT 
Emergence is it is a concept that should undergo more careful philosophical analy-
sis. This paper aims to promote the idea that “emergence” should be taken as an on-
tological regulative principle (rather than a conceptual instrument able to provide a 
quick empirical answer to many concrete scientific problems). The usefulness of the 
proposed approach rests in the fact that it could work as an overarching theoretical 
framework for the ever-growing body of theories and empirical data provided by 
natural and social sciences; it could also help to overcome (at least partly) the ex-
treme over-specialization that characterizes contemporary knowledge. Furthermore, 
it could work as a programmatic framework for comparing and combining data and 
theories belonging to very different fields – from the natural to the social sciences – 
but related to one single, very complicated entity, that is, Man. So, after a short his-
tory of the concept of emergence, an analysis of its ontological nature will follow; 
then some specific philosophical problems – like the metaphoric aspects of the 
emergentist approach, or the ontological unification of every kind of emergence – 
will be discussed. Afterward this paper will provide a few reasons for supporting a 
regulative approach to emergence and will illustrate its advantages – supplying an 
example/proposal taken from the debate about free will. 
1. INTRODUCTION: EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE 
There is a lot of talk about “emergence” going on these days; indeed, it 
seems that emergence is back, and that this venerable – although controver-
sial – concept is joining other popular buzzwords, such as “system,” com-
plexity,” “non-summativity,” “wholeness,” and so forth. In fact, a lot has 
been written in recent years about the “re-emergence of emergence” (e.g., 
Clayton and Davies 2006, Bedau 2008). 
The vocabulary produced by so-called “system science” has definitely 





It is possible to find it everywhere, often connected with other philosoph-
ical concepts, like “existence.” One example of this is the Dutch theoretical 
physicist Erik Verlinde and his hypothesis of “Entropic Gravity,” according 
to which gravity is not a fundamental interaction, but probabilistically 
“emerges” from physical systems’ spontaneous tendency to increase their 
level of entropy (Verlinde 2010). Another example – taken from applied re-
search – is systems biology, a collective name for a certain number of trends 
of contemporary biotechnology and biosciences (e.g., Alon 2006) strongly 
focused around the goal to discover and produce emergent properties in liv-
ing systems. Philosopher Craig Callendar (Callendar 2010) writes in «Scien-
tific American» that time and change are illusions, as they “emerge from a 
universe that, at root, is utterly static,” implicitly stating that emergence is 
the opposite of existence – that is, if something emerges, this means that it 
does not properly exist – and so endorsing a form of “mereological nihil-
ism.” And these are just three examples out of many. 
The notion of “emergence” is getting trendy, so it should undergo a more 
careful philosophical analysis. After a short history of the concept of “emer-
gence,” this paper will analyze the proposal that this concept should be taken 
as an ontological regulative principle of organization (rather than a concep-
tual instrument able to provide a quick empirical answer to many scientific 
problems). The usefulness of the proposed approach will be then illustrated 
(which rests in the fact that it could work as an overarching theoretical 
framework for the ever-growing body of theories and empirical data pro-
duced by natural and social sciences, and could also help to overcome, at 
least partly, the extreme over-specialization that is characterizes contempo-
rary knowledge). And as one of the central debates about human nature, that 
is, free will, has arguably reached a “theoretical stalemate,” an emergentistic 
program to set this discussion in motion again will be proposed. 
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPT 
In his book Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Real-
ity, historian and philosopher of science David Blitz writes that the term 
“emergent” was used for the first time by George Henry Lewes (Blitz 1992). 
Lewes compares and opposes, in his Problems of Life and Mind (1874-
1879), two words, “resultant” and “emergent”: the latter indicates an unpre-
dictable trait or effect, which cannot be explained through the mere sum of 
its components. Lewes was following the idea – coined by John Stuart Mill – 
of “qualitative novelty,” as in the example given by Mill about the properties 
of water, which cannot be reduced to those of hydrogen and oxygen. In fact, 
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the first thinker to talk about emerging qualities was Aristotle, who in his 
Metaphysics characterized composite entities as “having a number of parts 
where the totality is not a heap but the whole is something besides the parts” 
(Book H, 1045:10). During the Twenties, emergence and emergentism found 
several followers, like Samuel Alexander, Roy Wood Sellars, Arthur 
Lovejoy, the South-African politician Jan Smuts (father of another important 
systemic concept, “holism”), Charlie Dunbar Broad, and Conwy Lloyd Mor-
gan. The latter published three works on this topic: Emergent Evolution 
(1923), Life, Spirit and Mind (1926), and The Emergence of Novelty (1933). 
In spite of their differences, all these thinkers and theorists have common 
ground, namely, the idea that the world is built like a ladder, composed of 
well identifiable strata, paralleled by an analogous stratification of the natu-
ral and social sciences. Of course, the fundamental level is the physical one, 
followed by the chemical, the biological, the psychological, and the social. 
And of course the disposition of layers follows criteria of growing organisa-
tional complexity. 
From many points of view emergentism is a monist substitute for an ob-
solete approach, vitalism, but actually emergentism had, from the beginning, 
a broader focus: while vitalism regarded only living systems, emergentism 
aimed to include in its theoretical web the whole of reality. But how did the 
first emergentists define “emergence”?  
Lloyd Morgan said that “Under what I call emergent evolution stress is 
laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent 
of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective thought” (Lloyd 
Morgan 1923). Interestingly, Lloyd Morgan’s view was not a real scientific 
theory, but a philosophical one, as it did not introduce specific, concrete 
causal mechanisms able to explain the phenomenon of emerging properties 
(Blitz 1992). 
In the landmark work The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), Broad 
added a concept strongly tied with the idea of emergence, namely the idea of 
“level,” and introduced a fundamental distinction between “intra-ordinal 
laws,” referring to events and objects belonging to a specific level or order, 
and “trans-ordinal laws,” related to the development of higher-level proper-
ties from lower-level ones. 
In the Thirties an emergentist multi-level view of life was advanced by 
embryologist Joseph Needham (Needham 1937), and in 1940s by Julian 
Huxley (Huxley and Huxley 1947) and by biologist Alex Novikoff in a well 
known article published in «Science», The Concept of Integrative Levels in 
Biology (Novikoff 1945). 
During the Fifties, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an Austrian biologist and 
philosopher already famous for his works on theoretical biology, inspired the 




which led to the foundation – in 1956 – of the Society for General Systems 
Research. The meta-scientific and philosophical nature of Bertalanffy’s ap-
proach is clearly illustrated by his goal to unify all sciences and to provide 
them with a conceptual framework capable of being for contemporary sci-
ences what Aristotle’s logic was for ancient ones . Ambitious as it was, his 
program of a unification of all sciences was destined to stay programmatic, 
that is, not to be concretized in any real scientific breakthrough (Bertalanffy 
1968). 
Anyway, the Society for General Systems Research offered, through its 
annual publications («General Systems»), the opportunity to work on sys-
temic and emergentist themes to many researchers, such as Anatol Rapoport, 
Kenneth Boulding, Ralph Gerard, Heinz von Foerster, Russell Ackoff, Don-
ald T. Campbell, Herbert Simon, George Klir, Paul Weiss, James G. Miller 
and several others. 
Among the several other scholars involved with the concepts of emer-
gence and system, we cannot omit Herman Haken – father of “synergetics” – 
and Ilya Prigogine, with his seminal work on non-equilibrium thermodynam-
ics and open systems – which he called “dissipative structures” (see, e.g., 
Haken 1977, Prigogine 1980, Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). 
Of course, during these decades, emergentism and systemic philosophy 
did not lack critics, from Bertrand Russell (1927) – who considered emer-
gent qualities merely epiphenomena without scientific significance – to Ern-
est Nagel (1961) and Carl G. Hempel (1965), who refused to attribute to 
“emergence” any ontological status, as in their opinion this concept was too 
imprecise. According to them, emergence was admissible only as an episte-
mological label, roughly translatable with the expression “so far unexplaina-
ble.” 
3. ONTOLOGY, RATHER THAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
Definitions of emergence vary. Lewes writes: “The emergent is unlike its 
components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced 
to their sum or their difference" (Lewes 1875). Jeffrey Goldstein more for-
mally defines emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, 
patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex 
systems” (Goldstein 1999). Biologist Peter Corning specifies that systemic 
laws are merely descriptions or patterns, and so they do not actually “gener-
ate” anything and cannot be considered as underlying causal agencies (Corn-
ing 2002). 
Most researchers and philosophers talk about two different kinds of 
emergence, namely a “strong emergence” and a “weak emergence.” For in-
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stance David Chalmers says that 
 
a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, 
but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle 
from truths in the low-level domain. We can say that a high-level phenome-
non is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-
level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning 
that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level 
domain (Chalmers 2002). 
 
According to this philosopher in the whole universe there is only one single 
strongly emergent phenomenon, namely, human consciousness. The defini-
tion given by Chalmers is quite clear, even clear-cut: there are two kinds of 
emergence that can coexist. I have to disagree with Chalmers: his take on 
emergence – based on the idea of its “uniqueness” – sounds like a kind of 
miracle and has an anthropocentric slant which looks incompatible with the 
scientific understanding of the world. Conjecturing a multi-layered ladder of 
emerging levels makes more sense and sounds philosophically more ac-
ceptable. Similarly, Mark A. Bedau raises doubts about strong emergence 
more broadly, stating that “although (…) logically possible, it is uncomfort-
ably like magic” and that its “mysteriousness will only heighten the tradi-
tional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from 
nothing” (Bedau 1997). 
So, who is right? Is emergence only an epistemological, or subjective 
phenomenon, expressing our (perhaps temporary) ignorance about the facts 
of the world, or is it an ontological, or objective one? The short answer is: no 
one can know. Let us consider the long answer. On the epistemological side, 
it is in fact possible to view “emergence” as an obstacle on the path toward 
the explanation of a certain phenomenon. I do think it is impossible to say 
for certain that a certain entity or process is emergent in a strong sense, and 
this just because one day a reductionist explanation could be found. On the 
ontological side, it is possible to say (as many philosophers have noticed) 
that the reductionist program is, well, just a program. In other words, reduc-
tionism rests on the faith that one day everything will be reduced to some, so 
far unknown, elementary entities. When and if this will happen, concepts of 
emergence and existence will be put on opposite sides, that is, emergence 
will mean the contrary of existence, and every emerging object or process 
will not exist in a proper sense.  
In the meantime, while waiting for a general reduction of everything to the 
simplest entities imaginable, and just to keep natural and social sciences ac-




they are about do really exist. And so, we should hypothesize that biological 
organisms do really exist, that human beings do really exist, that even socie-
ty exists (the latter does not mean to endorse or to thwart any project of 
building a social ontology like Searle’s, a topic too large to be faced here). 
There is a strong reason for this pragmatic choice: in fact, no one can say 
what the ultimate, elementary entities, the building blocks of our world, are. 
So far physical science talks about elementary particles, and sometimes 
about strings; one day, some new entity – closer to the “bottom” of reality 
than particles or strings – could appear. Consequently, any coherent hard-
line reductionist approach implicitly calls for a suspension of every judg-
ment about existence beyond this unknown, ultimate level of reality.  
4. WHY EMERGENCE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A STRONG THEORY OF 
EVERYTHING 
The ambition to build an “emergentist theory of everything,” or a “general 
theory of emergence,” should be carefully avoided. The reasons to follow 
this precept are basically two: the need not to fall into what I would like to 
call “systemic hype,” which I think is (from a theoretical point of view) haz-
ardous and rather naïve; and a certain number of de facto limitations, which 
cannot be bypassed anytime soon.  
According to many supporters of the “theory of complexity,” complex 
systems emerge because of simple principles of self-organization, and these 
rules are applicable everywhere, from living beings to human cognition, 
from atmospheric weather to the ebbs and flows of the stock market. In fact, 
everything can be explained with a definitive, unifying, grand self-
organizing algorithm, which could be around the corner. Does it sound re-
ductive, even reductionist? Of course it does, because, to a certain extent, it 
is. But this is exactly the approach embodied during the Eighties by one of 
the main centres working on the theory of complexity, the Santa Fe Institute. 
Research carried out at this institute since the mid-Eighties by diverse schol-
ars (such as Murray Gell-Mann, Doyne Farmer, Stuart Kauffman, John Cas-
ti, Jim Crutchfield and John Holland) brought a lot of theoretical work, many 
popular books and, to tell the truth, a certain degree of opacity and confusion 
to the concept of emergence. For instance, Kauffman talks about a brand-
new “fourth law of thermodynamics,” an immanent organizing principle of 
the universe that resists entropy and manages to combine a clear reductionist 
flavour with a vitalistic opacity (Kaufmann 2000). As – without any irony – 
physicist Doyne Farmer puts it: “It’s not magic … but it feels like magic” 
(Waldrop 1992). In the end, the approach of the Santa Fe Institute tries to 
canalize into physics many philosophical and meta-scientific topics and to 
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find a “third way” between holism and reductionism. But, as shown in the 
case of Kaufmann (among other examples), it fails and it develops a reduc-
tionist, non-philosophical interpretation of the concept of emergence.  
The history of science and philosophy are filled with examples of at-
tempts to explain everything using a few simple concepts and rules, and past 
failures should persuade future systemic thinkers to be more careful in theo-
retically “invading” specific disciplines or in expecting to solve conundrums 
raised by fields and topics very far from the one they were originally trained 
in. 
But there are more important reasons to avoid any attempt to build a 
strong, decisive “general theory of emergence,” namely, some de facto limi-
tations, which are related with a notion strongly tied with the topic of emer-
gence: the concept of level. The first question I would like to raise is: how 
many levels are there? We have seen that Chalmers dismisses the whole no-
tion of a hierarchy of “strong-emerging” levels, while systemic philosopher 
Ervin Laszlo (Laszlo 1972) presents a very articulated model of hierarchy, 
composed of a main hierarchical system and one local – but the latter is just 
an example of a potentially infinite series. The first system, which he calls 
“macro-hierarchy,” represents the purely physical reality, distributed on a 
ladder going from the space-time continuum and elementary particles to gal-
axy clusters and basically the whole physical universe. The local hierarchy, 
called “micro-hierarchy,” is about the terrestrial ecosystem, from organic 
molecules to human society. Of course Laszlo admits other potential micro-
hierarchies, which – according to his model – seem more or less commen-
surable with the terrestrial one. 
My preference goes to Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt, who identify, as 
a working hypothesis, a ladder composed of four primary levels: the physi-
cal-chemical, the biological, the psychological, and the social. They also add 
many interesting details:  
The ontology of levels we attempted to give was framed in a materialist 
and evolutionary perspective that implied that the relation between levels 
was considered to be inclusive, permitting the ‘local’ existence of different 
ontologies, all included within the physical level and non-violating physical 
laws. (…) the biological ontology is local to the extent that different biolo-
gies, different organizing principles of life, may emerge on other planets 
(who knows if life universally takes shape as the natural selection of DNA-
coded genotypes?) (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 2000). 
According to them there is a further point of discussion, one about the 
degree of sharpness in discriminating levels and sub-levels: 
One can argue at length about the number of (and demarcations between) 
the primary levels. Our choice of the four levels mentioned was in part 




ous candidates for further primary levels), but what is ontologically im-
portant is that such levels of reality can in fact be rationally distinguished 
(Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 2000). 
In fact, it is always possible that, in the near future, new and finer and 
clear-cut ontological discriminations will emerge (for example between sim-
ple consciousness and self-consciousness), or that the ontological ladder will 
be completely redefined and redesigned.  
Furthermore, “other ‘local ontologies’ of other higher levels may exist 
within the global, physical primary level, and we cannot tell beforehand 
which other initiating condition for mentality or sociality other ‘local biolo-
gies’ may constitute” (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 1997). 
I believe, then, that in the universe there could be an unknown number of 
“parallel hierarchies,” based on principles very different from the ones 
founding our own bio-psycho-sociological ladder. Moreover I want to add to 
Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt’s approach one more consideration: these 
hierarchies could be ontologically non-commensurable to each other; for in-
stance, the number and typology of levels could easily not be in a one-to-one 
correspondence with the levels of any other hierarchy. Inside the same hier-
archy, there is, or there could be, a different kind of emergence for any given 
level.  
All classifications of levels should be taken as preliminary, as further dis-
coveries could force a revision of the number and typology of levels and 
sub-levels. In the end, although I am not persuaded, I have also to admit the 
possibility that no ladder exists at all, and the only truly emergent phenome-
non could be consciousness. So, my question can be restated as: How many 
possible parallel ladders are there? Only one? An infinity? A number in be-
tween? Is there a ladder at all? No answer is possible right now.  
I do however believe that there is a second de facto limitation, which I 
never found explicitly and exhaustively analyzed in scientific literature: I am 
talking about the possible emergence of highly speculative, future further 
levels. This consideration was suggested me by a specific anthropological 
theory, neoevolutionism. While discarding many concepts of social Darwin-
ism (like the idea of progress), this approach maintains that evolution of hu-
man societies can be described objectively and divided into stages, which 
can be measured using empirical criteria – like the amount of energy used by 
a certain civilization or the quantity of information produced. A good exam-
ple of this approach is Leslie White, author of the seminal book The Evolu-
tion of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome (1959). 
Without endorsing all the precepts and ideas of this approach to the social 
sciences, I would like to stress the similarities between White’s ideas and the 
so-called Kardashev Scale, developed in 1964 by the Russian astrophysicist 
Nikolai Kardashev (Kardashev 1964). Highly speculative, the Kardashev 
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Scale measures the level of technological and scientific advancement 
reached by a hypothetical extraterrestrial civilization. The scale includes 
three levels, labelled Type I, Type II and Type III, in accordance with the 
amount of energy a civilization has at its disposal (that is, the energy of its 
planet, of its stellar system, or of its home galaxy). The Kardashev Scale has 
been extended by other researchers, like Zoltan Galantai (Galantai 2003) and 
Michio Kaku (Kaku 2004), who talk about a Type IV civilisation; further-
more, Carl Sagan (Sagan 1973) proposed to add to this classification another 
dimension, related not to the energy available but to the information pro-
duced. An obvious objection to this classification is that, as we are talking 
about a civilisation more advanced than ours, it is impossible to guess its 
true nature and predict its behavior. But from my point of view, the implica-
tions are nevertheless clear: we can easily try to interpret Kardashev’s classi-
fication from an emergentistic viewpoint, that is, to read the types as 
possible levels. Which can possibly lead to even more speculative – maybe 
far-fetched, but surely interesting – questions, which quite probably it will 
prove impossible to answer. For example: How many upper levels of com-
plexity are admissible? Is there an upper limit to the levels of complexity? 
So we have a problem: As we are talking about levels of development be-
yond ours – which could definitely include new emerging properties – how 
can we plan to reach a complete, decisive, and coherent “general theory of 
emergence” any time soon? 
5. UPPER LEVELS: METAPHORICALLY CLASHING AGAINST A WALL 
The topic of upper levels is so interesting that it deserves further analysis to 
underline few other related problems. 
First of all, let us go back to the problem concerning the number of possi-
ble upper levels, and let us ask again: is their number finite, or could it be 
infinite? I am not the only one here to suggest the possibility of the existence 
of an infinite number of levels, or alternatively, an infinite degree of com-
plexity. For instance, in a different but related field, communication theory, 
Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin and Don D. Jackson suggest a similar 
possibility in reference to human cognitive self-perception – namely, our 
ability to “frame” and “read” our own surrounding reality and our self-
interpretation by encapsulating it in higher and higher conceptual frames, on 
a cognitive ladder which is potentially infinite (Watzlawick, Beavin and 
Jackson 1967).  
Secondly, about “cognitively transcending” upper levels: even if we can 
recognize their possible existence, we cannot say much more about them. 




the very same moment we try to conceptualize them, or even only to think 
about them, we get “pushed back” to our own level of emergence, which in-
escapably “frames” our cognition. To put it in other terms: we can think of 
them because we have at our disposal a metaphoric ladder, on which every 
level is represented by a rung. And so we can see, touch, and analyze the 
rung we are on and the ones below it; in the case of upper rungs, we can im-
agine their existence, but we cannot really reach for them, just because we 
don’t have either the conceptual tools, or the metaphorical ones, to climb the 
ladder beyond our own actual level. Some philosophers think that human 
knowledge is intrinsically metaphoric. From the emergentistic perspective it 
could be useful to take a look at the work of George Lakoff and Mark John-
son on cognitive metaphors. In their seminal book they skillfully showed 
how our knowledge and even our everyday language is packed with meta-
phors of every kind (Lakoff and Johnson 1980); their work could be very 
useful because, besides some aspects of Bertalanffy’s analysis, systemic and 
emergentistic schools of thought never tried to explicitly understand the 
“metaphors they live by” – and this could be a very interesting topic to work 
on in the future. 
Put in other terms: according to Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Bertalanffy 
1968) scientific investigation is developing toward a “progressive 
demetaphorisation”, which means that, step by step, our scientific interpreta-
tion of the world is getting rid of every trait specifically related to the human 
experience. So for example, as our understanding of reality seems visual-
based, quantum mechanics managed to get over it, developing a scientific 
worldview which is inherently “unvisualizable.” Together with the develop-
ment of new technological tools for observation, this process pushed us far 
beyond our daily, visual-based, metaphoric interpretation of the world. All 
this allowed us to eliminate the many limits of our sensory experience – at 
least if we philosophically support a world-view based on scientific realism, 
and not, say, on empiricism or idealism. 
Let us keep in mind that this erasure process already “cleaned” scientific 
investigation of many perceptual traits – colours, smells, sounds – and other 
features (and metaphors) might be cancelled in the future. So, one could ask: 
how far can we get with this process, before being compelled to get rid of 
emergence’s main metaphor, that is, the “ladder”? Will the “ladder” still 
stand? Could it withstand this (alleged) demetaphorization process?  
A related question I would like to raise is the following. There are no real 
ladders, here, we know that, but so far this concept has been very useful – 
together with many other metaphors we live by. So now we should ask our-
selves: is this concept forcing our hand? Maybe the idea of an infinite hierar-
chy is only an unintended and mistaken consequence of a metaphor (the 
ladder) taken too far. 
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Maybe it is even possible that, at a potential level beyond ours, the ladder 
metaphor does not hold; that from the upper level viewpoint there are no 
ladders at all. So one could wonder: while climbing this ladder composed of 
emerging levels of complexity, and trying to reach for the upper rungs, are 
we metaphorically clashing against a wall? 
6. THE PLATONIC WAREHOUSE 
Let us now look at a different order of problems connected with the concept 
of emergence and not yet solved, maybe because they coincide with the 
broadest and deepest problems of philosophy at large (and poorly analyzed 
and understood by many classic emergentistic thinkers). Let us ask: what is 
the ontological “source” of emergence? As I said before, it is possible that 
every level has its own way to emerge from the lower level. In spite of this, 
we aim to find a general theory of emergence, which should conceptualize 
every trait the different kinds of emergence have in common.  
We need an ontogenetic source; so a unifying theory of emergence should 
be really unifying. That is: if there are different kinds of emergence at any 
level and on any possible ladder, they all should be explained through a 
deeper and more general form of emergence, in other words, a theoretic 
“source” of all emergence. And not only that: a general theory of emergence 
which aims to be general in the widest possible sense, should even explain 
itself, namely, explain how emergence emerged in the first place, and how it 
can generally emerge. Of course to expect this question to be answered is 
like expecting an ultimate, complete answer to all the main problems posed 
by theoretic philosophy. Nevertheless, in the fields of systems theory and 
complexity theory, there have been some attempts, but – in my opinion – ra-
ther naïve or incomplete. 
I would like to mention just a couple of them, the “morphic field” of Ru-
pert Sheldrake and the so-called “digital philosophy” promoted by Gregory 
Chaitin, Edward Fredkin, Konrad Zuse and Stephen Wolfram. According to 
the latter scholars – mostly mathematicians and theoretical physicists – eve-
rything that exists – space, time, thought, consciousness – is a consequence 
of a huge, unitary process of computation (Zuse 1969, Fredkin 1992, Wolf-
ram 2002). The whole universe should be seen as a computer of unimagina-
ble size. This self-proclaimed “digital philosophy” reflects the spreading of 
the idea that the process of computation could be everywhere, and actually 
the computational processes performed by human-made computers could be 
seen as a smaller, primitive version – or even a simple manifestation – of this 
huge all-encompassing universal process of computation. As digital philoso-




divided in many sub-streams. I do not think this approach is really persua-
sive, let alone satisfactorily complete, as it does not even try to answer the 
most fundamental question of all: who or what “computes” our reality? Ac-
cording to Friedkin, this “pan-computational” process is carried out by a not-
better-defined “Other,” whose nature we do not know. Another universe or 
dimension? A “meta-universe”? No answer is forthcoming. 
The concept of morphic field was coined by British biologist Rupert 
Sheldrake to indicate an alleged “field of information” which acts as “data-
base” as well as “development drive” for both organic and abstract forms – a 
collective “library” and an ontological and emergentistic “source” (Shel-
drake 1981). I would say that Sheldrake’s approach is vitalism, plain and 
simple, while digital philosophy’s is reductionist. But at least someone – in-
side the variegated complex systems community – is trying to answer the 
following question, which I never saw explicitly stated: where are the levels 
of complexity we see around us from? Are they totally, genuinely “new”? 
and if so, what is the source of this “novelty”? Can it be conceptualized like 
the age-old idea of creatio ex nihilo? On the contrary, if those levels of 
emergence are not really “new”, but already implicitly existent, “where” are 
they before coming into existence? Are these upper or alternate, not-yet-
existent levels stored in a kind of “Platonic warehouse” or in a Popperian 
“World 3”? What really matters here is the fact that the problem of origin or 
source of emergence looks very far from being solved. 
7. WHY EMERGENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE 
INSTEAD 
My partial conclusion is: there is so much philosophy in emergentism and 
theory of complexity, and so little recognized. This “elephant in the room,” 
these unaddressed philosophical problems, make me state the following: If 
“emergence” has to be interpreted as an ontological concept, this implicitly 
means that it cannot be taken as a simple scientific concept with immediate 
utility. As mentioned above, one of the accusations flung at Bertalanffy’s 
General Systems Theory was about its programmaticity. And what if this 
programmaticity could be turned into something positive, that is, into a vir-
tue?  
Let us make a digression and try to set things right about the systemic ap-
proach and the related currents (General Systems Theory, Theory of Chaos, 
Theory of Complexity, and so on). In spite of many naiveties and few re-
sults, their philosophical intentions are more than noble: to allow, or even 
foster communication among disciplines; to favor the positive interchange of 
concepts and ideas among different fields; in the end, to be a building block 
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for something we have not heard of for a while, namely, a kind of “philoso-
phy of nature.” Like Bertalanffy, and like his more famous forerunners (such 
as Alfred North Whitehead), the contemporary systemic approaches aim to 
go beyond the present separation among disciplines or between Snow’s “two 
cultures,” and rebuild (maybe unrealistically, maybe not) a kind of renais-
sance mentality.  
Although very ambitious, the goal to revive such a typology of philo-
sophical stances is definitely easier to achieve than the construction of an ul-
timate general theory of emergence. Instead, philosophy, and in particular 
systemic thinking, could focus on the creation of a general emergentistic 
“draft” in which to insert (little by little) all the small pieces of data and dis-
coveries about reality that natural and social sciences will find in the near 
and far future. It should be a flexible map, a map able to accommodate “re-
ductionist” discoveries and new, “emergent” processes, and consequently to 
change on demand; furthermore, is should push us to reflect on our emer-
gentistic framework, philosophically asking again and again the question of 
the ontological source of the emergence and the metaphoric nature of the 
concepts it uses. 
The pragmatic approach advocated here – that is, the interpretation of 
emergence as an ontological or meta-scientific framework – could rightly be 
called an ontological “regulative principle of organization,” more or less in 
the same sense that Kant used for the concepts of “soul,” “world,” and 
“God.” 
8. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
Now a new question arises: What is the point in pursuing this “light” version 
of a general theory of emergence? Why cannot the special sciences keep do-
ing what they have done so far with great results, without caring about other 
disciplines? Is there some advantage in talking about systems, emergence, 
levels of reality, and so forth? 
First of all, as shown above, this approach authorizes from an ontological 
point of view natural and social sciences to talk about their own objects 
without waiting for the discovery of the “bottom” of reality – if it is possible 
to find that at all. To put it in another way: I believe it allows – at least in 
principle – the foundation of every discipline iuxta propria principia (that is, 
according to their own principles). 
Secondly, it could help to reconcile (if this is the goal) the perceptual 
world (that is, the world naively perceived) with the comprehensive 
worldview offered by scientific realism. In other words this emergentistic 




both the data coming from human ordinary perception and the theories and 
data provided by all the different disciplines working on this topic (psychol-
ogy of perception, cognitive neurosciences, and so on). 
Thirdly, it could repair one of the main defects of the classic systemic ap-
proaches. In fact, the picture built by those has many gaps, whether from the 
viewpoint of logic, mathematics, or metaphysics. In other words, while Gen-
eral Systems Theory was meant to be a truly all-inclusive philosophy of na-
ture, many of the contemporary theorists of emergence (although with a 
certain number of exceptions) seem to focus mostly on physics, biology, and 
philosophy of mind, and omit that a “general theory of emergence” should 
be really general, and so should include every kind of system, even the more 
abstract ones. 
Last but not the least, such an approach does foster communication 
among disciplines, and it can definitely help to find a way out of the over-
specialization that plagues contemporary knowledge, by providing philoso-
phers, natural scientists, and social scientists with at least a common ideal 
goal.  
And now let us just try to offer an example of the usefulness of this pro-
posal. 
9. A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE: DOWNWARD CAUSATION, FREE WILL, AND A NEW 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Inside the theory of emergence the concept of downward causation exerts a 
function as important as the one of level; actually we can say that, from 
many points of view, they are one and the same.  
The concept of downward causation implies that events or phenomena 
belonging to a certain level can act upon events and phenomena of the lower 
levels; this specific inter-level relationship, together with its opposite – that 
is, upward causation, which illustrates how some entities at a certain level 
produce other related entities at a higher level – are basically the core of any 
emergentistic philosophy. 
According to Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt, it is possible to hypothe-
size at least three kinds of downward causation: a strong downward causa-
tion, a medium one, and a weak one, all the three defined by the strength of 
their influence on their lower levels (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 2000). 
These scholars discriminate three different kinds of downward causation: 
 
The idea of strong downward causality may be briefly described as follows: a 
given entity or process on a given level may causally inflict changes or ef-
fects on entities or processes on a lower level. (…) (It) introduces a non-
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scientific, that is, irrational principle, and violates the assumption of the in-
clusivity of levels. (…) Medium downward causation can be defined as fol-
lows: an entity on a higher level comes into being through a realization of 
one amongst several possible states on the lower level -- with the previous 
states of the higher level as the factor of selection. This idea can be made 
more precise with the aid of an interpretation of the concept of “boundary 
condition.” ...[In the case of weak downward causation] the higher level is 
conceived as an organizational level, characterized by the organization, the 
whole, the pattern, the structure, in short the form into which the constituents 
are arranged. […] it must not be identified with physical or mechanical re-
ductionism; the forms of the higher level are supposed to be non-reducible. In 
contrast to medium downward causation it is characterized by not admitting 
the special interpretation of boundary conditions as constraining conditions, 
and hence it does not allow the possibility that several higher level phenome-
na correspond to one and the same lower level phenomenon. 
 
Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt opt for the third kind, although I believe 
that developments in future scientific investigation could make the first or 
the second one more palatable. Anyway, no matter which kind of downward 
causation one decides to choose, this concept could be a good starting point 
to unify the bulk of knowledge about human beings that natural and social 
sciences – from neurosciences to genetics, from psychology to anthropology, 
to linguistics, to sociology, and so forth – are collecting. This goal could be 
achieved by offering to those disciplines a common vocabulary and a com-
mon web of concepts. A similar attempt was already pursued in the first half 
of the Twentieth Century by the school of philosophical anthropology 
(Scheler 1928, Plessner 1928, Gehlen 1940, Cassirer 1944), and maybe the 
time for a new, perhaps less pretentious attempt is coming – and actually 
some attempts in this direction are already underway (see for example Mur-
phy, Ellis and O'Connor 2009). From this viewpoint, I would like to suggest 
that a philosophical problem worthy to be read within this emergentistic 
mainframe could be that of free will. 
Almost as old as philosophy itself, the debate about existence and nature 
of free will – which continental philosophy sometimes perceives as some-
thing belonging to the Middle Ages and out of fashion – is alive and vital on 
the analytic side of philosophical speculation. And, among the many philo-
sophical problems faced by contemporary thought, free will is one of the 
most interdisciplinary – as it probably lies at the heart of the debate on hu-
man nature (nature versus nurture, genetics versus environment and so 
forth). And in fact this theme can be approached at least from two, maybe 
three sides. 
Fist of all, we can discuss the existence and nature of free will from a 




ministic worldview, if it is indeterminist in its nature, and so on. Related 
with this approach, we have the problem of moral responsibility, or, put in 
other terms, the compatibility of this or that idea of free will with our social 
and ethical habit to keep human beings accountable for their actions. This 
approach produced a great number of different positions (from compatibil-
ism to incompatibilism, from hard determinism to metaphysical libertarian-
ism, all interwoven in many ways), and involves too many thinkers to name 
here.  
Secondly, we can investigate different scientific fields – like neurosci-
ences, evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, just to name a few – to 
verify if free will really exists. And actually some researchers, like Benjamin 
Libet, cast doubt not only on the existence of free will, but even on the real 
extent of our self-awareness (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl 1983; Libet 
2004). 
Thirdly, some stimulating research is being done – through the tools of 
contemporary psychological investigation – concerning what regular people 
think about themselves in terms of free will, self-agency, self-efficacy and so 
on (see for example: Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist 2009). 
Although the problem of the nature and coherence of free will, and the 
problem of real existence of free will, are and should be treated as separate 
problems, I think there are a few topics and arguments inside one or the oth-
er battlefield which are interdisciplinary in nature. For instance, at a certain 
point the supporters of an incompatibilist and libertarian take on free will 
tried to provide some evidence to their view quoting quantum physics’ inde-
terminism as a possible source of our free volition. The main proponent of 
this approach – which is indeed fascinating – is Robert Kane, who in his 
book Free Will and Values talked about “probability bubbles” at the roots of 
human volition (see Kane 1985). Far from being satisfied by Kane’s view, 
some philosophers criticized the alleged usefulness of quantum indetermin-
ism in this debate. According to Derk Pereboom neither determinism nor in-
determinism account for free will (Pereboom 2001), and criticism toward the 
quantum interpretation of the latter is expressed also by J. J. C. Smart, who, 
in a famous passage, notes that: “Indeterminism does not confer freedom on 
us: I would feel that my freedom was impaired if I thought that a quantum 
mechanical trigger in my brain might cause me to leap into the garden and 
eat a slug” (Smart 2003). 
In my opinion what matters here is not these quantum physics interpreta-
tions’ soundness, but rather the fact that they utilize concepts and ideas be-
longing to a completely different field, without much discussion about the 
relationship between quantum phenomena and bio-neurological ones – 
which is exactly what an emergentist worldview would and should do. In 
fact, if one decides to endorse a general theory of emergence and to support, 
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say, a strong view of downward causation, any interpretation of free will in 
the light of quantum mechanics indeterminacy would sound reductionist at 
least, and then should be dropped or revised. In other words, here is my pro-
posal: the emergentist model could work as a tool to test free will not in it-
self, but against the natural order as we know it (the whole body of physical 
laws, the emergentist ladder, and so on). 
Another interesting point is the following. Social sciences and psycholo-
gy provided us with a rich amount of data about many different topics appar-
ently not related to the problem of free will, which actually are connected 
with it in various degrees: for example, we could talk about the nature and 
existence of introspection (which could be seen as a tool to process free de-
cisions), the related topic of meta-cognition, long term planning and – more 
broadly speaking – a theme underlying every specifically human trait, that is, 
abstract symbolic language. I think that an emergentist model offers a 
framework in which we can distribute and accommodate all the growing in-
terdisciplinary knowledge relative to free will provided by social and natural 
sciences. Let us put it in other terms. Neurosciences are providing their own 
take on free will, and some researchers are actually denying it or even sug-
gesting that our thought is mostly unconscious – and therefore outside free 
will’s reach. This is exemplified by the case of Benjamin Libet’s work on 
readiness potential quoted above. So, one could provocatively ask: what’s 
the point in defending, say, a libertarian version of free will if – in the mean-
time – some neuroscientists basically state that it is just an illusion? That is 
why trying to have different fields talking to each other through an emer-
gentistic common ground could be a good and fruitful thing. 
A third point is related to the idea of “degrees of freedom”. One could 
think that free will is not about “all-or-nothing”, that there can be many di-
versified constraints which compel us to talk about “degrees of freedom”. 
This approach is known as “restrictivism”: the idea that only a small number 
of human actions is really “free”. For example Kane talks about “self-
forming actions”, related to moral, all-important decisions difficult to evalu-
ate and take (Kane 2007). Imagining these really “free” actions existing 
along with or fighting against other non-free actions and thoughts could help 
to make sense of an age-old philosophical topic, the problem of the “weak-
ness of the will,” that is, actions taken against our best judgment. And so I 
believe that the emergentist view could allow us to unravel the different 
causes of human actions, partitioning them according to the field and the 
emergent level they belong to, correctly connecting them to each other and 
tidying up this whole topic. Another example could be Harry Frankfurt’s hi-
erarchy of desires (Frankfurt 1971), which could be easily accommodated in 
an emergentist view of the mind. 




ti-deterministic, but also anti-indeterministic), one could find in emergence a 
good setting to locate this apparently counter-intuitive position. Usually the 
inexistence of a third quid between necessity and randomness is taken for 
granted, but some philosophers would like to find a “third way” between de-
terminism and pure chance, in order to save both moral responsibility and 
real freedom, establishing human nature as something completely autono-
mous (causa sui). Easier said than done, but if there is even a small chance to 
achieve this goal, it probably lies in an emergentistic model (incidentally, I 
like this controversial idea of a possible “third way” to free will, although I 
think that, at least for the time being, it retains a certain degree of opacity). 
More generally speaking, we could easily institute a parallelism between 
free will conceptions and downward causation conceptions, to see how many 
different kinds of downward causation are possible with emergentism; if 
they can fruitfully accommodate different takes on free will; and which of 
the latter are compatible with what it is scientifically established about hu-
man beings. 
In the end, what can a theory of emergence do for free will? An emer-
gentist model could provide a frame of reference to systematize all the inter-
disciplinary knowledge about free will, in what can be seen as a program of 
cross-fertilization. It is just a program, but isn’t emergentism intrinsically 
programmatic? 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
Summarizing all the ideas expressed in this paper: 
1. Emergence is back, and this concept can be found in many different 
disciplines. 
2. Although it could seem mainly a scientific notion, it is a philosophical 
one, with a long history. 
3. That is why it should undergo again and again a careful philosophical 
analysis. 
4. It should be considered an ontological notion rather than an epistemo-
logical one, just because pragmatically speaking it confers ontological au-
tonomy to every discipline. 
5. Emergence should not be taken as an ultimate, even arrogant “Theory 
of Everything,” because such an attempt would face many de facto obstacles, 
like the factual impossibility of knowing precisely how many levels of reali-
ty there are, how many there could be, and how many different local ontolo-
gies exist. 
6. There are many philosophical problems related to a theory of emer-
gence still to be adequately answered, such as the nature and possible num-
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ber of upper levels, the implicitly metaphoric nature of some emergentist 
concepts – like the “ladder” – and the ontological source and status of exist-
ing and future levels of complexity. 
7. Emergence should be taken as an ontological and meta-scientific regu-
lative principle of organization, because it is a flexible approach and could 
help philosophy, natural science and social sciences to systematize and or-
ganize the data they are discovering and the theories they are developing lit-
tle by little. Furthermore, this approach could satisfy – first of all, by 
recognizing it – the “human, too human” ambition and burning desire to 
know the truth in its entirety, or at least to come closer and closer to it, and 
certainly to talk about it. 
8. A core concept of the emergentist worldview, downward causation, 
could be useful in accommodating our ever-growing body of knowledge 
about Man; it could also foster interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, accom-
modate many different positions on existence and nature of free will, and test 
them against what we know so far about the nature of life and the physical 
laws of the universe. 
Although the final destination is beyond our grasp, this is a road worth 
traveling. 
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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the article is to initiate a dialogue between sociology and philosophy, in 
order to clarify the relationship between ontology and society, subjectivity and the 
massification process and between the need for meaning and the spread of nihilism. 
The starting points of my analysis are Giddens’ claim that the formation of identity 
in contemporary society requires ontological trust and Touraine’s thesis of the end 
of society which calls for the formation of subjectivity. In the dialogue between phi-
losophers such as Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl 
Jaspers and sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Anthony Giddens 
and Alain Touraine, I reflect on the meaning of ontological trust, the way in which it 
can be achieved and why today it has become central to the sociological debate. The 
fruit of this dialogue is that what was once considered society’s role is now recog-
nized as the burden of the individual himself. For this reason ontological trust is 
fundamental for the formation of a strong and stable identity, for overcoming nihil-
ism and finding new meaning and for the affirmation of the ethic of responsibility. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article I would like to reflect on a series of issues that I consider es-
sential to understand the nature of the social-historical period we live in. I 
would like, in particular, to address the question of the “destiny of modern 





At the beginning of the modern era, man1 had certainties. Rationalization 
and secularization taught him that he was the author of social order, and 
believing in those tools helped free him from the yoke of tradition. Science, 
for instance, gave the impression that one could control nature and with it 
control the development of the forces of production. Politics had secured the 
control of national boundaries and, most of all, the certainty of control of the 
good functioning of democracy. Modern man had built his myths: progress, 
freedom and equality, and thanks to them he thought he would live in the 
golden age. 
From the beginning of modernity until today there have been profound 
changes that have led some philosophers and sociologists to speak of post 
modernity (Lyotard 1979), or of late modernity (Giddens 1990, 1991). Even 
if it is hard to believe that we are at the end of an era and at the beginning of 
a new one, it is evident that the certainties of early modern man have been 
lost by contemporary man who lives in a society where risk rather than secu-
rity is the prevalent condition (Beck 1992), where radical individualism has 
replaced solidarity, where free competition and the ideology of the fittest are 
the new myths. It is not by chance that the British sociologist Anthony Gid-
dens, serious observer of contemporary societies, has mentioned the necessi-
ty to rely on “ontological trust” in order for the individual to face deep 
uncertainties of contemporary society. Or the French sociologist Touraine, 
who believes that only strong subjectivity, which implies self- reflection and 
the strength to accept the responsibility for actions taken, is an answer to the 
end of society. By the end of society Touraine means the end of solidarity 
(Touraine and Khosrokhavar 2000). 
Neither sociologists believe that social struggle is a valid opposition to 
the uncertainties of contemporary society, on the contrary they find the an-
swer in the individual himself. The individual must be able to find in himself 
the security the society does not guarantee as well as the integrity that will 
make him responsible toward himself and the other. For this reason, ontolo-
gy is considered for the first time so crucial in the sociological literature. A 
dialogue with philosophy is then in order, given that ontology has always 
been a philosophical field. I will address in particular the question of how 
ontology and society are connected, in order to clarify how ontological trust 
as well as strong subjectivity can be achieved. My thesis is that the search 
for meaning is what connects the two, and self-reflection is the way mean-
ings are found. 
The Greek tragedies have shown the central role the quest for meaning 
has in one’s life and how it can be fulfilled through the process of self-
reflection (know yourself). Modern man, and more so contemporary man has 
                       
1 I use the term man, and the pronoun he, in the general meaning of human kind.  




lost the capacity for self-reflection because he has been trained to see in-
strumental rationality as the only valid tool for acquiring knowledge. Weber 
has been the main interpreter of the process of rationalization which he saw 
as the main feature of modernity. The main consequence of such one-
dimensionality has been the loss of meaning and the loss of the tragic, which 
is the inability of man to reach that level of reflection where the truth about 
existence is discovered: 
 
Man cannot return to an immediacy without reflection, without losing him-
self: he can, however, follow this path to its end so that rather than succumb 
to reflection, he can reach his own foundation by means of it...Therefore, in-
finite reflection, precisely through its limitlessly mobile dialectic, is the con-
dition of freedom...In this encounter Existence is given to itself as a gift so 
that by giving itself up to infinite reflection, it fully masters it (Jaspers 1986 
[1883-1969], 43-44). 
 
Contemporary man instead finds himself in an iron cage (Weber) 
and nihilism is his answer, confining himself to an existential desert and at 
the same accepting to be part of the mass society which sees the individual 
as a small cog on a big machine: 
 
Today the spirit of religious ascetism- whether finally, who knows?- has es-
caped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical 
foundations, needs its support no longer […] No one knows who will live in 
this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development 
entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas 
and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of 
convulsive self-importance (Weber 2002 [1904-1905], 124). 
 
Weber was inspired by Nietzsche who declared that modern man suffers 
from the problem of giving an answer to that screaming question , ‘To what 
purpose do we suffer?’ (Nietzsche 1956 [1887]). 
In this article I will first of all define the meaning of ontology and its link 
to the social sphere; furthermore, taking off from the reflections of Durk-
heim and Weber, I will move on to consider the social-existential drama of 
contemporary man: being between anomy and the iron cage. I then consider 
how contemporary man can overcome this social-existential condition, and 
become an individual rather being just a member of the masses, with a new 
emphasis on self-reflection and the quest for meanings. These two can save 
contemporary man from being stultified in a condition of ignorance about his 
destiny, believing that the struggle for survival is the only meaning of life 




1. ONTOLOGY: FROM BEING TO EXISTENCE 
Heidegger defines ontology as ‘the doctrine of being’ which deals with gen-
eral definitions of being (Heidegger 1999, 1)2. He further clarifies his idea 
stating that being must be understood as ‘Being in the world’. It is clear that 
for Heidegger the ontological question of being cannot be considered in ab-
stract terms, but rather in relation to socio-historical reality. The main ques-
tion concerns then the relationship between the I and the world. For 
Heidegger the “I” is immersed in the world and understanding his being in 
the world, understands his Dasein (existence). In his act of understanding 
there is also his freedom to transcend the limitations because he can make a 
choice and therefore he can make his existence his own project. 
Heidegger distinguishes between authenticity and inauthenticity. 
The individual who is able to care about his being in the world, therefore ex-
ercising his freedom, is authentic, rather the individual who accepts the limi-
tations, in other words accepts his condition without intervening with his 
own project is inauthentic (Warnock 1970). Being in the world thus means 
both to be determined and at the same time to have the possibility of over-
coming the limitations, which is an act of freedom. 
The philosopher Jaspers further clarifies the relationship between the I 
and the world: 
 
The animal is bound to a natural fate which automatically fulfils itself in ac-
cordance with natural laws. Man is likewise bound but in addition he has a 
destiny the fulfilment of which lies in his own hands. Nowhere, however, do 
we find man as a completely rational being; he is borne along by natural ne-
cessity, which reaches into the furthest ramifications of his reason. In earlier 
centuries the imagination of men conceived of angels as pure intelligence. 
Man, however, is himself neither animal nor angel; he shares the condition of 
both but the existence of neither (Jaspers 1968 [1923], 8). 
 
For Jaspers, one’s possibility to fulfil his destiny is also the reason for his 
fragility since freedom gives him infinite possibilities which could be the 
cause of illness: 
 
Here the incompleteness and vulnerability of human beings and their freedom 
and infinite possibilities are themselves a cause of illness. In contrast with an-
imals, man lacks an inborn, perfected pattern of adaptation. He has to acquire 
                       
2 The reflection on being has a long philosophical tradition. I consider only those authors who 
have emphasized the relationship between the ontological sphere and the socio-historical 
conditions. 
 




a way of life as he goes along. Man is not merely pattern, he patterns himself. 
In so far as he is merely pattern, he is nearer to the animals (Jaspers 1968 
[1923], 8). 
 
Jaspers then uses the concept of psyche for describing the experience of 
Being in the world: 
 
Psyche is not to be regarded as an object with given qualities but as ‘being in 
one’s own world’, the integrating of an inner and outer world’: “among these 
categories is that of life as an existence in its own world since all life reveals 
itself as a continuous interchange between an inner and an outer world (Jas-
pers 1968 [1923], 12). 
 
Jaspers’ definition of being in one’s world adds one aspect with respect to 
Heidegger: he clarifies the relationship between the inner and the outside 
world, putting emphasis on the experience (psyche) rather than on action 
(caring). For Heidegger, in fact, the individual is ‘thrown into world’ (Ver-
fallenstein) and he is able to make his Dasein (existence) through an act of 
caring for the world3. 
Jaspers’ analysis clarifies the central points that interface the relationship 
between the ontological and the social sphere: first the fact that the individu-
al existence develops as a continuous interchange between an inner and an 
outer world, and it is in this exchange that the meaning of existence is found; 
then, the recognition that man shapes his own destiny making choices and 
therein lies his freedom: finally, the recognition that to make choices man 
faces infinite possibilities which may cause illness. For Jaspers then the 
question is not authenticity vs. inauthenticity, but between freedom and ill-
ness. 
The analysis of the two philosophers have shown that the individual is 
not totally controlled and shaped by society. Freedom lies in the I (con-
science), in the ontological sphere, however, the I is immersed in the world, 
therefore must relate to it in order to live his own freedom. The relationship 
between the ontological and the social dimensions is then crucial because it 
is where the individual can overcome his given destiny in order to become 
the creator of his own destiny, within certain limits. 
In conclusion, ontology is that sphere where man stands before infinite 
possibilities which require that he make a choice. In making the choice he 
experiences freedom, because he exercises his will as a project. Socio-
historical reality however is where the infinite possibilities and the act of 
making a choice finds limits that cannot be avoided or ignored since socio-
                       
3 Already the Greeks have recognized the central role played by the psyche, also called the 




historical conditions are the necessary ground on which his will can be exer-
cised and his project realized. For this reason it is not possible to speak of 
man’s project in general terms, but to define it with respect to the socio-
historical conditions in which he lives4. 
The Greek tragedies represent clearly the link between the ontological 
and the social. They represent the drama of the individual who is forced to 
confront the choices he has made given certain socio-historical conditions, 
that is, the pattern he has chosen for his life, and the unexpected conse-
quences of his choices. For this reason, the Greeks used the word destiny for 
describing human existence. 
Man’s existence has its roots in both the ontological sphere where there 
lies the freedom of the individual and in the social realm, where the con-
straints are. The ontological and the social are then strictly related, to deny 
one means to give a partial view of man’s existence. 
2. DURKHEIM: SOCIETY AS SUI GENERIS ENTITY 
Sociologists have rephrased the link between the ontological and social 
sphere in terms of the relationship between the individual and society. This 
question is at the centre of Durkheim’s sociological analysis. He recognizes 
a primacy of society arguing that the individual needs society because with-
out its norms and rules, and, above all, without society in its symbolic di-
mension, man would be in chaos. 
For Durkheim man has two parts: the materialistic part and the spiritual 
part. The former is dominated by infinite desires which must be controlled 
by the latter. The spiritual part comes into life through the internalization of 
society as a sui generis entity. With the expression sui generis entity Durk-
heim wants to underline the symbolic nature of society. He explains it argu-
ing that the symbolic is triggered by the feelings of gratitude which 
transform the group into a sacred entity. 
Given that it is the individual conscience that can attribute a symbolic 
meaning to something, we can argue that even though Durkheim wants to 
avoid recognizing an independent role of the individual conscience, and for 
this reason most of his critics have accused him of social determinism, he is 
forced to bring it in as the place where the group’s transfiguration into a sa-
cred entity occurs. He does not speak of freedom and choices, but of the in-
                       
4 The question of the relevance of ontological trust is also present in the psychoanalytic litera-
ture. Particular authors such as Erik Erikson (1963), Peter Laing (1963 [1950]), have ad-
dressed the fundamental importance of the formation of trust as result of the interaction with 
the mother. In such interaction they also see the beginning of a social relationship. 




dividual need to be connected to a superior entity, which inspires respect and 
submission, both expressions of the feeling of the sacred. Even though 
Durkheim does not mention the ontological sphere, de facto he introduces it 
because the ontological sphere is where the capability for transfiguration is, 
which is the feeling of the sacred. 
The role of the sacred in the formation of the social bonds between the 
individual and society emerges very well in his work The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life (1965 [1912]). Durkheim was a structuralist, he believed 
that, in spite of social changes, certain structures remain the same. This is 
particularly true of the fundamental connection between the individual and 
society. In order to explain it, he thought it better to analyse this relationship 
in primitive society where it was still very strong. The social life of primitive 
man was grounded in the sacred, whereas modern man has a far weaker con-
nection with it and for this reason where once there were social ties there is 
now individualism, where once there were meaning now there are patholo-
gies. Pushed by his commitment to construct sociology as a science (Jones, 
1998), he saw the source of the sacred in the group’s ties, however group ties 
could have such role only if perceived as sacred. Nevertheless, for Durkheim 
individual consciousness is grounded on collective consciousness therefore 
he denies the existence of the ontological sphere as separate from the social 
one5. There is then in Durkheim’s theory of society as a sui generis entity a 
twist that partially legitimizes the criticism of him as being a reductionist. 
However, I believe that the definition of society as a sui generis entity and 
social fact as res lose their deterministic character if interpreted in a phe-
nomenological way, as the following quotation illustrates: ‘It is the Sache, 
res, the question that must be analyzed, as it presents itself, not in its factu-
ality, on the contrary in its essentiality’ (Bello 1992, 29). 
The closeness to the phenomenological view emerges also if we consider 
the development made by Edith Stein, pupil of Husserl, with respect to the 
phenomenological method. Edith Stein, in her seminal work on empathy that 
she developed in her dissertation, moves Husserl’s emphasis from the tran-
scendental ego to the relation with the other6. 
Edith Stein wrote her dissertation in 1911, the year Durkheim wrote his 
“Communication to the International Congress of Bologna”, where he clari-
fies the difference between value and reality judgment. The following year, 
                       
5 The relationship between a symbol of the sacred and the formation of positive feelings is 
also present in the work of C.G. Jung. Both authors share the idea that the symbol of the 
sacred creates inner unity, and reinforces the sense of identity. 
6 “In her dissertation on empathy, done under Husserl’s supervision, she accepts the method 
elaborated by her teacher and she applies it in a genial way, above all if we think of her young 





he published The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912. Even though 
from two different perspectives they both underline the link between con-
science and feelings, between conscience and the relationship to the other 
(Stein 1989 [1917]). 
Even if Durkheim speaks of collective feelings and not of a dyad, the 
similarities with the German philosopher lie in the recognition of the link be-
tween conscience and feelings. St. Augustine and the medieval mystics, who 
also underlined the relationship between love and conscience, between God 
and conscience, already saw such a link. In their understanding, the spiritual 
man prevails over rational man, and conscience is not grounded in Cartesian 
doubt but on feelings. 
The same view is shared by a few critics of modernity, for instance 
Simone Weil, the French philosopher who was trained in the Cartesian 
method, which she abandoned for mysticism and the rediscovery of spirit 
beside reason (Weil 1999). The same view was shared by the Spanish phi-
losopher Maria Zambrano who in her book Man and the Divine, sustains that 
at the origin of perception there is the sacred: “There are yet neither “things” 
nor beings in this situation; they become visible only after the gods appear 
and have been given names and shapes. Gods seem to be, then, a form of 
agreement with reality” (2001, 26). Zambrano continues her reflections say-
ing: […] the initial primal relationship of man with the divine does not occur 
in reason, but in delirium. Reason will channel delirium into love’. Further, 
she adds: ‘the supremacy of psychiatry coincides with the sacred, the divine 
not yet revealed’ (2001, 24). 
Durkheim’s emphasis on religion thus means for him the refusal of the 
Cartesian view and of the materialistic view. His evaluation of primitive 
man, because of his roots in the sacred, is an implicit critique of modern 
man, who has lost such roots. Moreover, Durkheim, valuing the religious 
life of primitive man, has refused a linear view of history, and with it the 
idea that modernity is the most advanced stage of humankind and has noth-
ing to learn from the past. On the contrary, modern man, according to Durk-
heim, must rediscover the primitive man in himself in order to go back to 
his roots, to the deep emotional ties with the group, to the sacred, even 
though the idea of the sacred might have a different content. 
The Jewish man, grounded in the Old Testament, discovers the New Tes-
tament, and with it the idea that law is connected to deep feelings of com-
munion. Durkheim’s reductionism is thus only apparent. 
3. INDIVIDUALISM AND THE CULT OF MAN: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION? 
Durkheim’s deep interest in Religion emerges in the letter that he sent to the 




English priest, Simon Deplaige, Durkheim’s contemporary, who attacked 
him on a series of articles published by the Revue Neoscolastique. Deplaige 
accused Durkheim of having raised society to a level superior to that of the 
individual. Durkheim answered the English priest with a series of letters he 
wrote to the editor in which he underlines the profound impact his discovery 
of the role religion plays in society had on him. After making this discovery 
in 1895, his way of thinking changed: “This reorientation was entirely due to 
the studies of religious history which I had just undertaken, and notably to 
the reading of the works of Robertson Smith and his school’ (Durkheim 
1907, 612-613). 
He accused then, Modernity, with its loss of roots, with its separation of 
feelings from reason, of causing social and individual neurosis. This is ex-
plained by Durkheim as the fading of the link between the individual and the 
group, between the individual and the symbolic. He defines this situation 
with the concept of anomy; one of the main symptoms is the increased rate 
of suicides (Durkheim 1951 [1897], 924). 
Bellah in his introduction to Durkheim’s sociology of morality poses the 
question whether for Durkheim the increase in suicides might be a symptom 
of a pathological society. The American sociologist recognizes that Durk-
heim considers it a sign of sickness of modern society, together with the ap-
pearance of pessimism. He concludes that for Durkheim the problem is one 
of meaning, of man knowing the purpose of his existence and of legitimate 
standards for judging his own actions (Bellah, 1973, p. xxx). Durkheim, the 
scientist, has never been separated from the social reformer, who believed 
that history can not go backward and for this reason saw the good side of 
individualism. Given that individualism fosters the cult of the individual a 
new religion can develop which can renew the feeling of the sacred: 
 
Society has consecrated the individual and made him pre-eminently worthy 
of respect. His progressive emancipation does not imply a weakening but a 
transformation of the social bonds. The individual does not tear himself from 
society but is joined to it in a new manner, and this is because society sees 
him in a new manner and wishes this change to take place (Durkheim 1924, 
72). 
 
The cult of man helps the individual to overcome his egoistic attitudes 
and to reach a level that obliges him to come out of himself and relate to 
others: 
 
If, moreover, we remember that the collective conscience is becoming more 
and more a cult of the individual, we shall see what characterizes the morality 
of organized societies, compared to that of segmental societies…It only asks 




ty… (Durkheim 1947 [1893], 407-408). 
 
Even though Durkheim does not speak of subjectivity or self-reflection, 
he is forced to see that the features of modernity require that the individual 
himself become more aware of the need to respect the other and to be just 
with the others. Before, Durkheim saw society having such role, but with 
the affirmation of individualism he was forced to accept that the same role 
can only be fulfilled by the individual conscience, without an external au-
thority. 
4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW: THE LOSS OF TRAGIC AND NIHILISM 
The analysis of the ontological drama and how nihilism is the answer to it in 
modern times has been carried on by the existentialist philosophers, among 
whom I focus on Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Jaspers. The analysis of Nie-
tzsche’s and Jaspers’ are particularly relevant given that their works have 
deeply influenced Max Weber’s analysis of modernity and his claim that 
modern man is living in an iron cage. 
Nietzsche’s main thesis is that the culture of the tragic ended with Socra-
tes and it has meant the separation from the tragic and consequently the loss 
of roots. Socrates in fact claimed the superiority of reason over the tragic and 
mythical culture (Nietzsche 2000 [1872]). For Nietzsche the tragic is man’s 
deep experience of the truth of human existence: pain. Pain is the result of an 
intrinsic inner disunity, represented in the Greek mythology with Dionysius, 
who symbolizes a primeval status of division and dismemberment. The 
Greek’s pessimistic view, for Nietzsche, is the truth of life (Nietzsche 2000 
[1872]). 
The Socratic epistemological revolution was followed by another im-
portant epistemological revolution, the advent of the Judeo-Christian view, 
which created a divided conscience whose main imperative is no longer the 
will to power but guilt lived as sin and the need to expiate it. Ancient man 
was at one with his conscience; thus, the main imperative was “know your-
self”, and the main acknowledgment was the recognition that the tragic is the 
essence of life. Christianity has replaced the tragic with the idea of salvation, 
substituting the Greek pessimistic view with guilt and the fear of sin 
(Niezsche 1956 [1887]. 
With the advent of modernity, another epistemological revolution oc-
curred. Gradually, the knowledge that God is dead replaced the Cristian faith 
with nihilism. Nevertheless, man cannot endure nihilism. He must find a 
way to discover new values and with them to reach a new meaning of life 
(Nietzsche, 1995 [1883-1891]. 




Kierkegaard has also analysed the consequences of the process of secu-
larization and rationalization in Modern Times. He argued that modernity 
has left the individual entirely to himself, making him believe that he is his 
own creator: a belief that has transformed guilt into sin, and pain into re-
morse. This nullifies the tragic (Kierkegaard 1959 [1843], 147). Anxiety has 
replaced it, feeling the entirety of his sorrow at the present moment, and his 
pain is without meaning. The main consequence is madness: 
 
Anxiety is in this sense a truly tragic category, and the old saying: quem deus 
vult perdere, primum dementat, in truth rightfully applies here (Whom the 
God would destroy he first makes mad (Kierkegaard 1959 [1843], 152-153). 
 
Both philosophers recognize that man’s deepest experience is an experi-
ence of chaos, of disunity, which means deep pain and loneliness which can 
be overcome thorough the transvaluation of values, that is the overman (Nie-
tzsche), or through a leap of faith (Kierkegaard). 
Kierkegaard illustrates how the leap of faith saves one from anxiety in his 
book Fear and Trembling. In his poetic philosophical style he evokes Abra-
ham’s anxiety, which represents the acceptance of surrender to an unknown 
will. Abraham’s act of trust is the leap of faith thanks to which he conquers 
what he was afraid to lose: Isaac’s life. Together with Isaac’s life Abraham 
obtains the deep transformation of his conscience: the unknown becomes the 
infinite, the experience of nothingness is transformed into the experience of 
the divine and chaos is now cosmos, universe and firmament. Such a miracle 
can occur thanks to man‘s capacity to trust the unknown, that is thanks to a 
leap of faith. Ontological trust and faith go together: “Yet Abraham believed 
and did not doubt, he believed the preposterous” (Kierkegaard 1973 [1844], 
35). Abraham, Kierkegaard says, was the tragic hero who did not say a 
word: 
 
He remained true to his love. But he who loves God has no need of tears, no 
need of admiration, in his love he forgets his suffering, yea, so completely 
has he forgotten it that afterwards there would not even be the least inkling of 
his pain if God Himself did not recall it, for God sees in secret and knows the 
distress and counts the tears and forgets nothing. So either there is a paradox, 
that the individual as the individual stands in an absolute relation to the abso-
lute/or Abraham is lost ( Kierkegaard 1973 [1844], 35). 
 
Faith allows for the formation of the inner relationship grounded on the 
inner relationship with the Other, bringing feelings of communion with him-
self and with the Other. At this point the connection between tragic and on-
tology is clearer. The ontological level, being the place where deep emotions 




inner transformation and the emergence of the spiritual man as opposed to 
the natural man, and the world as a spiritual entity. 
Sophocles in his trilogy showed the process of transformation of the natu-
ral man into the spiritual man, from inner disunity to inner unity and to the 
feeling of communion with the Other. In his first tragedy, he describes the 
moment in which the natural man, Oedipus the King, confronts his sins. It is 
a tragic moment in which there is no salvation. Deep emotion characterizes 
it, for self-knowledge is not gained without deep pain (Sophocles 1941 [456 
b.c.]). In the following tragedy, Oedipus at Colonus, Sophocles describes the 
process of inner transformation, so where once there was a guilty man, there 
is now a transformed man who has accepted his sins and has found the deep 
meaning of his life. After years of peregrination, Oedipus is ready to find a 
place that he can call his home. He finds it at Colonus, which is part of 
Athen’s territory. Oedipus dies a member of the Athenian community. Leav-
ing Thebes, he was homeless, as a sign of his guilt, now a re-born man he 
had a home, a community to which he belonged. 
Freud, who more than anybody else has taken into consideration the role 
of instincts, has described human destiny governed by the laws of nature 
with the Oedipus myth. Man can be saved from it through culture. Unfortu-
nately, Freud opposes natural man to the rational man (where there was the 
Id there will be the Ego) and in this way he denies the existence of an onto-
logical drama that man lives beyond the instinctive level (Freud 1989 
[1923]). 
Jaspers has also devoted a great deal of his philosophical work to the 
question of the tragic (Jaspers 1953). Through the analysis of Kierkegaard’s 
and Nietzsche’s ideas, whom he sees as addressing the same questions and 
formulating the same view, he underlines the connection between the loss of 
the tragic and the drama of modern man: 
 
Thus in their basic substance they have in common a historical judgement 
about their time. They see the impending nothingness, but both possess 
knowledge of the substance of what was lost... [What is lost is] “infinite re-
flection” through which man can reach the authentic Existence. Modern man 
is left with a form of reflection that is “reasoning without commitment, ... 
dissolution of all authority, …abandonment of all content that gives to 
thought measure, aim, and meaning; in this way, having become an indiffer-
ent game of the intellect and with nothing to restrain it, reason now fills the 
world with noise and dust (Jaspers 1986 [1883-1969], 42-43). 
 
The tragic, on the contrary, is the ceaseless pursuit of the answers to 
questions, and such questions, What is man?, What leads him on, What is 
guilt? What is fate? What are the ordinations valid among men, and where 




do they come from? What are the Gods?, are directed to the gods . Such in-
cessant questioning does not make the person merely a spectator, but a man 
who is personally involved and for this reason he discovers his limits, his re-
sponsibility, his guilt and his pain. Tragic knowledge, as Jaspers recognizes, 
makes man free because he leaps into transcendence where he finds mean-
ing. The primacy of rationality has separated man from his deep roots, where 
he had to confront pain and disunity, but at the same time he would be in-
volved in a cathartic process that would make him aware of his limits giving 
him however the possibility to transcend them (Jaspers 1953, 34-36). The 
process of transcendence is not the result of the work of Gods and of faith, 
rather the result of the process of self-reflection thanks to which man experi-
ences the deep contradictions of human existence, the antinomies of which 
human existence is made: between freedom and limits, between choices and 
constraints. 
The loss of the tragic, denounced by both the philosophers means the loss 
of the ontological experience, that is, the only one that would make him feel 
that he knows himself. In the process of knowing one’s self, of self-
discovery he also finds himself. On the contrary, the process of rationaliza-
tion forces modern man to think only in an instrumental way, searching for 
rational-technical solutions rather than seeking a reason to exist and a reason 
to overcome one’s self, one’s limits. This is his iron cage. 
5. MAX WEBER AND THE IRON CAGE: THE PHILOSOPHER STATES THE 
PROBLEM; THE SOCIOLOGIST MUST FOLLOW THROUGH 
Weber, besides being a sociologist, was also an economist, an historian, and 
a philosopher. He had a deep philosophical view that influenced his socio-
logical view (Jaspers 1965 [1937])7. He believed in fact that sociology’s 
main goal is to understand the meaning of social actions given that man’s 
search for meaning is the center of man’s existence. Weber analysed the des-
tiny of modern man looking at the process through which meanings are 
formed. Contrary to Durkheim, he has never defined himself as a positivist; 
his epistemological interest has been to frame sociology as one of the sci-
ences of the spirit. In order to avoid introspection, he has chosen history as 
the ground for understanding the origin and the development of the spirit; 
that is, of that original relationship through which man finds fundamental 
meaning. 
In his book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (1904-
                       
7 Jaspers was a good friend of Weber. At Weber’s death he wrote a necrology in which he 




1905), Weber analyzes the existential condition of modern man in the early 
phase of capitalism. He links the origin of capitalism and its early develop-
ment to the development of the Spirit of Capitalism. He defines it a rational 
conduct of life that assumes the nature of a vocation. The historical reason 
for the formation of this type of personality is the rise of the Protestant Ethic 
(Weber 2002 [1904-1905]). In his book Max Weber and Thomas Mann, 
Goldman maintains that for Weber and for Mann the idea of “a calling” is 
central to understanding the formation of the “occidental personality” (1988, 
4). Both authors went back to the original idea of “a calling” as work done to 
serve God, and they thought that it was this idea that gave the first genera-
tion of capitalists the meaning of their existence. 
With the development of the process of rationalization, however, the in-
ner worldly ethic loses its original meaning concerned with the question of 
salvation, because the instrumental reason becomes dominant, completely 
separate from the fundamental questions. This has also implied a process of 
disenchantment that has replaced the meaning of calling in service to God to 
the secularized notion of work causing a transformation in both individual 
and collective life. It has caused the loss of meaning and the spread of nihil-
ism (Goldman 1988, 2). 
Thomas Mann in his novel Buddenbrooks describes the transformation 
that occurred from the first generation of capitalists to the third 8. The found-
er of the dynasty was primarily a man of faith and secondarily a capitalist, 
while his grandson, Thomas, the last capitalist of the family, loses his faith 
and consequently his role as capitalist does not give him any reason to live. 
Mann describes Thomas as a man divided between his narcissism, which 
causes him to give importance to the material symbols of his wealth, and his 
nihilism, which leads him to find solace in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The 
capitalist who found meaning in life seeing his work as a vocation is dead 
and by the third generation has been replaced by a divided man who even 
though haunted by nihilism struggles to accept it as his only creed. However, 
he knows that such a struggle is in vain because emptiness is his new dimen-
sion: 
 
                       
8 Harvey Goldman in his book on Max Weber and Thomas Mann justifies the comparison of 
the work of a sociologist and a writer in the following way: ‘We are accustomed to seing the 
discourse of social science and literature as quite distinct, concerned in different ways with 
different issues of “outer” world and “inner” world, the one focusing on explaining empirical 
“reality”, the other on “fictional” explorations or representations of themes from that reality. 
But this distinction is unfortunate and artificial, especially for an approach to social science 
that is interpretative rather than causal in its orientation. Such an approach must rely on a 
broader range of cultural experience and expression and a wider set of themes to do its work’. 
(1988, 16). 




In his hours of gloom- and they were frequent-Thomas Buddenbrooks would 
ask himself what sort of man he really was and what could still justify his 
seeing himself as something better than any of his simple-hearted, plodding, 
and small-minded fellow citizens. The imaginative élan and cheerful idealism 
of youth were gone. To play at work, to work at play, to strive, to direct one’s 
self-serious, half-whimsical ambition toward goals to which one ascribes on-
ly symbolic value – that requires a great deal of vigour, humour, and a breezy 
kind of courage  for debonair, sceptical compromises and ingenious 
half-measures; but Thomas Buddenbrooks felt indescribably weary and list-
less… Because, as soon as he began to think of the end of life as something 
more than a distant, theoretical, and minor necessity and regarded it, instead, 
as imminent and tangible, as something for which one must make immediate 
preparations, he began to brood, to search himself, to examine how things 
stood between him and death and what he thought about matters beyond this 
earthly life. And at his very first attempt to do so, what he found was hope-
less immaturity and a soul unprepared for death….No, when it came to ulti-
mate and highest questions, there was no help from outside - no mediation, 
no absolution, no soothing consolation…before it was too late, he must either 
achieve some clear readiness for death, or die in despair (Mann 1993 [1901], 
593, 631-632). 
 
Thomas Buddenbrooks’ loneliness is so deep because there are no longer 
any shared values and consequently each person is imprisoned within his 
own walls. Even a relationship with his wife and son is prevented by the 
fact that neither shares the values in which he has grown up: “earnest, pro-
found, remorseless, to the point of self-flagellation” (Mann 1993 [1901], 
632). The difference between Thomas’s values and those of his wife and 
son reflects the discrepancy in Thomas’ conscience between the world of 
his ancestors based on Beruf, i.e. hard work and accumulation in the hope of 
salvation, and his inner world which by now is very unstable because it is 
no longer connected to any belief or Weltanschauung. 
The decadence from the first to the last generation becomes very clear in 
Hanno, Thomas’s son. Hanno is reminiscent of the romantic heroes of late 
XIX century and beginning XX century; for them sensitivity is all they 
have, and for this reason it has become a cause of weakness rather than a 
force of inspiration. Mann, influenced by Goethe, portrays Hanno as a per-
son sick in his spirit, unable to find a place in this world, as the following 
words show: 
 
I just want to go to sleep and not have to deal with it. I want to die, Kai! No, I 
won’t amount to anything. I can’t even bring myself to want anything. I do 
not want to be famous. The idea scares me, as if it meant doing something 





Hanno may represent the man of late modernity whose crisis of identity 
reflects the crisis of values of the nation. This is pointed out by Weber and 
Mann as well. They believe that the existential crisis of the individual and 
the crisis of values of a nation go together; one recalls the other, in other 
words they are dialectically related. For instance, values for Weber are col-
lectively defined, however it is the individual conscience that will chose 
which values to make his own. Neither of them, society or individual, can 
do without the other. 
With the decline of consciousness of the bourgeois of the first genera-
tion, the man of virtue, the heirs confront meaninglessness because in a ma-
terialistic culture stultification takes the place of the existential inner 
dialogue for the search for meaning. In his essay Science as vocation, We-
ber underlines the drama of modern man: the inability to face the profound 
questions of existence: life and death: 
 
Now, this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in Occi-
dental culture for millennia, and, in general, this “process,” to which science 
belongs as a link and motive force, do they have any meanings that go be-
yond the purely practical and technical? One will find this question arise in 
the most principled form in the works of Leo Tolstoy. He came to raise the 
question in a peculiar way; all his broodings increasingly revolved around the 
problem of whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon. His answer 
was: for civilized man death has no meaning (Weber 1994 [1918], 286-287). 
 
Modern man is caught in a crisis of meaning, this includes death. The 
end of modern man’s existence will not coincide with the peak of his wis-
dom; on the contrary it will coincide with the collapse of all his certainties 
and the bitter experience of not leaving any sign behind because, after all, 
most discoveries are temporary. Contemporary man is in fact caught within 
the process of technological change which makes each discovery a precari-
ous result, thus also making existence itself obsolete overall (Weber 1994 
[1918], 287). 
Weber clarifies this point when he compares modern man to Abraham, 
who, on the contrary, could see the meaning of his death and therefore of 
his existence: 
 
Abraham, or some peasant of the past, died “old and satiated with life”, in 
terms of its meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life 
had to offer; because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to 
solve; and therefore he could have had “enough” of life. Whereas civilized 
man, placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, 
knowledge, and problems, may become “tired of life” but not “satisfied with 
life”. He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings 




forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not 
definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And be-
cause death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very 
“progressiveness” it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness (Weber 1994 
[1918], 287). 
 
Weber’s denouncement of the iron cage in which modern man would be 
forced to live is also a denouncement of the formation of the mass man; a 
man who has lost a separate destiny, who has been deprived of his own par-
ticular drama, whose conscience is dominated by ideology and who is fear-
ful to face life as an individual on his own. 
The loss of meaning is not only a drama for the individual; it is also a 
drama for society which is transformed into a dehumanized machine whose 
goal of efficiency can see the extermination of a race as a technical task. 
Bauman in his book Modernity and Holocaust (2001) maintains that the 
Shoah has been possible because of the efficiency of the German bureau-
cracy. Furthermore, the search for meaning was twisted into nationalism 
and the ideology of the supremacy of the race, which both found their main 
expression in the religion of death. Death of the enemy, both outside the 
country and inside the country. The connection with the transcendental was 
thus replaced by the values promulgated from the religion of death: war, 
violence and aggression. 
6. BEYOND NIHILISM: LOOKING FOR A REASON TO EXIST 
If we draw conclusions from the ideas advanced by the authors I have ana-
lyzed in the previous sections, we see that all of them conceive of a strong 
subject that can bring about cultural renewal: a man of faith for Kierkegaard; 
a man able to go beyond his time and his limits (overman) for Nietzsche; a 
tragic man who centres his existence on ‘infinite reflection’ for Jaspers; a 
charismatic leader capable of bringing new values and, then meanings for 
Weber, a man who has man as his main value, for Durkheim. 
All these ideal types have one trait in common: inner trust (ontological 
trust) and the need to find new values that allow modern man to go beyond 
nihilism. In fact, for Kierkegaard, Abraham is a man of faith because he has 
been able to trust God; Nietzsche also evokes trust when he reclaims the 
human above all: man as the highest value, and most of all, man in search of 
himself (“you sought the heaviest burden and you found yourself- it is a bur-
den you cannot throw off…”), who for Jaspers, becomes a man of infinite 
reflection through which he reaches authentic Existence. Weber translates 




reflective man of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jaspers, becomes the charis-
matic leader, who announces new values and with them a new culture is cre-
ated that will give a meaning to life again. The same is true for the man who 
believes in the religion of the individual, which implies a trust in Man, there-
fore he must find trust in himself. 
The belief in ontological trust has replaced the belief in progress. Neither 
the sociologists nor philosophers, that I have considered, believe blindly in 
progress, the myth of modernity. All of them see and denounce that techno-
logical discoveries and rationalization cause problems in man’s existence as 
well as in society. Weber, for instance, denounces the danger of being 
trapped in an iron cage because the needs of social organization have be-
come stronger than man’s individual needs. The domination of instrumental 
reason has forced man to live in a deserted land, where the seeds of inner life 
have been eradicated. Durkheim has interpreted the same loss in terms of 
moral disorientation, which recalls Kierkegaard’s claim of anxiety as the re-
sult of absence of the inner relationship of the “I” with the “I”9, only possible 
in the presence of a relationship with the transcendental. Finally, Nietzsche’s 
idea of eternal present expresses the same denial of progress and change. 
Nietzsche, in particular, is one of the first philosophers who, contrary to 
Hegel, refused the teleological idea of history and substituted the idea of the 
necessity of a continuous confrontation with the roots, the essence of human 
nature, in order to find those values, those aims that could take man beyond 
himself. Zarathustra is the symbol of such a man, able to go beyond himself; 
not super man, then, but “the higher man”, the man who strives for transfor-
mation. For Kierkegaard too, it is not progress that brings freedom, but the 
possibility for man to choose among the infinite possibilities. Freedom in 
fact is an existential condition besides being a political one. The man who 
confronts infinite possibilities and is able to overcome the anxiety that the 
choice implies is the man with a strong subjectivity. As explained by Jaspers 
the condition of having infinite possibilities can also bring illness rather than 
freedom. For the individual to feel free in the face of infinite possibilities it 
is necessary to be able to establish a strong relationship with himself based 
on a dialogue with the ultimate values. This forms a link between the inner 
and the outer world, which cannot be accomplished without the development 
of a feeling of belonging that is a feeling of communion within and with the 
world. 
On the relationship between the inner and the outer world, I find Jasper’s 
reflections on guilt particularly illuminating. Guilt is the other face of anxie-
                       
9 Kierkegaard maintains that inner unity is the result of the formation of the I with the I, which 
can be formed only through the relationship with God. It is this relationship that forms the 
spiritual man (1973).  




ty. It is, like anxiety, an ontological and a tragic category, as Sophocles has 
so brilliantly shown in Oedipus the King. It becomes dominant when 
trust/faith is lacking which causes the death of the soul, as Kierkegaard ar-
gues in his work The Sickness unto Death (1973 [1844]). Guilt is present 
when there is the death of the soul. In other words, when there is no internal 
relationship of the I with the I, which, for Kierkegaard, is possible only if 
there is also a relationship with God/transcendental. Man naturally is in a 
state of disunity, perceived as sin and its arising guilt. 
Nietzsche also gives great importance to guilt seen as the cause of the di-
vided conscience of the Christian man. For the German philosopher, the 
Christian emphasis on guilt has imprisoned man, preventing him to live life 
fully. The man of yes should supersede the guilty man. 
Jaspers went beyond the analysis of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, consider-
ing The Question of German Guilt (2001 [1947]). His first statement is: “ No 
one is guiltless” (Jaspers 2001 [1947], 16), then he moves on to enquire 
about guilt, which means responsibility, individual and collective responsi-
bility. He recognizes that the main problem is “that so many people do not 
really want to think […]” (Jaspers 2001[1947], 16). To think is to deal with 
guilt: “for only consciousness of guilt leads to the consciousness of solidarity 
and co-responsibility without which there can be no liberty” (Jaspers 2001 
[1947], 114-115). The process of self-reflection should be carried on at both 
individual and collective levels. Even though the two are different, the latter 
can occur only by way of the former because a real metamorphosis can occur 
in the individual, in many individuals independent of or mutually inspiring 
one another (Jaspers, 2001 [1947], 96). 
A self-reflective man is not then an egoist, but a man who feels responsi-
ble for all his actions, and sees purification from guilt as “an inner process 
which is never ending but in which we continually become ourselves. Purifi-
cation is a matter of freedom […] the premise of our political liberty” (Jas-
pers 2001 [1947], 114). The formation of the subject thus implies a person 
capable of assuming the responsibility of freedom, conceived as the freedom 
to build his own existence, recognizing the consequences of his actions, 
which are his choices. This means not only the formation of a free and re-
sponsible man but also of a responsible citizen: “For only the pure soul can 
truthfully live in this tension: to know about possible ruin and still remain 
tirelessly active for all that is possible in the world” (Jaspers 2001 [1947], 
116). 
The loss of meaning caused by a culture that puts emphasis only on mate-
rialistic needs and the struggle for survival is then the result of a deep inner 
split between feelings and reason10. Such division means the transformation 
                       




of the ontological level from the siege of emotions and meanings into a res-
ervoir of chaotic feelings that the individual is unable to control. The expres-
sion “the gods have become illness”, uttered by the Swiss psychiatrist and 
psychoanalyst C.G.Jung, means precisely the inability of the individual to 
control and to live meaningfully with his feelings. 
To free modern man from his illness means to free him from solitude 
making him experience the inner unity and the outer community so that feel-
ings can become links, ties, and meanings. This means the creation of a soci-
ety able to recognize that the individual has both material and spiritual 
needs, and to accept that the second is not secondary to the first (Weil 1990 
[1949]). Furthermore, it implies the recognition that new values, and with 
them a new culture, can be formed only by the individual consciousness. It is 
not social struggles, war, class struggle that can save us from the iron cage or 
the desert in which we live. Furthermore, in times of uncertainty and wars all 
over the planet, the question of guilt (everybody is guilty) is a standing ques-
tion. 
7. THE NEED FOR SUBJECTIVITY IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEATH 
OF SOCIETY 
Anthony Giddens and Alain Touraine, following Durkheim and Weber, have 
re-proposed the need to find meaning as the way of overcoming man’s social 
existential condition of uncertainty. Both sociologists see a solution in the 
development of subjectivity and in the formation of a strong identity rather 
than in a collective struggle. They are aware that it is not possible to go back 
to a society where community can replace radical individualism and a collec-
tive struggle can defeat free competition. They are also aware that the new 
social condition exposes the individual not only to loneliness, to the feeling 
of being up-rooted, but also to the problem of a profound disconnectedness 
that is the cause of widespread individual and social pathologies (Graziosi 
2015). Finally they are aware that Durkheim’s theory of the formation of a 
new religion has not taken place, while Weber’s theory of the iron cage is 
more and more present. Even though they share the view of social change, 
they give slightly different interpretations of subjectivity. 
Giddens believes that subjectivity can be formed only in the presence of 
ontological trust. He stated so openly (1991), however he does not believe 
that ontological trust can derive from faith, as for instance Kierkegaard be-
lieved, or from inner dialogue with ultimate values, as Weber thought. His 
                                                      
the personality of contemporary man forced to be flexible by the requests of the market econ-
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answer is secular, more precisely psychological. He relies in fact on Peter 
Laing’s existential view of schizophrenia. 
In his analysis of schizophrenia, the Scottish psychiatrist recognizes onto-
logical trust as the necessary condition for the development of a healthy per-
sonality. He defines ontological trust as the feeling of being an entity that 
exists in time and has a place in space. This condition is what allows a per-
son to be ontologically born, that is, a presence in the world. Without onto-
logical trust the person does not have a strong identity and therefore he will 
never achieve the secure autonomy necessary for internal coherence and to 
form a relationship between the body and the soul (Laing 1990 [1960]). 
Sharing Laing’s view, Giddens maintains that once there is ontological 
trust a strong identity can be formed through self-reflection. This allows to 
recognize a pattern that ties his life together thus gives meaning and coher-
ence to his existence. Contrary to previous society, identity is not formed by 
the internalization of social roles, nor is it stable over time (Mead 1934), but 
is the result of a narrative constructed by the individual himself reflecting on 
the events of his life, finding a continuous thread that gives them a meaning 
(Cavarero 1997). For Giddens, subjectivity coincides with the activity of 
self-reflection. It is Touraine who gives a broader view. 
For Touraine, the main social change is the death of society, that is the 
absence of strong social ties, strong institutions and a system of collective 
values that characterized the previous stages of modernity. Subjectivity is the 
way the individual can face the death of society, which however for him can 
be developed not thanks to faith but through a process of self-reflection that 
expands consciousness and allows for the formation of the ethic of responsi-
bility toward the other. With respect to this latter aspect, Touraine goes back 
to Weber’s idea. Weber was the first to speak of the need for modern man to 
develop the ethic of responsibility in face of the growing individualism. Eth-
ics has its roots in the individual consciousness, while morality has them in 
the collective consciousness present only if society is strong. Touraine be-
lieves that such a result can be achieved thanks to the new culture that is 
emerging with minority movements, in particular with the enhancement of 
women’s culture (Touraine 2004). 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The main result of the dialogue between philosophy and sociology is the 
recognition that the burden to find meaning, to form a strong identity, to 
form subjectivity, is on the individual. A responsible and reflexive subject 
can replace the emptiness left by the death of society. 




moral disorientation, all of which cause inner disconnectedness, and to 
achieve a deep feeling of unity. This social existential condition will allow 
him to conceive of himself as the agent of his own life and therefore to expe-
rience freedom as the will to pursue his goals, without however ignoring the 
presence of social constraints. As the existentialists J.P. Sartre e S. de Beau-
voir maintain, freedom is an ontological aspect and it can be exercised, that 
is have a real experience of it, conceiving existence as a project (Graziosi 
2017). 
The reiteration of the importance of the ontological level by sociologists 
is then mainly due to the new social-existential conditions in which the indi-
vidual can no longer count on collective agents for reaching a better position 
but must confront the growth of inequality, the growth of alienation by him-
self and find the solution in himself. The doubt remains that to build a strong 
subjectivity is a privilege for an elite and not for everyone. It is possible that, 
instead, the future will be a repetition of the past, with the masses becoming 
the protagonist of the revival of populism, going even so far as to pursue au-
thoritarian solutions. Nevertheless, there is always hope that those who are 
able to form a strong subjectivity will denounce the manipulation of the 
masses and work for a culture that increasingly favours the formation of sub-
jects, that is, free responsible individuals. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article traces a brief history of a particularly relevant concept in political econ-
omy and economic sociology: technological unemployment. The historical narration 
aims at covering four centuries, since the beginning of the industrial revolution up to 
the present. As a consequence, it has to be highly selective. It is mainly based on 
sources in the English language and refers only to a few of the many social scientists 
involved in the debate. The scopes of the inquiry are essentially two. The first is to 
show that focusing on technological unemployment as an idea – and not simply as a 
phenomenon – is appropriate, because of the high level of controversy that still 
characterizes the debate. The second is to drive attention to a concept that could be 
extremely useful to understand the technological and societal changes occurring in 
the twenty-first century.11 
1. GENERALITIES 
The concept of technological unemployment is regaining momentum in the 
discourse of economists and economic sociologists. However, when analyz-
ing the debate, what is most surprising is the substantial absence of agree-
ment on the very existence of technological unemployment as a 
phenomenon. Some observers present technological unemployment as a 
sprawling monster that is completely subverting the global economy, while 
others conclude that this picture is just a mirage of doomsayers. Since repu-
table scholars are engaged in the debate, we cannot simply blame the polari-
zation of narratives on the incompetence of one or the other school of 
thought. Even if the definitions of technological unemployment provided by 
different sources do not differ particularly, it has become evident that the 
terms contained in these definitions may assume different meanings depend-
                       
11 Prior to publication in this journal, this article was deposited in the repository of the International 





ing on the theoretical perspective. 
Unemployment is a phenomenon studied by both sociologists and econ-
omists. As Tony Elger (2006: 643) remarks, “[s]ociologists often focus on 
the experience and consequences of unemployment, leaving economists to 
analyze causes. […] However, consideration of the underlying processes that 
generate these patterns of unemployment exposes continuing controversy 
among economists, for example between neoliberal, neo-Keynesian, and 
neo-Marxist analyses of the political economy of contemporary capitalism. 
Thus, economic sociologists have to adjudicate between these different 
causal accounts [...]” 
Unemployment is a complex phenomenon. “Economists distinguish be-
tween frictional unemployment, involving individual mobility of workers be-
tween jobs; structural unemployment, resulting from the decline of particular 
sectors or occupations; and cyclical unemployment, resulting from general 
but temporary falls in economic activity” (ibid.). To this list, one can add 
technological unemployment. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics defines technological unemploy-
ment as follows: "Unemployment due to technical progress. This applies to 
particular types of workers whose skill is made redundant because of chang-
es in methods of production, usually by substituting machines for their ser-
vices. Technical progress does not necessarily lead to a rise in overall 
unemployment” (Black 2012: 405). As one can see, it is a concept that al-
ready includes a theory, since it puts into causal relationship two distinct 
phenomena: technological progress and unemployment. The disagreement 
between the different schools of thought mainly concerns the existence of 
this causal relationship.  
Technological unemployment can be studied at different levels of the 
economic system: at the level of individual actors, companies, productive 
sectors, countries, or global economy. That at least one individual has lost 
his job because the employer or the customer has purchased a machine that 
can accurately perform his/her duties is a fact that can hardly be denied. 
Similarly, it cannot be denied that entire companies have been automated 
and this process has resulted in a drastic reduction of employment inside the 
company. As well as it cannot be denied that, owing to technological innova-
tion, entire economic sectors have been largely emptied of their workforce. 
The transition from traditional agriculture to intensive agriculture, through 
the use of agricultural machinery, herbicides, fertilizers, fungicides, etc., has 
led to demographic emptying of the countryside. The evaporation of jobs in 
the primary sector of the United States of America offers impressive num-
bers: in 1900 41% of the population was employed in agriculture, a century 
later, in 2000, only 2% of Americans still worked in same sector 
(Wladawsky-Berger 2015). A similar phenomenon was observed in the sec-




ondary sector, or manufacturing, at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first 
century. In the United States, the ratio between employment in the factories 
decreased from 22.5% in 1980 to 10% today and is expected further decline 
to below 3% by 2030 (Carboni 2015). Similar situations can be observed in 
other industrialized countries, including Italy (Campa 2014a). 
This emptying of whole sectors of the economy was accompanied by a 
migration of the workforce from one sector to another. A first migration was 
observed from agriculture to manufacturing, a visible phenomenon because 
it also led to a massive migration from rural to urban areas. A second migra-
tion of the labor force, less visible but equally significant, occurred from the 
manufacturing sector to the services sector (Campa 2007). Overall, at least 
so far, the increase in productivity in individual sectors has not resulted in 
the emergence of a permanent and chronic technological unemployment on a 
global level. This does not mean, however, that technological unemployment 
– at least as a temporary or local phenomenon – does not exist. 
It should also be clear that the reabsorption of the unemployed into the 
economy has been possible thanks to two main levers: the first is free mar-
ket, which enabled the birth and development of new sectors of the econo-
my; the second is social and industrial public policies. The fact that both 
forces are at work is often obscured by the fact that observers are largely di-
vided into two tribes: those who worship the Market as an almighty God, 
and those who attribute an analogous divine character to the State. Only 
those who do not profess either ‘religion’ can see that many factors have 
contributed to dampen the phenomenon of technological unemployment. 
Private entrepreneurs have created manufacturing industries and used the 
cheap labor flowing from countryside to city, in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. New enterprising capitalists have created service compa-
nies to redeploy manpower pouring out from factories, in the second half of 
the twentieth century. At the same time, trade unions and socialist political 
parties, through tough political and labor struggles, have succeeded in 
achieving steady reduction of working hours (even a halving of working 
hours, if we consider the period from the nineteenth century to the present), 
retirement and disability pensions, paid holidays, paid sickness, maternity 
leave, and other social rights, which on the whole have forced private em-
ployers to hire more workers than they would have hired in a laissez-faire 
capitalist regime. 
Moreover, the idea that the equilibrium of a national economy is assured 
by the Invisible Hand is belied by the fact that employment crises have 
sometimes been resolved by the mass migration of workers from one country 
to another. This means that it is not written in the stars that capable private 
entrepreneurs and creative people who create new jobs, new companies, or 




are no social and cultural conditions that permit them to arise, the unem-
ployment crisis generated by the introduction of new technologies can be-
come chronic and irreversible in a specific geographical area. Finally, other 
forms of public intervention, such as industrial policies, have contributed to 
cushion the phenomenon. For instance, the creation of public manufactories, 
the nationalization of private companies, public contracts (just think of the 
incidence of military spending in the United States), wars, crime (the prison 
population in the US now exceeds two million individuals), as well as the 
creation of millions of jobs in the public service – jobs that are sometimes 
unnecessary and therefore constitute a permanent masked dole. 
If you consider all these aspects, some of which are ignored by economic 
theory, it seems difficult to deny the existence of technological unemploy-
ment. Somewhat different is the question of whether it is a significant phe-
nomenon on a global scale. From the psychological point of view, being 
replaced by a machine is certainly a big concern for those who lose their 
jobs, even temporarily. But the issue begins to acquire political relevance on-
ly if the proportion of individuals affected by the phenomenon is likely to 
disrupt an entire economic system. Throughout history, different moments 
when the phenomenon of technological unemployment has assumed critical 
proportions were observed. In these periods, the idea of technological unem-
ployment has gained major relevance in the public debate. 
2. LUDDISM: THE FIRST REACTION 
Notoriously, a rather critical moment in European history was the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, and not only for bloody political revolutions 
that accompanied the transformation. In the so-called feudal system, the cre-
ation of work did not constitute a problem, because social mobility was min-
imal. Children inherited the job of their fathers. The children of the farmers 
knew that they would be farmers themselves, or serfs. The children of the 
artisans learned their profession in the workshops of their fathers. The eldest 
son of an aristocratic family inherited the family estate, while his younger 
brothers were initiated in a military or ecclesiastical career. Daughters would 
be wives of men chosen by the father, or nuns. Beggars, robbers, vagabonds, 
prostitutes, and adventurers formed exceptions to the strict rule. In the Mid-
dle Ages, others were the economic concerns: wars, epidemics, famines. A 
serious problem that could arise was rather labor shortages as a result of the-
se phenomena. 
With the transition to capitalism, previously unknown problems arise: in 
particular, overproduction and unemployment. The introduction of machines 
in the production system and social mobility disrupt the traditional concep-




tion of work and life. To many, it appears inconceivable that someone will-
ing to work cannot find a job. So much so that the first reaction of the politi-
cal authorities is to limit the use of the machines where cause 
unemployment. Even mercantilist Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who gave great im-
pulse to the industrialization of France by the creation of so-called Manufac-
tures nationales, passed measures to restrict the use of machines in private 
companies. 
Where the authorities do not intervene, the workers themselves may make 
a fierce and desperate struggle against the machine, of which we find a de-
tailed account in Capital by Karl Marx (1976: 554-555): “In the seventeenth 
century nearly all Europe experienced workers' revolts against the ribbon-
loom, a machine for weaving ribbons and lace trimmings called in Germany 
Bandmühle, Schnurmühle, or Mühlenstuhl. In the 1630s, a wind-driven 
sawmill, erected near London by a Dutchman, succumbed to the rage of the 
mob. Even as late as the beginning of the eighteenth century, saw-mills driv-
en by water overcame the opposition of the people only with great difficulty, 
supported as this opposition was by Parliament. No sooner had Everett con-
structed the first woolshearing machine to be driven by water-power (1758) 
than it was set on fire by 100,000 people who had been thrown out of work. 
Fifty thousand workers, who had previously lived by carding wool, peti-
tioned Parliament against Arkwright's scribbling mills and carding engines. 
The large-scale destruction of machinery which occurred in the English 
manufacturing districts during the first fifteen years of the nineteenth centu-
ry, largely as a result of the employment of the power-loom; and known as 
the Luddite movement, gave the anti-Jacobin government, composed of such 
people as Sidmouth and Castlereagh, a pretext for the most violent and reac-
tionary measures. It took both time and experience before the workers learnt 
to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and there-
fore to transfer their attacks from the material instruments of production to 
the form of society which utilizes those instruments.” 
David F. Noble (1995: 3-23) maintains that the Luddites are not to be 
considered technophobic. When the machinery was introduced in manufac-
tures, the workers destroyed it because of necessity, not because of techno-
phobia. Their choice was limited to three options: 1) starvation for them and 
their families; 2) violence against the uncompassionate owners of the means 
of production; 3) destruction of the means of production. Choosing the third 
option was the mildest way to communicate their discomfort as regards un-
employment. 
The reaction of the political authorities was clearly less mild. Such was 
the incidence of the phenomenon that the English government implemented 
the death penalty for Luddites. The ‘assassination’ of a machine was put on a 




3. CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE FIRST DENIAL 
In spite of the fact that the appearance of machinery produces worrisome so-
cial disorders, economists are reluctant to modify their theories in order to 
make place for technological unemployment. There are just a few excep-
tions. For instance, an attempt at conceptualization is found in James 
Steuart’s book An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy (1767), 
and precisely in chapter XIX (“Is the Introduction of Machines into Manu-
factures prejudicial to the Interest of a State, or hurtful to Population?”). 
Steuart admits that the sudden mechanization of a segment of the production 
can produce temporary unemployment and, therefore, public policies are 
needed to facilitate the absorption of the labor force into other tasks. He is 
still persuaded that the advantages of mechanization outweigh negative side 
effects, but is also convinced that problems do not solve themselves. How-
ever, that of Steuart is an isolated voice.  
Classical economics is dominated by Adam Smith’s optimistic perspec-
tive, which emphasizes the positive effects of mechanization and the self-
regulating nature of market economies. In his masterpiece An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, he provides evidence of a 
causal connection between high taxation and unemployment (Smith 1998: 
1104), or excessive prodigality of the landlords and unemployment (Smith 
1998: 448-449), rather than between the use of machinery and unemploy-
ment. Machinery is mainly seen as a means to increase the productivity of 
laborers: “The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be 
increased in its value by no other means but by increasing either the number 
of its productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who 
had before been employed. […] The productive powers of the same number 
of labourers cannot be increased, but in consequence either of some addition 
and improvement to those machines and instruments which facilitate and 
abridge labour; or of a more proper division and distribution of employment” 
(Smith 1998: 455-456). 
When Smith takes into consideration the possibility of a connection be-
tween the mechanization of labor and the redundancy of laborers, he sees 
this situation uniquely as a chance for capitalists and landlords, and not as a 
problem for the working class: “In consequence of better machinery, of 
greater dexterity, and of a more proper division and distribution of work, all 
of which are the natural effects of improvement, a much smaller quantity of 
labour becomes requisite for executing any particular piece of work, and 
though, in consequence of the flourishing circumstances of the society, the 
real price of labour should rise very considerably, yet the great diminution of 
the quantity will generally much more than compensate the greatest rise 
which can happen in the price” (Smith 1998: 338). 




Afterwards, classical economists developed “the theory that the working 
class is being compensated for initial sufferings, incident to the introduction 
of a labor-saving machine, by favorable ulterior effects” (Schumpeter 2006: 
652).  
Marx baptizes this theory as theory of compensation. Among the fathers 
of the theory, Marx lists James Mill, John McCulloch, Robert Torrens, Nas-
sau W. Senior, and John Stuart Mill. David Ricardo should also be added to 
the list. In synthesis, this theory states that, if new machines allow to save 
labor, manpower will be needed for the production of said machinery. Also, 
if initially the new production processes saves labor, then they boost demand 
and jobs, through the reduction of costs and, therefore, the price of the goods 
offered. Finally, it is hypothesized that there is a perfect identity between in-
come and spending, and therefore the theory assumes that the major reve-
nues arising from the reduction of the workforce in factories and farms will 
result in greater demand for consumer goods by capitalists and landlords, 
which in turn will create new jobs. 
4. THE CONVERSION OF DAVID RICARDO 
If this is so, why do laid-off workers get so angry? Evidently, even admitting 
that there is a medium-term or long-term compensation of losses, the short-
term effects are devastating for a social class that has no capital or assets. 
For those who live for the day, and perhaps have many children to support, 
even a few weeks unemployment can be lethal. If we consider that, in order 
to find a new job, the proletarian must sometimes emigrate, leaving loved 
places and people, or accept a less satisfying and less remunerated job, while 
he or she sees his or her former employer getting richer thanks to the new 
machinery, his or her backlash appears less mysterious. 
It is for this reason that the great economist David Ricardo, in 1821, de-
cided to bring the issue of technological unemployment into economic theo-
ry. It must be said that, initially, Ricardo not only remained in the wake of 
classical economics, denying the issue and arguing that the introduction of 
machinery is beneficial to all social classes, but had also produced what 
Blaug (1958: 66) has called “the first satisfactory statement of the theory of 
‘automatic compensation’.” Subsequently, however, disorienting his own 
followers, “Ricardo retracted his former opinion on the subject” (Kurz 
1984). In the third edition of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, published in 1821 – and precisely in Chapter XXXI, “On Machin-
ery” – one can indeed find both the admission of the conversion and a clear 
formulation of the idea of technological unemployment. 




opinions on this question because they have, on further reflection, undergone 
a considerable change: “Ever since I first turned my attention to questions of 
political economy, I have been of opinion, that such an application of ma-
chinery to any branch of production, as should have the effect of saving la-
bour, was a general good, accompanied only with that portion of 
inconvenience which in most cases attends the removal of capital and labour 
from one employment to another.” 
The English economist proceeds by summarizing the theory of compen-
sation. Afterwards, he states that these “were” his opinions on the matter. 
More precisely, Ricardo (1821: 283) states that his opinions “continue unal-
tered, as far as regards the landlord and the capitalist;” but now he is con-
vinced “that the substitution of machinery for human labour, is often very 
injurious to the interests of the class of labourers.”  
That this injury concerns both salaries and employment chances is de-
clared a few pages later. First, he provides examples based on numbers. 
Then, he concludes as follows: “All I wish to prove, is, that the discovery 
and use of machinery may be attended with a diminution of gross produce; 
and whenever that is the case, it will be injurious to the labouring class, as 
some of their number will be thrown out of employment, and population will 
become redundant, compared with the funds which are to employ it” (Ricar-
do 1821: 286). Historians of economics often underline the importance of 
this step. For instance, Heinz D. Kurz (1984) concludes that, thanks to Ri-
cardo, the idea of technological unemployment “marks its first appearance in 
respectable economic literature.”  
As we have seen, the Luddites had denounced this problem much earlier, 
but not until Ricardian economic theory did technological unemployment 
take on the aura of a scientific concept. After Ricardo, classical economists 
were obliged to refute the most simplistic forms of compensation theory and 
to develop more sophisticated forms of it.  
In his 1848 Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill (2009: 51) 
states that “[a]ll attempts to make out that the laboring-classes as a collective 
body can not suffer temporarily by the introduction of machinery, or by the 
sinking of capital in permanent improvements, are, I conceive, necessarily 
fallacious.” He stresses that it is “obvious to common sense” and also “gen-
erally admitted” that workers would suffer in the particular department of 
industry to which the change applies. However, he still concludes that, at 
least in opulent countries, the extension of machinery is not detrimental but 
beneficial to laborers. In his words, “the conversion of circulating capital in-
to fixed, whether by railways, or manufactories, or ships, or machinery, or 
canals, or mines, or works of drainage and irrigation, is not likely, in any 
rich country, to diminish the gross produce or the amount of employment for 
labor” (Stuart Mill 2009: 252). 




5. KARL MARX: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC THEORY 
The subtitle of Karl Marx’s Capital is A Critique of Political Economy. As a 
consequence, to label “political economy” his own scientific work would 
imply some degree of intellectual violence. It is also true that no discipline 
can easily describe his theoretical and empirical contributions to social sci-
ence. Besides being considered a philosopher, a political thinker, an historian 
and an economist, Marx has been also described as a sociologist (Lefebvre 
1982, Durand 1995) and, more specifically, as an economic sociologist 
(Swedberg 1987: 22-24). This characterization is particularly appropriate 
when talking about technological unemployment.  
Economic sociology and political economy are two mutually enriching 
disciplines, differing in a few important respects (Smelser 1976). One of the-
se is the range of the analysis. The former offers a holistic point of view, by 
paying attention also to cultural determinants, emotional dimensions, and so-
cial consequences of economic phenomena. Economists asks themselves if 
there is a causal connection between technological development and unem-
ployment, in the short or the long run. Economic sociologists aim also at 
knowing the life conditions of workers inside and outside the factory, that is: 
if they work safely or unsafely, if they are mobbed when employed, if they 
abuse alcohol or fall into depression when unemployed, how and where their 
family live, how many children they have, if their children go to school, if 
they were forced to migrate, etc.  
When we read the chapter on “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry” of 
Capital, we find much information that we can hardly find in a book of polit-
ical economy. Here is just an example: “Here we shall merely allude to the 
material conditions under which factory labour is performed. Every sense 
organ is injured by the artificially high temperatures, by the dust-laden at-
mosphere, by the deafening noise, not to mention the danger to life and limb 
among machines which are so closely crowded together, a danger which, 
with the regularity of the seasons, produces its list of those killed and 
wounded in the industrial battle” (Marx 1976: 552). 
Unlike the economist of his time, who would just deal with laws and reg-
ulations by assuming that they are respected and, therefore, constitute a solid 
basis for predictive theories, Marx takes into account also the possibility that 
laws and regulations may remain just on paper and never affect real factory 
life. This is the typical sociological point of view. For instance, Marx (1976: 
552) notes that “although it is strictly forbidden in many, nay in most facto-
ries, that machinery should be cleaned while in motion, it is nevertheless the 
constant practice in most, if not in all, that the workpeople do, unreproved, 
pick out waste, wipe rollers and wheels, etc., while their frames are in mo-





Coming to the problem of unemployment, Marx observes that machinery 
has not freed man from work and guaranteed widespread well-being as the 
utopians promised. It has rather caused the loss of any source of income for 
part of the working class and the inhuman exploitation of those who re-
mained employed in the factory. This is because, by simplifying and easing 
the physical work, machinery allowed physically stronger adult males to be 
replaced by women and children. The benefit to the owners of the means of 
production was threefold: less labor required; lower cost of labor because 
women and children were considered lower rank workers; and indefinite 
time extension of work, because the natural physical fatigue of workers was 
no longer an obstacle to it. The result was the unemployment and brutishness 
of adult males, who remained at home to laze around or get drunk, while 
their relatives were buried alive in the factories.  
Not without sarcasm, Marx (1976: 557) notes that “[i]t is supposed to be 
a great consolation to the pauperized workers that, firstly, their sufferings are 
only temporary (‘a temporary inconvenience’) and, secondly, machinery on-
ly gradually seizes control of the whole of a given field of production, so that 
the extent and the intensity of its destructive effect is diminished. The first 
consolation cancels out the second.” 
No wonder then that Marx (1976: 565) praises Ricardo for his “scientific 
impartiality and love of truth.” Similarly, Lowe (1954: 142) will characterize 
the chapter “On Machinery” by Ricardo as “a rare case of self-destructive 
intellectual honesty.” The debate on the scientific legitimacy of the concept, 
however, did not end after Ricardo and Marx. 
6. THE MARGINALISTS: MATHEMATICS VERSUS LUDDITE FALLACY 
The birth of neoclassical (or marginalist) economic theory changes the cards 
on the table. In particular, after the works of Swedish economist Knut Wick-
sell the concept of technological unemployment enters a crisis and the bal-
ance begins to lean again in favor of compensation theory. Wicksell bases 
his analysis on the law of marginal productivity of factors of production and 
claims that wages are the key to the problem. According to his theory, there 
is no direct causal relationship between technological progress and unem-
ployment, because there is another ultimate cause of unemployment. While 
the expulsion of workers for the implementation of technical innovations 
creates an increase in labor supply over demand, it is also true that in a free 
economy the increase in supply leads to a decrease in wages. In turn, the re-
duction of the remuneration of labor in comparison to that of capital stimu-
lates the demand for labor, for the sectors not yet affected by technological 




innovation will find it convenient to absorb the excess labor. In other words, 
the unemployment rate that remains stable in the medium or long term – the 
one that really worries people and governments – is not attributable to the 
increase in productivity caused by technological progress, but eventually to 
the rigidity of a wage bottom which prevents the reabsorption of workers in 
less advanced sectors. 
Compared to classical economists, the representatives of the marginalist 
school adopt more sophisticated mathematical tools, such as infinitesimal 
calculus, and, thanks to the greater professionalization, the concept of mar-
ginal utility – which is the basis of their theory – can be accurately and for-
mally defined.  
Wicksell was originally a mathematician, and only afterwards entered the 
field of economics. This is the way he dealt with the problem: “If x and y are 
the number of labourers per acre on the first and second methods of cultiva-
tion respectively, and the productivity function in the one case is f(x) and in 
the other ø(y); and if we assume that m acres are cultivated on the first meth-
od and n acres on the second, then we must look for the conditions under 
which the expression  
 
mf(x) + nø(y) 
reaches its maximum value if, at the same time,  
m + n = B 
and  
mx + ny = A 
 
where B is the number of acres and A the number of labourers available for 
the industry in question (here agriculture) as a whole. By differentiation and 
elimination (the partial derivatives of the first expression being put = 0) we 
can easily obtain the two equations  
f’(x) = ø’(y) 
 and 
f(x) - xf’(x) = ø(y) - yø’(y), 
 
of which the former indicates that when the gross product is a maximum the 
marginal productivity of labour, and therefore wages, will be the same in 
both types of production, The second equation gives the same condition for 
rent per acre.  
Thus, although at first sight the going-over of some firms to the new 
method of cultivation seems to diminish the total product, actually the total 
product is maximized; but at the same time wages necessarily fall, so long as 
we assume that the gross product is less in the estates cultivated by the new 




The idea that the whole debate among theorists of technological unem-
ployment and theorists of automatic compensation could develop only be-
cause of the lack of professionalization of nineteenth century economists 
becomes widely accepted in academia. For instance, Schumpeter (2006: 652) 
concludes that “[t]he controversy that went on throughout the nineteenth 
century and beyond, mainly in the form of argument pro and con ‘compensa-
tion,’ is dead and buried: as stated above, it vanished from the scene as a bet-
ter technique filtered into general use which left nothing to disagree about.” 
To be precise, the controversy was “dead and buried” only for the econ-
omists of the neoclassical school (Montani 1975). For non-orthodox econo-
mists, in the folds of the calculations, a bleak thesis (to say the least) was 
hidden: if the Luddites attributed the ‘fault’ of unemployment to machinery, 
and Marxists to the capitalist system of exploitation, neoclassical economists 
unloaded it on workers who were not satisfied to work for a mess of pottage, 
or on those social democratic governments that imposed a minimum hourly 
wage so that workers could at least survive. 
7. THE KEYNESIANS: TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT AS FACT 
The hegemony of neoclassical economics in academia seemed to be unas-
sailable, when a game changer enters the spotlight: the devastating economic 
crisis of 1929. A new paradigm, the Keynesian, becomes destined to take 
stake in political and scientific circles. Challenging the orthodoxy, in a 1930 
article published in The Nation, John Maynard Keynes reintroduces the con-
cept of technological unemployment in the economic discourse. Quite curi-
ously, he speaks about it as a new disease, as if Ricardo and Marx had never 
discussed the issue before. These are his words: “We are being afflicted with 
a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name, but 
of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come – namely, techno-
logical unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of 
means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can 
find new uses for labour. But this is only a temporary phase of maladjust-
ment. All this means in the long run that mankind is solving its economic 
problem” (Keynes 1963: 325). 
Keynes is not a pessimist, nor a Luddite. He sees in technological pro-
gress a great resource for humanity. He is convinced that technological un-
employment is only a temporary illness. This is because he is confident in 
the possibility of solving the problem with appropriate public policies, start-
ing with a drastic reduction of working hours. In the same article, the Eng-
lish economist forecasts that “in the course of our life” (that is, in the space 
of a few decades), we will see ongoing social reforms that will lead us to 




work three hours a day, five days a week, for a total of fifteen hours per 
week, at equal income conditions. In short, it seemed reasonable to solve the 
economic crisis by implementing a simple formula: working less, work for 
all. That is, by evenly redistributing the benefits of technological progress. 
During the Great Depression, other outstanding scholars focus on the 
problem of technological unemployment. In August 1930s, Paul H. Douglas 
publishes an article entitled “Technological Unemployment” in the Ameri-
can Federationist, but only to say that the introduction of labor-saving im-
provements cannot cause permanent unemployment. He maintains that we 
should rather expect an “automatic” absorption into employment of fired 
workers, because the demand of employers and those workers still employed 
is destined to grow as a result of the reduction of costs per unit of output due 
to technological improvement.  
One year later, Alvin Hansen responds to Douglas with an article entitled 
“Institutional Frictions and Technological Unemployment”, appearing in The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1931). Here, Hansen accuses Douglas of 
reviving the old doctrine of J. B. Say, James Mill, and David Ricardo (mean-
ing the first and second editions of the Principles), and in particular the 
grave fallacy of compensation theory.  
Quite significantly, Hansen was still not “the American Keynes” in the 
moment when he published this article. He still defended the orthodox theo-
ry in 1937, when he occupied the chair of Political Economy at Harvard 
University. His conversion to Keynesianism happened later, but here we can 
see that there was already a convergence on the issue of technological un-
employment. 
The 1930s polemics does not end here. Gottfried Haberler (1932: 558) 
immediately takes the defense of Professor Douglas, “for it would be deplor-
able if an ungrounded hostility and suspicion against technological progress 
should be aroused or intensified.” 
That ‘temporary’ technological unemployment exists seems not in doubt 
even among defenders of the orthodox theory. The question is if ‘permanent’ 
technological unemployment does exist. Ten years later, Hans P. Neisser up-
grades technological unemployment from concept to theory. Indeed, these 
two words express a causal relation, and therefore a law. More precisely, 
Neisser (1942: 50) laments that “the theory of technological unemployment 
is a stepchild of economic science.” We read the following lines and we un-
derstand that, for this scholar, there is perfect adherence between this ne-
glected theory and ‘facts’. Permanent technological unemployment is not 
only a useful theoretical concept. It is a real phenomenon. Thirteen years af-
ter the 1929 crisis, in spite of compensation theory, there are still masses of 
involuntary unemployed workers: “The facts seem to stand in such blatant 




nological unemployment is possible, that most American textbooks prefer 
not to mention the problem itself” (ibid.). 
What is more important is that this ‘silence’ is unprecedented. Neisser 
reminds the readers also that “[t]he analysis to which Ricardo subjected the 
displacement of labor by the machine in the last edition of the Principles had 
stimulated a lively discussion among the later classical economists…” 
(ibid.). The discussion died down because of the rise of neoclassical equilib-
rium analysis. However, Neisser correctly underlines that this ‘silence’ con-
cerns only “Anglo-Saxon literature.”  
Everett Hagen (1942: 553) also remarks that only “[t]wo papers in Amer-
ican economic journals of the past eleven years have address themselves ex-
clusively to the correction of errors in the prevailing analysis of 
technological unemployment.” He means that written by Hansen in 1931 and 
that published by Neisser in 1942. He recognizes that Naisser makes a “defi-
nite contribution,” but he also reproaches him for having completely ignored 
Hansen and for having written an article in the “post-Keynesian period” that 
fails “to apply to the problem at hand the theory of saving and investment as 
determinants of employment.” Hagen gives himself the task of filling the 
hole. 
Indeed, the debate is much richer than it seems. First of all, it takes place 
also in books and not only in articles published in economic journals. An ex-
ample is the book Value and Capital by John R. Hicks. The first edition ap-
pears in 1939. The second edition is published in 1946 and, afterwards, is 
reprinted many times. Here the term ‘technological unemployment’ appears 
only at page 291, but the concept to which the term refers is discussed also 
in other parts of the book. The author stresses the fact that technology may 
produce unemployment only in specific situations, for instance, “that in 
which the new equipment, which has been produced, is ‘labour-saving’; in 
this case there is a fall in the demand for labour, as a result of the whole pro-
cess, relatively to the situation which would have arisen if no capital had 
been accumulated at all.” In other words, “there is not necessarily a fall in 
the demand for labour at all; there will be if early inputs and late inputs of 
labour are substitutes, but not if they are complementary” (Hicks 1946: 291). 
Another book assessing the problem very seriously is The Path of Eco-
nomic Growth, published in 1976 by German economist and sociologist 
Adolph Lowe. Here the term ‘technological unemployment’ appears many 
times throughout the book. Besides, being also a sociologist, Lowe is capa-
ble of keeping a distance from main economic schools (neo-classical, neo-
Marxian, Keynesian) in order to assess the controversy from a different point 
of view: “By centering our investigation of the traverse on the compensation 
of technological unemployment, we emphasize an issue the relevance of 
which is highly controversial. It has been debated for more than 150 years 




and, considering the secular employment trend over this period, it is not sur-
prising that, in the view of the majority of experts, technological unemploy-
ment is today regarded as perhaps an occasional irritant but not as an ever-
present threat to the stability of the system. Moreover, in the heat of polem-
ics, the arguments on either side have occasionally been overstated. What is 
still worse, the basic question at issue has been blurred. This question is nei-
ther whether, as a rule, nonneutral innovations initially create unemployment 
(they do) nor whether, given sufficient time, compensation is possible (it cer-
tainly is). The question is whether a free market is endowed with a systemat-
ic mechanism that assures compensation within the Marshallian short 
period, thus precluding any secondary distortions that could upset dynamic 
equilibrium” (Lowe 1976: 250). 
The literature on the topic appears much richer also if we take into ac-
count books and articles written in different languages. For instance, though 
being a technological optimist, French economist Jean Fourastié wrote much 
sur le risque de chômage technologique de masse (1949, 1954). Given the 
parameters of this work, however, we decided to limit our analysis to a few 
contributions in the English language. More details about the debate on 
technological unemployment in the Anglo-Saxon culture, with particular at-
tention to the interwar period, can be found in the works by Gregory R. Woi-
rol (1996, 2006). 
To put it briefly, while marginalist economists keep denying the problem 
of technological unemployment, Keynesians are sure that the problem exists, 
but they are also confident that it can be solved with opportune public poli-
cies. 
8. REAGANOMICS: THE NEW DENIAL 
After the Great Depression – which ended many years later thanks to Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal (according to the Keynesians) or to the 
Second World War (according to the Austrian School) – it seemed impossi-
ble that humankind could return to laissez-faire capitalism. Nonetheless, the 
return of the neoliberal paradigm was successful, a few decades later, with 
the landing of Margaret Thatcher to Downing Street in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan in the White House in 1981.  
What happened next to their policies was not, of course, the end of work, 
that is the permanent global unemployment of the masses. In spite of the fact 
that amazing innovations – innovations that in the 1930s belonged only to 
the sphere of science fiction – have been introduced in the productive sys-
tem, there are still jobs around. However, it must be adequately stressed that 




flexibility of salaries and job market, in full accordance with the theory of 
marginal analysis. 
To give just an example of the new attitude toward automation and un-
employment, I will quote some fragments from the article “Does More 
Technology Create Unemployment?” by R. H. Mabry and A. D. Sharplin, 
which appeared in 1986. This is the incipit: “Each new generation brings the 
reemergence of many of the fears of the past, requiring the repetition of old 
explanations to put them to rest. Today there is a renewed concern that tech-
nological advancement may displace much of the manufacturing (and other) 
work force, creating widespread unemployment, social disruption, and hu-
man hardship. For example, in 1983 the Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research forecast the existence of 50,000 to 100,000 industrial robots in the 
United States by 1990, resulting in a net loss of some 100,000 jobs” (Mabry 
and Sharplin 1986). 
The authors intend to refute “all these claims and predictions and the 
rhetoric that surrounds them.” They call rhetoric the discourse strategy of the 
Keynesians, but in fact their textual approach to the problem presents also 
the typical rhetoric of scientific discourse. For instance, they try to present 
themselves as equidistant from both conservatives and progressives – and 
therefore somewhat neutral or purely scientific. Indeed, they explicitly dis-
tance themselves from “conservative economic thinkers”, who “tend to dis-
parage persons who fear the rapid advance of technology by labeling them 
‘Luddites’.” This is said to be a term “both unfair and inaccurate.” However, 
a few lines below, they seem to justify the characterization of progressives as 
Luddites. They state that at least “[i]n part, opposition to technology springs 
simply from a more or less visceral fear of scientism, which is often taken to 
imply the dehumanization of humankind.”  
Again, they try to regain a fair position in the debate by recognizing that 
“the warnings heard today are thoughtful and well intentioned”, but, in the 
same sentence, they immediately underline that the theorists of technological 
unemployment are “often in error or somewhat self-serving.” This narrative 
implies that the deniers of technological unemployment are not self-serving. 
After a few sentences aimed at showing a more balanced attitude toward the 
problem, Mabry and Sharplin simply restate the standard position of ortho-
dox political economy: “Flatly in error are those that predict no more jobs 
for a very large sector of the population as a result of advancing technology, 
creating a massive problem of involuntary unemployment. It is not at all 
clear that a large number of jobs are about to be destroyed; even if they 
were, such long-run unemployment as would occur would certainly not be 
involuntary. Rather, it would take the form of even shorter work days, short-
er work-weeks, and fewer working members in the family, as it has through-
out our history. Some who correctly anticipate that technological change 




may produce short-run employment-adjustment problems overstate those 
problems. They also often fail to mention that the short-run unemployment 
that occurs is primarily the result of artificial imperfections -- a lack of com-
petition -- in certain labor and product markets.” 
Briefly, according to the authors, there is not long-run involuntary unem-
ployment, while short-run unemployment is not caused by technological ad-
vancement but by public policies. In a regime of laissez-faire capitalism, 
people would immediately find new jobs and enjoy technological advances 
by working less and earning more. 
9. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE SPECTER OF JOBLESS SOCIETY 
Has this 1980s prophecy been fulfilled in the following decades? By the end 
of the twentieth century, a legion of social scientists answers negatively to 
the question. The specter of a jobless society reappears in books such as The 
End of Work by Jeremy Rifkin (1995), Progress without People by David F. 
Noble (1995), and Turning Point by Robert U. Ayres (1998). The alarm 
takes a larger magnitude if we consider also the publications in other lan-
guages. For instance, Italian sociologist Luciano Gallino has written much, 
in his own mother tongue, about technological unemployment (1998, 2007). 
The narrative of this wave of social criticism can be summarized as fol-
lows: the introduction of computers and robots in factories and offices, in the 
last forty years, has led to the enrichment of a minority and the insecurity 
and impoverishment of the majority. There are still jobs on the market, be-
cause machines, at their present stage of development, cannot completely re-
place labor. They can only complement it. Jobs that do not disappear 
completely are those involving a physical effort that cannot be defined by a 
tractable list of rules and, therefore, cannot be easily implemented in a ma-
chine, or those that are so humble and low paid that, even when their auto-
mation is technically possible, it is still more economical to hire humans. 
However, it is just a matter of time. In the near future, machines will be able 
to replace humans in any activity. Therefore, a profound reform of our socie-
ty is needed and urgently. 
Social scientists with this viewpoint have occasionally attracted the accu-
sation of ‘intellectual Luddism.’ A similar accusation could not, however, be 
raised against a second wave of social criticism arising a few years later, 
given that its exponents are mainly engineers and computer scientists. An 
explosion of publications on Artificial Intelligence, seen as the demiurge of a 
jobless society, takes place after the 2008 financial crises. Authors like Mar-
tin Ford (2009, 2015), Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2012, 2016), 




convinced that technology is a ‘good thing,’ but it cannot but render human 
beings obsolete. Therefore, the only way to avoid an epochal catastrophe is 
to redesign our societies, starting from the basements, in order to make place 
for both humans and machines. 
These authors tend to underline that our own is an epoch of painful transi-
tion, but a ‘golden age’ of humankind is visible at the horizon. We just need 
to realize that technology is not just a tool of this or that politico-economic 
system, but rather the actual primum movens of human history. A primum 
movens which requires its own politico-economic system to work at its best. 
The introduction of a basic income guarantee (BIG) – that is, an income to 
be assigned unconditionally to all citizens of industrial countries – is among 
the various proposed solutions (Hughes 2014, Campa 2014b). 
The idea of a radical societal change, which has been buried for a few 
decades in the cemetery of dead ideas, could resuscitate thanks to the crisis 
of neoliberalism following the 2008 global financial bankruptcy. A crisis 
that, in the words of sociologist Luciano Pellicani (2015: 397), “has demon-
strated the technical – as well as moral – absurdity of the neoliberal para-
digm, centered on the idea of self-regulated market.” With the addition that 
the markets are self-regulating only for the lower classes, given that bankers 
and capitalists can systematically count on bailouts and public money when 
something goes wrong. 
Among the signs that what Ludwik Fleck called Denkkollektiv is chang-
ing, we can mention the Nobel Prize for economics assigned in 2008 to 
Keynesian economist Paul Krugman, who afterwards has also expressed his 
worries about technological unemployment (2013). Or, perhaps, the plane-
tary success of a book like Capital in the 21st Century by Thomas Piketty 
(2013). 
All the optimism of the 1980s has vanished. According to the above-
mentioned analysts, the present transition phase is characterized by involun-
tary unemployment due to automation and precarious jobs due to flexibility 
policies. True, many jobs have not yet been automatized. In the tertiary sec-
tor, we observe a proliferation of caregivers assisting elderly and disabled at 
home, bellhops, call center operators, waiters, fast foods workers, pizza de-
liverers, employees of cleaning companies, atypical taxi drivers, external 
collaborators with VAT registration, refuse collectors, private mail carriers, 
storekeepers, shop assistants, etc. In many cases, employers still find it more 
cost effective to hire uneducated workers or desperate immigrants than 
mechanizing these jobs (assuming that a machine is available or can be de-
signed to do it). 
However, what is clear is that all-life and full-time jobs – such as jobs in 
large factories and public offices – which used to be the prerogative of mid-
dle class workers, have significantly shrunk in number as in the level of re-




muneration. Observers seem to be amazed at this phenomenon, as illustrated 
by a recent article published in The Wall Street Journal: “The typical man 
with a full-time job–the one at the statistical middle of the middle–earned 
$50,383 last year, the Census Bureau reported this week. The typical man 
with a full-time job in 1973 earned $53,294, measured in 2014 dollars to ad-
just for inflation. You read that right: The median male worker who was em-
ployed year-round and full time earned less in 2014 than a similarly situated 
worker earned four decades ago. And those are the ones who had jobs” 
(Wessel 2015). 
This is what we read in ‘the bible of capitalism,’ not in a blog of angry 
radicals. However, it is not surprising that today workers earn on average 
less than their fathers or grandfathers, despite all the progress made by hu-
manity in the meantime, if we keep in mind that the theory of compensation 
does not say that thanks to technological progress we will all live happily 
ever after. The theory says that there will be no mass unemployment, if the 
governments guarantee wage flexibility. The negative side effect of this pol-
icy becomes what we might call ‘technological impoverishment.’ 
Moreover, the automation of the tertiary sector is also relentlessly taking 
place. We already hear of pizza delivery by means of drones, of autonomous 
vehicles on the roads, of chirurgical interventions made by robots, etc. Occa-
sional households have been replaced by cleaning robots in many homes, 
software substitute for lawyers (Pasquale & Cashwell 2015), the robotization 
of the military is in a very advanced phase (Campa 2015), and the automa-
tion of social work has also started (Campa 2016). So, it is not surprising 
that specialist economic literature is now taking seriously the issue of tech-
nological unemployment (Feldmann 2013, Feng & Graetz 2015). 
This does not mean that compensation theory has disappeared from pub-
lic discourse, but even those analysts still moving in the wake of orthodox 
economics do not dismiss the hypothesis of mass technological unemploy-
ment when talking about the future. For instance, in May 2013, the McKin-
sey Global Institute published a detailed study of a dozen new technologies 
defined ‘disruptive’ for their potential impact on the economy. The report is 
generally optimistic, because it focuses on the chances offered by technolog-
ical advances to big corporations. However, it also recognizes that “produc-
tivity without the innovation that leads to the creation of higher value-added 
jobs results in unemployment and economic problems, and some new tech-
nologies such as the automation of knowledge work could significantly raise 
the bar on the skills that workers will need to bring to bear in order to be 
competitive” (Manyika 2013: 151). In a 164-page report, the word ‘unem-
ployment’ appears only once, but at least there is no denial of the problem. 
The report assumes that policy makers can limit the negative side effects 




newing education. In other words, they “should consider the potential conse-
quences of increasing divergence between the fates of highly skilled workers 
and those with fewer skills,” and keep in mind that “[t]he existing problem 
of creating a labor force that fits the demands of a high-tech economy will 
only grow with time” (ibid.). 
This is the old recipe of neoliberalism: one does not need the redistribu-
tion of wealth to cope with unemployment and impoverishment; one just 
needs better educated citizens and workers. If in the short term workers may 
experience problems, in the long term innovation will result in the creation 
of new higher value jobs. The report maintains that also workers will take 
advantage of automation. Nonetheless, it is easy to demonstrate that these 
‘potential benefits’ could be turned into ‘potential threats’ by simply ex-
pressing them with different words. Let us give an example. At page 7, we 
read what follows: “It is now possible to create cars, trucks, aircraft, and 
boats that are completely or partly autonomous. From drone aircraft on the 
battlefield to Google’s self-driving car, the technologies of machine vision, 
artificial intelligence, sensors, and actuators that make these machines possi-
ble is rapidly improving. Over the coming decade, low-cost, commercially 
available drones and submersibles could be used for a range of applications. 
Autonomous cars and trucks could enable a revolution in ground transporta-
tion—regulations and public acceptance permitting. Short of that, there is 
also substantial value in systems that assist drivers in steering, braking, and 
collision avoidance. The potential benefits of autonomous cars and trucks 
include increased safety, reduced CO2 emissions, more leisure or work time 
for motorists (with hands-off driving), and increased productivity in the 
trucking industry” (Manyika 2013: 7). 
As you can see, McKinsey analysts predict a remarkable productivity 
growth and, among benefits, more free time or working hours for motorists, 
due to lower mental and physical fatigue. By using a most brutal language, 
we may say that the ‘benefits’ for workers will be more unemployment or 
exploitation. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
This debate seems to teach us that, in a laissez faire capitalist economy, the 
choice boils down to two perspectives: 1) if one introduces policies to safe-
guard the standard of living of workers by establishing that the minimum 
wage cannot fall below a certain threshold (moderate left policy), the system 
produces ‘technological unemployment;’ 2) if it is established that the gov-
ernment must not interfere in negotiations between capitalists and workers, 
letting the market decide wage levels (moderate right policy), the system 




produces ‘technological impoverishment.’ All this happens when an impres-
sive technological development may potentially improve the life condition of 
everybody. Thus, contemporary society seems to be inherently characterized 
by a ‘technological paradox.’ 
Traditional political forces converge on the idea that improving education 
could be the ‘weapon’ to contrast technological unemployment. However, 
not much attention is paid to the fact that Artificial Intelligence develops ex-
ponentially and not only promises to further reduce the workforce in manu-
facturing, but it will begin to erode the work of specialists in the service 
sector. In the near future, unemployment could concern economic actors 
who have attended higher education institutions and invested much time and 
money to acquire their professional skills, such as journalists, physicians, 
teachers, lawyers, consultants, managers, etc. 
Typically, those who bring attention to the ‘technological paradox’ char-
acterizing our society are immediately halted with a rather trivial argument: 
the historically known alternative systems to capitalism – namely: feudalism, 
fascism, and communism – have failed. But this is stating the obvious. To 
displace this rhetorical argument, the paradox can be better expressed by the 
following question: How can it be that sentient beings capable of inventing 
quantum computers and creating artificial life fail to come up with a new 
system of production and consumption in which these and other innovations, 
if they cannot be beneficial to all individuals at the same extent, at least are 
not detrimental to the majority? 
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ABSTRACT 
The concept of “standardization” was among the most used, in the 20th century, to 
describe and categorize socio-economic, as well as cultural, homologating and 
massifying processes. However, if the field of material consumption (technology, 
food, etc.) has been the one in which, more clearly, the standardization of production 
and consumption has given a new paradigm for interpreting current societies, even 
in music one, wonders, since the beginning of the last century, on the value of this 
homologation, identified by T.W. Adorno as, precisely, standardization. 
1. INTRODUZIONE 
Il concetto di “standardizzazione” è stato tra i più usati, nel XX secolo, per 
descrivere e categorizzare processi socio-economici, ma anche culturali, 
omologanti e massificanti, anche fino a casi estremi, come quello che Geor-
ge Ritzer ha denominato successivamente “Mcdonaldizzazione”1. Se però il 
settore dei consumi materiali (tecnologie, alimenti, ecc.) è stato quello in cui, 
in maniera più evidente, la standardizzazione della produzione e dei consumi 
ha dato un nuovo paradigma per interpretare le società attuali, anche nella 
musica ci si interroga, ormai da un secolo, sul valore di questa omologazio-
ne, identificata da Theodor L. W. Adorno come, appunto, standardizzazione. 
Ed è proprio a partire da questo autore che questo concetto sembra assumere 
un valore rilevante nella sociologia della musica, in particolare dalle cosid-
dette “Lezioni Americane”2 in poi. Negli Stati Uniti, infatti, egli venne a 
contatto con una società in cui sembravano consolidati capitalismo e liberi-
smo, al punto che molte delle sue intuizione vennero confermate sul campo, 
                       
1 Cfr. G. Ritzer, Il mondo alla McDonald's, Il Mulino, Bologna 1997.  
2 In Italia pubblicate nel volume T.W. Adorno, Introduzione alla Sociologia della Musica, 




in primis, quelle sull’industria culturale e sul libero arbitrio del consumato-
re, che diventa di fatto un ingranaggio di una catena di montaggio. «Il con-
cetto di gusto – scrive Adorno - è superato in quanto non c’è più una scelta: 
l’esistenza del soggetto stesso, che potrebbe conservare questo gusto, è di-
ventata problematica quanto, al polo opposto, il diritto alla libertà di una 
scelta che non gli è più empiricamente possibile. […] Per chi si trova accer-
chiato da merci musicali standardizzate, valutare è diventata una finzione»3. 
2. MAX WEBER: STUDI SULLA RAZIONALIZZAZIONE 
Volendo rintracciare un antecedente storico ad Adorno, che contribuì, pro-
babilmente, per vicinanza intellettuale4 alla formalizzazione dell’idea del 
processo di standardizzazione dobbiamo necessariamente risalire ad un altro 
sociologo, Max Weber che, sebbene non avesse mai introdotto letteralmente 
il termine “standardizzazione”5, nella sua opera postuma, The Rational and 
Social Foundations of Music6, fornì, attraverso un’altra idea, quella di “ra-
zionalizzazione”, gli strumenti necessari per rintracciarne l’origine e deli-
nearne il processo.  
Ma che cosa significa “standard”? Vari dizionari etimologici fanno risali-
re il termine al XIX secolo quale derivazione del latino extendere7 (ovvero 
“allargare”, “diffondere”) e Ulrich Ammon8, nei suoi studi di socio-
linguistica, individua sei attributi per tale concetto, tra i quali quello di “in-
variante” e “sovraregionale” ovvero “canonizzato” e che si rifà ad una collet-
tività che va oltre i confini del territorio. Weber però, dicevamo, non 
definisce il concetto relativo al processo di standardizzazione nel campo mu-
sicale, ma si limita ad associare lo standard, il canone9 appunto, a un altro 
                       
3 T.W. Adorno, Il carattere di feticcio in musica e il regresso dell'ascolto, «Dissonanze», 
Feltrinelli, Milano 1990, pp. 9-10. 
4 Così come è testimoniato, tra l'altro da numerosissimi altri autori. 
5 In inglese “standardization” o “standardisation”. 
6 M. Weber, D. Martindale, J. Riedel, G. Neuwirth, The Rational and Social Foundations of 
Music, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1958. 
7 Si veda, ad esempio, la definizione di “standard” del dizionario etimologico Douglas-
Harper 2001-2018 <URL=https://www.etymonline.com/> (11/2018). 
8 La nozione di standard è complessa e a definirla convergono fattori di diverso carattere. 
Ammon individua sei attributi principali definitori: lo standard è tale in quanto è: (a) codi-
ficato, (b) sovraregionale, (c) elaborato, (d) proprio dei ceti alti, (e) invariante, (f) scritto. 
(U. Ammon, Explikation der Begriffe ‘Standardvarietät’ und ‘Standardsprache’ auf 
normtheoretischer Grundlage, in Sprach-licher Substandard, hrsg. von G. Holtus & E. 
Radtke, Niemeyer, 3 voll., vol. 1º, Tübingen 1986, pp. 1-62).  
9 Il termine che appare nella trattazione in lingua tedesca è “normal”. 
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processo, quello di “razionalizzazione”10. Ed è indagando primariamente sul 
concetto di razionalizzazione che potremo arrivare a definire cosa è invece la 
standardizzazione in campo musicale. Ripercorriamo quindi brevemente i 
punti chiave relativi alla razionalizzazione11 che è un processo in cui la ra-
zionalità (dal latino ratio cioè calcolo, computo), appunto, viene applicata ad 
un’azione fatta per raggiungere uno scopo. Si tratta quindi di un agire dotato 
di senso12 in cui lo scopo prevale sul valore13. 
Sembra che il termine “razionalizzazione” sia stato introdotto per la pri-
ma volta da Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld14 in riferimento ai lavori di 
Frederick W. Taylor15 relativamente ai processi produttivi nell’industria, per 
designare l’insieme delle misure tecnico-organizzative mirate all’aumento 
della produttività. Con Max Weber si compie il passaggio dalla concezione 
economica a quella sociale (ovvero socioculturale) della razionalizzazione, 
con la convinzione che la razionalizzazione nell’ambito dell’impresa abbia 
avuto conseguenze positive per l’economia politica e il riconoscimento del 
ruolo svolto da fattori extraeconomici16. In The Rational and Social Founda-
                       
10 «In all cases, the substantive rationality is considered to be a “valid canon”; that is, a uni-
que “standard” against which reality's flow of un- ending empirical events may be selec-
ted, measured, and judged». M. Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1946) in Essays in 
Sociology, edited and translated by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford University 
Press, New York 1958, pp. 77-128. 
11 A tal proposito si invita alla lettura del saggio di E. Raganato, I concetti di razionalità e 
razionalizzazione nella Sociologia della Musica, «Orbis Idearum. European Journal of the 
History of Ideas», Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2017. 
12 Max Weber lo definisce nel modo seguente: «Agisce in maniera razionale rispetto allo 
scopo colui che orienta il suo agire in base allo scopo, ai mezzi e alle conseguenze con-
comitanti, misurando razionalmente i mezzi in rapporto agli scopi, gli scopi in rapporto 
alle conseguenze, e infine anche i diversi scopi possibili in rapporto reciproco». Cfr. M. 
Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1922), tr. it. Economia e società, vol. I, Milano 1995, 
p. 23. 
13 «Agisce in maniera puramente razionale rispetto al valore colui che – senza riguardo per 
le conseguenze prevedibili – opera al servizio della propria convinzione relativa a ciò che 
ritiene essergli comandato dal dovere, dalla dignità, dalla bellezza, dal precetto religioso, 
dalla pietà e dall'importanza di una “causa” di qualsiasi specie». Ivi, p. 21. Sulle premesse 
e le implicazioni della prospettiva weberiana, cfr.: R. Campa, Etica della scienza pura. Un 
percorso storico e critico, Sestante Edizioni, Bergamo 2007, pp. 385-392; Id., L’eredità di 
Nietzsche nella sociologia di Max Weber, «Orbis Idearum. European Journal of the Histo-
ry of Ideas», Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 53-91. 
14 F. von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Die natürlichen und technischen Bedingungen der Wirtschaft, 
Tübingen 1914. 
15 F.W. Taylor, The principles of scientific management (1911), tr. it. Principî di organizza-
zione scientifica del lavoro, ETAS, Milano 1976. 
16 Questo concetto ampliato di razionalizzazione ha acquistato rilevanza solo nell'area lin-




tions of Music, quindi, Weber studia la relazione tra forme musicali e socie-
tà, sottolineando la significativa interdipendenza tra realtà sociale e produ-
zione musicale. Nell’identificare gli elementi specifici della creazione 
musicale che possono significativamente essere messi in relazione alla strut-
tura sociale in cui vengono prodotti, Weber mostra come la razionalizzazio-
ne si sia affermata nel tempo e come la padronanza del materiale sonoro che 
ne è derivata abbia contribuito allo sviluppo della musica occidentale nella 
civiltà moderna. Attraverso una comparazione diacronica e sincronica tra 
musica antica e moderna e tra musica europea ed orientale, l’autore eviden-
zia come il fenomeno della razionalizzazione si sia manifestato solo nella 
cultura e nella musica occidentale. Questo processo, iniziato per fini prati-
ci17, da una speculazione teorica sui rapporti intervallari18 e dai vari sistemi 
di divisione dell’ottava19, ha portato alla nascita del cosiddetto “sistema tem-
perato”20, ovvero il sistema razionale e matematico di suddivisione 
dell’ottava in dodici suoni, posti tra loro ad intervalli uguali e discreti. Il si-
stema temperato è quindi per Weber il risultato di una razionalizzazione “di-
retta allo scopo” che inizia nei conventi medievali con i cosiddetti “neumi”, 
ausili grafici per l’apprendimento delle composizioni musicali. 
 
Il processo di razionalizzazione comporta nel tempo una definizione di prati-
che convenzionalmente accettate sia per quanto riguarda la tecnica musicale 
che per altri aspetti legati alla produzione di musica, tra i quali quelli relativi 
alla costruzione degli strumenti musicali21.  
 
Weber, sul finire della trattazione si sofferma anche sulla razionalizza-
zione che ha investito la produzione di strumenti musicali, partendo dagli 
strumenti ad arco fino all’organo e al pianoforte. A questo punto della tratta-
zione possiamo già individuare due rami principali del campo musicale in 
cui la razionalizzazione ha permesso una “canonizzazione” di elementi, pro-
                                                      
mentre in Francia e nei paesi anglosassoni resta prevalente il significato ristretto di tipo 
economico. La razionalizzazione sociale ha costituito inoltre il tema dominante della filo-
sofia critica tedesca degli anni venti e trenta, che vide autori di sinistra, liberali e conser-
vatori tutti uniti nel dare una valutazione negativa del fenomeno. Cfr. H. Schnädelbach, 
Zur Rehabilitierung des animal rationale, Vorträge und Abhandlungen 2, Frankfurt an 
Mainz 1992. 
17 M. Del Forno, Da Weber a Schomberg. Razionalizzazione e disincanto nella Dodecafonia, 
«Sociologia», Fondazione L. Sturzo, Roma 2005. 
18 Sempre Del Forno scrive che tali necessità erano principalmente a scopo mnemonico e di 
intonazione.  
19 L'intervallo di ottava è lo spazio compreso tra due note il cui rapporto di frequenza è 2:1. 
20 M. Weber, Politics as a Vocation, cit., p. 100. 
21 L. Savonardo, Sociologia della Musica, Edt, Torino 2014, p. 30. 
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cedure, “azioni orientate allo scopo”: la notazione musicale e la costruzione 
degli strumenti musicali. Volendo quindi definire il processo di standardiz-
zazione musicale (recuperandone la relazione con il concetto di razionalizza-
zione) relativamente agli studi di Weber, potremmo dire che è un processo di 
estrema razionalizzazione che nella musica si è compiuto attraverso 
l’utilizzo della scrittura in notazione musicale e attraverso la tecnologia degli 
strumenti musicali. Ovviamente, tutte le cause di questo processo sono da 
ricondursi alle stesse della razionalizzazione ed anzi, in quest’ottica, la stan-
dardizzazione si configura come una conseguenza dell’estrema razionalità. 
3. GEORG SIMMEL: IL RITMO COME PARADIGMA DELLA MODERNITÀ 
Gli studiosi orientati all’interpretazione sociologica della musica, quindi im-
pegnati a reperire regolarità dei comportamenti collettivi, dicevamo, sono 
stati vari. Tra questi, Georg Simmel, coevo di Weber, utilizzò alcuni para-
digmi mutuati dalla musica (melodia, ritmo, armonia, ecc.) per analizzare la 
società anche in termini di omogeneizzazione culturale. In particolare Sim-
mel, concentrò parte del suo lavoro sociologico, nell’elaborazione di un pa-
radigma di ricerca come il ritmo che risulta ancora oggi di grande utilità 
nell’analisi dei ritmi frenetici che caratterizzano la società postmoderna. Il 
ritmo, oltre ad essere un elemento musicale originario rappresenta il primo 
schema di elaborazione mentale in altri ambiti della vita dell’uomo22. Sim-
mel, nella sua analisi, rileva che benché il ritmo sia stato sempre un elemento 
caratterizzante e fortemente presente in ogni ambito della vita sociale, nella 
società moderna si è molto ridotto come fattore che connota la vita sociale ed 
anzi, secondo Simmel è stato proprio preda di un totale livellamento. Tale 
stato di cose deve essere imputato al denaro che non ha fatto altro che sper-
sonalizzare i rapporti umani23. Nell’economia monetaria tutti i rapporti tra 
uomini tendono a farsi misurabili e calcolabili e si ha il prevalere del calcolo 
rispetto al sentimento. Se da un lato la ritmicità della vita civile, a causa del 
denaro, si è abbassata, dall’altro, l’elemento ritmico si è notevolmente innal-
zato fino ad arrivare a livelli estremi, nella metropoli (nella quale 
l’espressione dell’accelerazione del ritmo di vita è sintomo di modernità) e 
                       
22 Per Simmel, infatti, «la configurazione simmetrico-ritmica si presenta come la prima e la 
più semplice forma con cui l'intelletto stilizza, per così dire, la materia della vita, la rende 
dominabile e assimilabile. É il primo schema mediante il quale la ragione può penetrare 
nelle cose e dare loro una forma». Cfr. G. Simmel, Filosofia del denaro (1889), trad. it. di 
A. Cavalli, R. Liebhart e L. Perucchi, UTET, Torino 1984, p. 688. 
23 Visto che con esso si può comprare tutto e si può comprare anche il servizio degli altri in 





in particolare nel lavoro di fabbrica. In tali contesti, il lavoratore è vincolato 
alla ripetizione rigorosamente costante di certi movimenti. La standardizza-
zione della produzione in serie riverbera e potenzia la complementare stan-
dardizzazione del comportamento (tutti si somigliano, tutti agiscono allo 
stesso modo).  
Anche l’atteggiamento frenetico col quale l’individuo si rapporta alla cul-
tura, rivela l’influenza del denaro e delle logiche di mercato che hanno to-
talmente invaso una sfera prima riservata all’interiorità del soggetto. In 
questo eccesso di stimoli si cerca di condensare «possibilmente in breve 
tempo, una quantità possibilmente grande di emozioni, interessi, piaceri»24. 
L’esaltazione estetica che caratterizza i prodotti culturali e non, altro non è 
che un escamotage per giustificare la presenza sul mercato di una grande 
quantità di merci spesso inutili e di esercitare una maggiore attrattiva sul 
consumatore. Si assiste, da parte dei sistemi di produzione e riproduzione 
culturale ad un tentativo nei confronti degli individui di sollecitare un ade-
guamento ai ritmi e ai valori della vita metropolitana. Diventa sempre più 
difficile quindi che l’individuo possa partecipare ad una vita culturale ade-
rendovi completamente, coinvolgendo totalmente la sua personalità. Tutta la 
cultura subisce questo processo di oggettivazione in quanto la produzione di 
massa, prevalendo sull’inclinazione personale, non permette una scelta indi-
viduale. Questo appiattimento di cui il mondo moderno della grande metro-
poli, descritto da Simmel, è teatro, riguarda anche il gusto musicale. Qui 
ogni differenza qualitativa scompare senza lasciare traccia, ogni sussulto 
psicologico è bandito nella misura in cui siamo anestetizzati a causa di una 
sovrastimolazione sensoriale incessante che altrimenti ci esaurirebbe in un 
batter d’occhio25, e gli individui si configurano come brulicanti monadi sen-
za porte né finestre, massificate e tenute “insieme” soltanto 
dall’omologazione al consumo26. 
4. THEODOR ADORNO E LA STANDARDIZZAZIONE 
Se in Weber e Simmel, quindi, possiamo rintracciare gli antecedenti storici, 
relativamente al campo socio-musicale, della standardizzazione, con Ador-
no, tale concetto, si delinea lucidamente. Con questo autore, infatti, la tratta-
zione sulla standardizzazione diviene specificamente musicale, quando, in 
                       
24 G. Simmel, Estetica e sociologia, Armando Editore, Roma, 2006, p. 63. 
25 Cfr. G. Simmel, cit., e G. Simmel, Le metropoli e la vita dello spirito, trad. it. di P. Jedlo-
wski, R. Siebert, Armando Editore, Roma 1995. 
26 Ibid. 
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Musica Leggera27 analizza (non senza un giudizio di merito) quello che de-
finisce come un caso di inesorabile “decadimento”28 ovvero la musica da 
consumo di massa. Già precedentemente29 aveva indagato sulle conseguenze 
dell’estrema razionalizzazione, cioè su quella che Weber chiamava «la gab-
bia d’acciaio», ma in questo saggio l’analisi (e l’invettiva) diventa più pun-
tuale. Adorno definisce la standardizzazione musicale come un «fenomeno 
sintomatico della reificazione musicale, del mero carattere di merce»30 e in-
dividua il prodotto tipico di questo processo nella forma canzone31 ed in ge-
nerale in tutta la musica cosiddetta “leggera”. Sebbene la canzone derivi da 
forme preesistenti, in particolare le danze tradizionali32, che avevano degli 
schemi standardizzati ben prima dell’avvento della fruizione di massa, 
Adorno distingue, ad esempio, quella che poteva essere la composizione di 
una Polka da parte di F. Chopin, o di una qualsiasi danza da parte di Mozart, 
dalle operazioni e dalle finalità dell’industria del settore33. La canzone ri-
prende schemi fissi, dei template da riempire con soluzioni musicali già co-
dificate34. In questo senso possiamo considerare Adorno come un 
antesignano nel prevedere tante di quelle applicazioni odierne da tablet o 
smartphone, che ti consentono di comporre una canzone attraverso una serie 
di operazioni preimpostate, di patterns. Fornire degli schemi familiari, non 
impegnativi dal punto di vista intellettuale, mette il fruitore in uno stato psi-
cologico di disponibilità all’ascolto35, che però mira a reazioni standardizza-
                       
27 T.W. Adorno, Introduzione alla Sociologia della Musica, Einaudi, Torino 2002, p. 26. 
28 Ivi, p. 27. 
29 T.W. Adorno, Filosofia della musica moderna, Einaudi, Torino 2002. 
30 Ivi, p. 32. 
31 «Nei paesi industriali progrediti la musica leggera è definita dalla standardizzazione: suo 
prototipo è la canzone di successo. Il che è stato ammesso con disarmante energia recla-
mistica già vent'anni or sono da un popolare manuale americano sul come scrivere e ven-
dere canzoni di successo». Ivi, p. 31. 
32 «Le forme standard della musica leggera sono derivate da danze tradizionali, ma anche 
queste erano in buona misura standardizzate ancora moltissimo tempo prima che la musi-
ca commerciale si legasse all'ideale della produzione di massa». Ivi, p. 39. 
33 C'è differenza tra la standardizzazione della musica leggera e i modelli rigorosi della mu-
sica seria. «Il rapporto tra la musica superiore e le sue forme storiche è dialettico. A loro 
essa si accende, le rifonde, le fa scomparire e poi ritornare in quanto scomparenti. La mu-
sica leggera invece usa le forme come vasi vuoti». Ivi, p. 32. 
34 «La standardizzazione va dall'impianto generale fino ai dettagli. La regola fondamentale, 
secondo la prassi americana valida per tutta quanta la produzione, è che il ritornello 
dev'essere di trentadue battute con al centro un bridge, e cioè una parte che riconduce alla 
ripetizione. Anche i vari tipi di canzonetta sono standardizzati». Ivi, p. 31. 
35 «Condizionato dallo schema, l'ascoltatore risolve immediatamente la digressione nella 




te36, semplicemente insaporendo «la perpetua identità senza metterla in peri-
colo»37 e facilitando un’immedesimazione emotiva con la canzone che dà 
l’illusione che certe parole e certa musica siano state scritte appositamente 
per noi. Anche l’offerta di generi commerciali variegata è una finta libertà 
che l’industria musicale concede all’individuo38. A questa sfera afferisce 
l’invenzione da parte delle riviste specializzate e dei negozi fisici e virtuali 
di dei tanti generi musicali nei quali incasellare i vari prodotti che rispondo-
no alle caratteristiche necessarie per essere commercializzati39. Secondo 
Adorno, il processo di standardizzazione connaturato all’industria culturale 
riguarda sia i prodotti che il pubblico destinato ad usufruirne. 
 
L’uomo sacrifica l’individualità, inserendosi nella regolarità di ciò che ha 
successo, e fa quel che tutti fanno per il fatto fondamentale che dovunque e in 
tutta la produzione standardizzata dei beni di consumo si offre all’individuo 
sempre la stessa cosa. Tuttavia la necessità che ha il mercato di occultare 
questa uguaglianza conduce alla manipolazione del gusto e a quella apparen-
za di individualità della cultura ufficiale, che di necessità cresce proporzio-
nalmente con la liquidazione dell’individuo40. 
 
Anche il Jazz, oltre alla musica leggera, è per Adorno fortemente rappre-
sentativo del concetto di standardizzazione41, con le sue caratteristiche di ri-
petitività, intercambiabilità e possibilità di sostituzione delle parti (che non 
sono possibili, invece, nella “musica seria”, poiché il tutto, la forma, dipende 
dalle relazioni tra le parti). 
Tali posizioni, che possono sembrare alquanto rigide, anche da chi non ne 
                       
36 «La standardizzazione della musica leggera, in forza del suo crudo semplicismo, non va 
interpretata tanto da un punto di vista interno-musicale quanto da un punto di vista socio-
logico. Essa mira a reazioni standardizzate, e il successo che incontra, [...] conferma che 
l'operazione le è riuscita». Ibid. 
37 Ivi, p. 32. 
38 «[La pseudo-individualizzazione] del compratore che sceglie liberamente al mercato se-
condo i suoi bisogni, mentre è questa stessa aureola che obbedisce alla standardizzazione 
e fa si che l'ascoltatore non si accorga di consumare prodotti già digeriti a dovere». Ivi, p. 
39. 
39 Una di queste, ad esempio, è quella di essere riconducibile ad uno di questi generi. 
40 T.W. Adorno, Il carattere di feticcio in musica e il regresso dell'ascolto, cit., pp. 23-24. 
41 «Se è certa la presenza di elementi africani nel jazz, altrettanto lo è, fin da principio, 
l’irreggimentazione, la riduzione a rigido schema dell’elemento irregolare, la fusione del 
gesto di rivolta con la disposizione alla cieca obbedienza. […] Furono proprio queste ten-
denze intrinseche a favorire la standardizzazione, lo sfruttamento commerciale e la pietri-
ficazione del genere». In T.W. Adorno, Moda senza tempo. Sul jazz, in Prismi. Saggi sulla 
critica della cultura, Einaudi, Torino 1972, p. 116. 
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è sostanzialmente chiamato in causa42, si “ammorbidiscono” nella continua-
zione del saggio, aprendo degli spiragli di grande attualità: «Non si deve pe-
rò paragonare in maniera troppo letterale il modo di produzione della musica 
leggera intesa come prodotto di massa alla produzione di massa industriale. 
Le forme di diffusione sono molto razionalizzate, e così pure la pubblicità 
che reclamizza - specie nel sistema radiofonico americano - precisi interessi 
industriali. Ma questo, tutto sommato, si riferisce alla sfera della circolazio-
ne, non a quella della produzione»43. 
Dopo l’analisi del fruitore di canzoni, Adorno focalizza l’attenzione sulla 
figura del compositore di musica leggera, che sebbene piegato alla logica del 
denaro e del sistema produttivo, non per questo deve necessariamente rite-
nersi di scarsa qualità44. La tolleranza dell’autore in questo caso vale anche 
per le composizioni prodotte45. 
5. EDGAR MORIN: LA STANDARDIZZAZIONE IMPOSSIBILE 
Molto vicina alla posizione possibilista di Adorno è in questo senso quella 
successiva di Edgar Morin che disquisendo sulle formidabili industrie cultu-
rali americane, in particolare quella cinematografica, nota come non si possa 
produrre niente di veramente identico ed anche in un contesto altamente 
standardizzato come quello di Hollywood, la produzione deve fare necessa-
riamente appello alla creatività, che ha permesso che dalla mediocrità seriale 
venissero fuori anche dei grandi capolavori46. Allo stesso modo si riferisce 
alla musica Rock. Morin però, a differenza dei precedenti autori, ha avuto 
anche la possibilità di riflettere sugli effetti della standardizzazione culturale 
a livello globale immaginando una sostanziale impossibilità fisiologica 
all’omologazione. «Quando si tratta di arte, di musica, di letteratura, di poe-
sia, la mondializzazione culturale non è omogeneizzante»47. Parla piuttosto 
di grandi ondate trans-nazionali che favoriscono comunque l’emergere di 
originalità meticce. La tesi di Morin è che la globalizzazione abbia operato 
una mondializzazione tecno-economica, favorendone un’altra sistematica-
                       
42 Adorno è solitamente un bersaglio privilegiato dai “critici” musicali o dai jazzisti che si 
occupano di letture “impegnate”. 
43 T.W. Adorno, Introduzione alla Sociologia della Musica, cit., p. 37. 
44 «Il fatto che tanti musicisti di possibilità ben maggiori lascino abusare di sé in questa ma-
niera ha naturalmente ragioni economiche». Ivi, p. 40. 
45 «Perfino in questa fase avanzata della totale commercializzazione si incontreranno, specie 
in America, idee di prima mano». Ibid. 
46 E. Morin, Lo spirito del tempo, Meltemi, Roma 2005. 




mente incompiuta, di tipo culturale. Sebbene quindi esistano numerose cor-
renti transculturali, che costituiscono una pseudo-cultura planetaria, frutto 
dei rimaneggiamenti che i mass-media hanno prodotto nel XX secolo, queste 
hanno prodotto continuamente nuove culture, nuovi temi e nuovi folklori. 
«Un folklore planetario si è costruito e si è arricchito attraverso integrazioni 
e incontri»48, cosicché così come si è diffuso il Jazz che ha dato vita a nuovi 
stili in tutto il mondo, il Tango argentino, il Mambo cubano, ecc., così e so-
prattutto ha travalicato i confini il Rock che dagli Stati Uniti si è diffuso in 
tutto il mondo prendendo ogni volta un’identità nazionale. La musica quindi 
subisce l’industrializzazione e la commercializzazione, una “McDonaldizza-
zione” generalizzata che tende all’omogeneizzazione, che tuttavia rimane in-
compiuta fino all’avvento di una nuova ondata transculturale. 
6. CONCLUSIONI 
Per concludere questa breve disamina sul concetto di standardizzazione, a 
seguito di tanti studi e riflessioni tutto sommato anche molto recenti 
sull’argomento, intendo riprendere un altro concetto di Morin, quello della 
“complessità”, per suggerire un’ulteriore possibilità di analisi sul fenomeno 
in oggetto: «complessificare significa tentare di vedere non solo il ruolo mol-
teplice e diverso delle interazioni, delle sovrapposizioni, delle retroazioni, 
degli antagonismi [...] ma anche gli aspetti opposti di uno stesso fenome-
no»49. In quest’ottica la standardizzazione assume quindi un valore parziale, 
sia contestualizzato storicamente (ovvero, ad esempio, al tempo di Adorno) 
sia riattualizzato (dal momento riguarda, infatti, solo il mondo “occidentaliz-
zato” e non le potenze culturali emergenti). Evidentemente poi, il cambia-
mento di paradigmi economici e sociali indotti dalla globalizzazione, la 
progressiva dematerializzazione dell’industria musicale, la libera diffusione 
in rete, la facilità nell’home recording, ecc., hanno avuto un impatto signifi-
cativo anche a livello culturale, che nello specifico musicale si manifesta, ad 
esempio, con una liquidità tra generi, in cui il paradigma dominante sembra 
essere, attualmente, quello del crossover.  
Nonostante una necessità di riattualizzazione, l’eredità di Adorno, tutta-
via, rimane fondamentale nello stesso campo musicale50. Non solo guardan-
do all’operato delle grandi produzioni delle Major discografiche ma anche, 
ad esempio, a tutti quei software che sono disponibili in rete e che consento-
no a ciascuno di “creare” la propria musica, spesso in modo intuitivo e senza 
                       
48 Ivi, p. 51. 
49 Ivi, p. 111. 
50 Cfr. E. Fubini, Il pensiero musicale del Novecento, ETS, Pisa 2011, p. 131. 
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bisogno di pregresse conoscenze tecniche e teoriche musicali. Nella maggior 
parte dei casi si tratta di algoritmi pre-impostati che consentono di fare delle 
operazioni già codificate, ottenendo dei risultati che sebbene possano essere 
combinati in un’infinità di modi (come in un processo di pseudo-
individualizzazione), limitano in ogni caso la creatività personale, che può 
essere eventualmente replicata seguendo semplicemente delle istruzioni co-
me se fossero ricette di cucina. La trattazione a questo punto implicherebbe 
un’ulteriore disamina (che esulerebbe, tuttavia, dagli obiettivi di questo sag-
gio) e un confronto sul campo tecnologico (già previsto, peraltro, da Ador-
no51), a partire da un altro autore coevo al Nostro, ossia Walter Benjamin52. 
Ma senza voler addentrarsi in giudizi né di merito (Adorno stesso fu accusa-
to di avere una visione elitaria dei consumi musicali53) né estetici (musica 
seria, musica leggera, ecc.), che sembrano oramai superati dall’attuale Musi-
cologia, riteniamo utile sottolineare che ad oggi, nel melting pot globale, cer-
te formule e certe pratiche rappresentano solo una parziale, seppur rilevante, 
visione delle cose ma riportano l’urgenza di una nuova profonda riflessione 
sul significato sociale della musica stessa. 
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ABSTRACT 
The idea of “technological singularity” – that is, of a dramatic and irreversible 
change in the human condition due to the vertiginous growth of new technologies – 
is one of the theoretical cornerstones of transhumanist futurology. The article shows 
how this idea fits perfectly into a particular historical and cultural path of the West-
ern World; one aimed at overcoming traditional religions and replacing them with a 
new cult. Attempts to found a new universal religion, compatible with the develop-
ments of science and technology, have followed one another since the times of the 
scientific revolution and have intensified after the beginning of the industrial revolu-
tion. In the most recent attempts, the focus is on the mystical or salvific character of 
human evolution, which would have technological singularity as its last stage. Sin-
gularity is framed by its theoreticians within different scientific paradigms, here 
qualified as “biological,” “cybernetic,” “informatic,” “robotic,” and “hybrid.” 
1. PREMESSA 
La singolarità tecnologica è uno dei capisaldi teorici della futurologia di 
orientamento transumanista, anche se – va subito precisato a scanso di equi-
voci – la credenza in questo evento futuro non è conditio sine qua non per 
dirsi transumanisti. Perciò, è in uso anche l’aggettivo-sostantivo “singolarita-
riano/i” per indicare chi ripone fiducia in questo sviluppo delle società tecno-
logicamente avanzate. Alcuni studiosi hanno giustamente notato che la 
visione dei transumanisti singolaritariani, pur partendo da premesse scienti-
fiche, sembra sconfinare nella religione e nella metafisica (Manzocco 2014; 
Paura 2016). Ciò che intendiamo mostrare in questo articolo è che lo “scon-
finamento” non è affatto accidentale. Sebbene molti transumanisti contem-
poranei siano atei o agnostici, alle origini del transumanesimo c’è il 
consapevole tentativo di fondare una nuova religione.  
L’idea di fondare una nuova religione compatibile con la scienza moder-




e da essa traggono linfa vitale. L’ansia di rinnovamento spirituale che si dif-
fonde nel clima del Rinascimento non è infatti limitata alle contaminazioni 
neopagane del Cattolicesimo, alla Riforma protestante o alle tante eresie cri-
stiane che predicano il ritorno agli insegnamenti della Bibbia e del Vangelo, 
variamente interpretati. Dagli albori del Seicento ai nostri giorni, in Europa, 
è tutto un proliferare di forme alternative di spiritualità, di sette esoteriche, di 
nuovi culti intenzionati a trovare punti d’accordo con gli sviluppi della 
scienza e della tecnica. Si pensi al deismo degli illuministi, alla spiritualità 
delle obbedienze massoniche, all’esoterismo degli Illuminati di Baviera, al 
culto dell’Essere Supremo istituito da Robespierre nei giorni della rivoluzio-
ne francese, alla religione dell’umanità fondata da August Comte, o alla reli-
gione-morale della velocità lanciata dai futuristi italiani all’inizio del 
Novecento (Campa 2012: 191-211). Sono, questi, tutti tentativi di riempire il 
vuoto generato dalla crisi del cristianesimo tradizionale. 
Ripercorrendo la storia dell’idea di singolarità tecnologica, cercheremo di 
mostrare come essa si incastri perfettamente in questo percorso storico e cul-
turale dell’Occidente. 
2. L’IDEA DI “SINGOLARITÀ TECNOLOGICA” 
C’è un fenomeno localizzato nel futuro che sta modificando i nostri pensieri 
e le nostre azioni, i nostri modi di esistenza, la nostra vita quotidiana, proprio 
come un buco nero distorce lo spazio tempo e influenza il comportamento 
dei corpi celesti che lo circondano, inclusi quelli molto lontani dall’orizzonte 
degli eventi. Se sta cambiando, in modo sempre più rapido, il nostro modo di 
lavorare, di conoscere, di comunicare, di viaggiare, di divertirci, di amare, di 
riprodurci, di combattere, è perché c’è questo analogo sociale di un oggetto 
supermassivo che modifica le strutture della società. Questo fenomeno è la 
cosiddetta “singolarità tecnologica”. Quello che abbiamo appena esposto po-
trebbe essere il nucleo teorico di un’ipotetica “sociologia della singolarità”. 
Sennonché, esposta in questi termini, la teoria farebbe certamente sobbalzare 
qualche luminare della materia. Naturalmente, si può vedere l’intera questio-
ne al contrario, rispettando la freccia del tempo ed evitando scivolamenti in 
una logica deterministica: una serie di cambiamenti sempre più rapidi nella 
nostra società ci sta conducendo verso la singolarità tecnologica. Questa se-
conda versione è più prosaica, più convenzionale, o – in negativo – meno 
poetica, meno misteriosa, ma proprio per questo più facilmente incorporabile 
nel paradigma sociologico dominante. 
Il termine “singolarità” (lat. singularitas) è da tempo utilizzato nel lin-
guaggio ordinario per indicare ciò che è originale, eccezionale, caratteristico 
di un individuo. Il termine è utilizzato anche in alcune discipline scientifiche, 
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con diverse accezioni. Nel linguaggio della matematica, indica un punto in 
cui una funzione assume un valore infinito (per esempio, il valore di y nella 
funzione y = l/x, quando x assume valore zero). Nel linguaggio 
dell’astronomia, indica un punto nello spazio-tempo in cui la materia è infi-
nitamente densa, il suo volume tende a zero e la sua massa all’infinito, tipi-
camente il centro di un buco nero. Nel linguaggio della biologia 
evoluzionistica, indica i “salti” salienti dell’evoluzione, come la comparsa 
della vita o l’ominazione. Recentemente, il termine ha acquisito un nuovo 
significato nell’ambito della futurologia. Se i dizionari italiani sembrano in 
generale refrattari, o perlomeno in ritardo, nell’accogliere il nuovo uso, non 
così è per gli English Oxford Living Dictionaries, che tra le definizioni han-
no aggiunto la seguente: «Singularity = (usually the singularity) A hypothe-
tical moment in time when artificial intelligence and other technologies have 
become so advanced that humanity undergoes a dramatic and irreversible 
change». 
Nella definizione si sottolinea il fatto che il termine è introdotto 
dall’articolo determinativo “the”, quando si riferisce allo stato futuro della 
società umana, proprio perché si tratta di una trasformazione unica e irrever-
sibile. Per quanto poco rispettate in ambito accademico, molto più aggiorna-
te e approfondite sono le voci, nelle principali lingue del mondo, 
rintracciabili sull’enciclopedia della rete, Wikipedia: “singolarità tecnologi-
ca”, “technological singularity”, “singularité technologique”, “technologi-
sche Singularität”, “technologiczna osobliwość”, ecc. Come si può notare, 
per via del ruolo che in essa assume l’intelligenza artificiale – destinata in 
previsione a superare l’intelligenza umana e tendere all’infinito – il termine 
nell’accezione futurologica è seguito dall’aggettivo qualificativo “tecnologi-
ca”. 
3. IL PARADIGMA BIOLOGICO 
L’esigenza di un rinnovamento spirituale diventa particolarmente sentita do-
po l’affermazione, negli ambienti scientifici, della teoria dell’evoluzione di 
Charles Darwin e la conseguente crisi del creazionismo biblico. Che il vec-
chio mondo stia definitivamente crollando sotto i colpi della scienza, è opi-
nione anche del padre gesuita e paleoantropologo Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin. Per dar conto dei cambiamenti più radicali, il religioso francese ri-
corre al concetto di “singolarità” (Teilhard 2013). Utilizza il termine 
nell’accezione biologico-evoluzionistica, ma inquadra il fenomeno in una 
cornice misticheggiante. Immagina infatti l’intera evoluzione del cosmo co-
me una spirale ascendente che si sviluppa attorno a un asse “divino” e indica 




che si pongono tra l’Alfa della creazione e l’Omega dell’apocalisse (Campa 
2017a). Tuttavia, insiste sul fatto che tali eventi non possono essere conside-
rati punti d’arrivo, una volta che si ammette la realtà storica dell’evoluzione 
e la possibilità teorica dell’evoluzione autodiretta. Ai salti evolutivi già av-
venuti devono seguire ulteriori vette, come la comparsa dell’ultraumano e 
infine del transumano. La singolarità finale, quella transumana, per lo scien-
ziato gesuita, costituirà il compimento della storia, ovvero la Parusia, 
l’avvento del Cristo cosmico (Teilhard de Chardin 1968, 1972; Campa 
2016). 
Attraverso i suoi scritti più filosofici, che notoriamente non ricevono 
l’imprimatur delle gerarchie ecclesiastiche, Teilhard de Chardin intende re-
visionare la teologia cristiana e attivare nella stessa Chiesa cattolica le risor-
se culturali ed energie psichiche necessarie per fare fronte alla sfida della 
modernità e avviare una fase di evangelizzazione rinnovata, al punto che non 
è azzardato parlare di “neo-cristianesimo”1. Il gesuita si rende conto che le 
nuove scoperte scientifiche, a partire dalla rivoluzione copernicana per arri-
vare alla teoria dell’evoluzione, passando per la scoperta dell’immensità del 
cosmo e degli abissi temporali che ci separano dalla nascita della vita sulla 
terra, per arrivare allo straordinario sviluppo dell’industria e delle comunica-
zioni, chiamano a una religiosità diversa. Così si esprime: «Sino a ieri, il cri-
stianesimo rappresentava il punto più elevato raggiunto dalla coscienza 
umana nel suo tentativo di umanizzarsi. Ma occupa ancora questo posto, o 
per lo meno potrà occuparlo ancora per molto tempo? … Molti ritengono di 
no» (Teilhard 1972: 148). Gli scettici si dividono in due categorie. Da un 
canto c’è chi, una volta constatato che «il fiore evangelico si adatta male al 
clima critico e materialistico del mondo moderno», conclude che si può vi-
vere benissimo senza religione. D’altro canto, tra coloro che hanno compre-
so che la stagione del cristianesimo è passata, c’è anche chi sostiene che si 
debba trovare al più presto un degno sostituto, che «è necessario che un altro 
tronco cresca nel campo delle religioni» (ibid.).  
Teilhard de Chardin è invece convinto che l’umanità possa ancora placare 
la propria sete di spiritualità restando nell’ambito di un cristianesimo pro-
fondamente rinnovato. Le moltitudini sono disorientate, ma cercano ancora 
qualcuno che tenga il timone, e perciò si immergono in nuove correnti spiri-
tuali, in cerca di senso e direzione. È vero che «la maggior parte di quelli che 
le diffondono vi salutano, almeno implicitamente, la comparsa di una reli-
                       
1  La letteratura critica che evidenzia questo aspetto è piuttosto corposa e non possiamo ci-
tarla tutta. Ci limitiamo a menzionare quello che ci pare il tentativo più ambizioso e accu-
rato di ricostruire il pensiero teologico e filosofico di Teilhard de Chardin, ovvero la 
monografia Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: Geobiologia/Geotecnica/Neo-cristianesimo, di 
Gianfilippo Giustozzi (2016), alla quale rimandiamo per un approfondimento. 
IL CULTO DELLA SINGOLARITÀ 
 
99 
gione destinata a soppiantare i culti antichi», ma, di fronte a queste provoca-
zioni, i cristiani non dovrebbero rispondere con la diffidenza. Il gesuita invi-
ta i propri correligionari a rigenerare la propria fede, guardando senza timori 
proprio a ciò che accade al di fuori dell’ovile. Ciò perché «né noi né i nostri 
avversari abbiamo preso in sufficiente considerazione gli sviluppi riservati 
dal Cristo alla sua Chiesa» (ibid.: 39).  
Teilhard de Chardin si carica il fardello sulle spalle. San Tommaso 
d’Aquino aveva già rinnovato una volta il cristianesimo, pacificandolo e 
fondendolo con la scienza “pagana” di Aristotele. Ora, il gesuita si erge a 
nuovo Tommaso e propone una sintesi tra il culto di Cristo e le frontiere più 
avanzate della scienza biologica e cosmologica. Il tentativo in parte riesce e 
in parte fallisce. Dopo la proibizione a leggere le sue opere, arriva infatti una 
sua “riabilitazione”, in concomitanza con il Concilio Vaticano II. Tuttavia, 
ancora oggi ci sono forti resistenze nei confronti dell’impianto dottrinale tei-
lhardiano e dello stesso Concilio2. 
Ciò che ci interessa principalmente sottolineare in questa sede è che la ri-
cerca di una nuova religione occupa da secoli un posto centrale nell’agenda 
delle élite intellettuali. Nel Novecento, l’alternativa al tentativo teilhardiano 
di rinnovare – o addirittura “trasfigurare” – il cristianesimo, non è tanto un 
materialismo ateo dagli esiti nichilistici, quanto la fondazione di un nuovo 
culto e di una nuova chiesa. Il padre putativo del transumanesimo, Julian 
Huxley, prima ancora di forgiare il nome e dunque la cosa, discute a più ri-
prese la questione religiosa. Nella raccolta di articoli Essays of a Biologist 
(1923), lo scienziato inglese parte da due considerazioni fondamentali: 1) la 
religione cristiana è ormai apertamente in conflitto con le scienze naturali; e 
tuttavia 2) il bisogno di spiritualità è profondamente radicato nell’uomo, co-
stituendone forse il tratto più saliente. Partendo da questi due postulati os-
servativi, Huxley (1923: 302) conclude che, «poiché il modo di pensare 
scientifico è di validità generale e non solo locale o temporaneo, costruire 
una religione sulla base di esso significa consentire a quella religione di ac-
quisire una stabilità, un’universalità e un valore pratico fino ad ora non rag-
giunto». In altre parole, il biologo concorda con l’idea programmatica di 
Lord John Morley, riassunta nella seguente frase: «Il prossimo grande com-
pito della Scienza è creare una religione per l’umanità» (Huxley 1923: 235).  
Le osservazioni di Huxley sono contenute in un saggio intitolato Religion 
and Science: Old Wine in New Bottles, per dire che il vecchio vino, il senti-
mento religioso profondamente radicato nell’uomo, deve essere travasato 
nelle nuove bottiglie offerte dalla scienza. Significativamente, l’articolo che 
                       
2  La ricezione delle idee del “gesuita proibito” da parte della Chiesa cattolica è un problema 
assai spinoso, che abbiamo affrontato nel saggio Il fascino inquietante dell’ultraumano 




fonda (almeno nominalmente) il transumanesimo compare in apertura di una 
nuova raccolta di saggi, pubblicata nel 1957, intitolata New Bottles for New 
Wine. Ora tutto è nuovo: le bottiglie e il vino, il contenitore e il contenuto. 
In uno dei saggi ivi raccolti, leggiamo: «Come primo passo, abbiamo bi-
sogno di una nuova scienza diretta allo studio di possibilità umane non anco-
ra realizzate. Proseguendo, questa scienza deve essere abbinata a una 
religione basata sull’idea di realizzazione di possibilità. Il cristianesimo ha 
fatto il primo grande passo verso questo obiettivo, affermando che tutti gli 
uomini hanno la possibilità di salvarsi. La nostra formulazione moderna sarà 
che tutti gli uomini hanno la possibilità di giungere a una maggiore realizza-
zione» (Huxley 1957: 242). L’imperativo di trascendere se stessi, realizzan-
do le nuove possibilità che la scienza dischiude all’uomo, viene denominata 
“transumanesimo” (Huxley 1957: 17). 
4. IL PARADIGMA CIBERNETICO 
Le riflessioni di Teilhard de Chardin e Huxley, anche se non trascurano 
l’impatto sociale delle nuove tecnologie, sono principalmente incentrate 
sull’evoluzione biologica della specie umana, in una prospettiva eugenetica. 
Gli sviluppi dell’informatica, della cibernetica e della robotica, nella seconda 
metà del Novecento, aprono invece le porte alla nuova concezione della sin-
golarità tecnologica. Il primo uso del concetto, in stretta relazione alle nuove 
tecnologie computazionali, va ascritto al matematico, fisico, informatico un-
gherese John von Neumann, inventore della moderna teoria dei giochi, in-
sieme a Oskar Morgenstern (Campa 2014). 
Negli anni cinquanta, nel corso di una conversazione, von Neumann af-
ferma che «il progresso sempre più accelerato della tecnologia e i mutamenti 
dei modi della vita umana danno l’impressione di un avvicinamento ad una 
singolarità essenziale nella storia della razza oltre la quale gli affari umani, 
come oggi li conosciamo, non potranno continuare» (Ulam 1958). Nota 
Raymond Kurzweil (2005), uno dei principali teorici della singolarità, che 
von Neumann coglie con grande anticipo due aspetti essenziali dello svilup-
po tecnologico. Il primo è che il progresso segue una curva esponenziale e 
non lineare, ovvero cresce accelerando. In altri termini, la potenza di calcolo 
delle macchine si espande moltiplicandosi ripetutamente per una costante e 
non sommando una costante. La seconda è che la curva dello sviluppo con-
duce a un punto di non ritorno, a una situazione qualitativamente diversa da 
quella in cui ci troviamo, che lo stesso von Neumann chiama “singolarità”. 
Va precisato che il matematico ungherese non era convinto che il futuro 
dell’umanità fosse di necessità legato alla scienza. Queste le sue parole: «Gli 
interessi dell’umanità possono cambiare, le curiosità presenti nella scienza 
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possono cessare, e cose completamente diverse possono occupare la mente 
umana in futuro» (Ulam 1958). 
Quella di von Neumann non è, dunque, una concezione positivistica dello 
sviluppo. Ai suoi occhi, il progresso scientifico non appare come un proces-
so ineluttabile. Il motivo per cui egli prende in considerazione anche 
l’eventualità di una scomparsa della scienza è la sua grande conoscenza della 
storia umana, inusuale per un matematico. In particolare, ci segnala Ulam 
(1958) che lo studioso ungherese era in grado di riportare a memoria tutti gli 
aneddoti della poderosa opera The History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire di Edward Gibbon, che mostrava come l’Impero Romano 
fosse crollato a causa dell’azione corrosiva del cristianesimo. Se è già suc-
cesso una volta che una civiltà avanzata sul piano dei costumi e delle cono-
scenze ingegneristiche è regredita, può succedere ancora (Russo 2006; 
Campa 2013). 
Ma è possibile un avvento della singolarità tecnologica, anche qualora gli 
esseri umani dovessero perdere l’interesse per la scienza? Sì, è possibile, se 
si prende in considerazione l’ipotesi che le macchine prenderanno in mano il 
proprio destino, riproducendosi autonomamente. “Automazione ricorsiva” è 
il termine utilizzato dal sociologo Luciano Gallino (2007) per indicare la co-
struzione di macchine da parte di altre macchine, che – si badi – è un proces-
so già in atto, sebbene ancora non autonomo. La questione di quale tipo di 
organizzazione logica necessiti una macchina per essere in grado di riprodur-
re se stessa è stata affrontata, nell’immediato dopoguerra, proprio da von 
Neumann, in una serie di lavori editi e inediti che, nel 1966, sono stati riuniti 
nel volume Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata. Nel tentativo di elaborare 
una teoria generale degli automi, il poliedrico studioso ungherese prende in 
esame e mette a confronto gli automata naturali (gli organismi viventi) e gli 
automata artificiali (i computer). 
5. IL PARADIGMA INFORMATICO 
Negli anni Sessanta, è Irving John Good, un matematico che ha legato il 
proprio nome al calcolo delle probabilità, a prospettare un futuro in cui 
l’intelligenza “esplode” come conseguenza dell’automazione ricorsiva. In un 
articolo, pubblicato nel 1965 sulla rivista New Scientist e intitolato Logic of 
Man and Machine, Good produce una confutazione dell’opinione comune 
che una macchina non potrà mai diventare intelligente come un essere uma-
no. Il matematico britannico parte dalla definizione di “finite automaton”, 
rilevando che questo tipo di macchina ha: 1) un numero finito di possibili 
stati interni; 2) un numero finito di possibili input in ogni momento; 3) un 




to successivo è determinato unicamente dallo stato presente e dall’input pre-
sente; 5) la proprietà che l’output successivo è anche determinato unicamen-
te dallo stato presente e dall’input presente. Good spiega che un esempio di 
automa finito è il computer digitale. Quindi, prende in considerazione il con-
cetto di “Turing Machine”, elaborato da Alan Turing nel celebre articolo On 
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, 
scritto nel 1936 e dato alle stampe nel gennaio dell’anno successivo. Nella 
sua definizione, condizionata dallo stato di avanzamento della tecnologia del 
tempo, una macchina di Turing è un automa finito combinato con un nastro 
infinitamente lungo. Se si ammette la possibilità di computazione di un nu-
mero infinito di input da parte di un automa che ha comunque limiti compu-
tazionali, si apre la possibilità di considerare l’uomo alla stregua di una 
macchina di Turing. Poiché gli esseri umani hanno un’intelligenza e una 
memoria limitata, segue logicamente che può essere costruita una macchina 
in grado di eguagliare o addirittura superare la capacità di un umano. Good 
precisa che valuta la questione sotto il profilo del pensiero razionale, mentre 
non considera la questione metafisica del “dolore” che una tale macchina po-
trebbe o non potrebbe provare. Aggiunge anche, per rispondere a coloro che 
chiama “mentalisti”, che c’è comunque una differenza sostanziale tra l’uomo 
e la macchina di Turing: il primo è un essere mortale, con una capacità per-
cettiva limitata, e quindi non è davvero in grado di analizzare un numero in-
finito di input. Ma questo significa soltanto che l’essere umano è meno, e 
non più, di una macchina di Turing. 
In un secondo articolo, pubblicato nel 1966 e intitolato Speculations Con-
cerning the First Ultra-Intelligent Machine, Good prevede che, quando ap-
pariranno le prime macchine davvero intelligenti, esse saranno in grado di 
progettare e costruire altre macchine intelligenti, senza l’intervento umano, e 
si apriranno scenari inediti nel campo dell’evoluzione. Queste le sue parole: 
«Definiamo una macchina ultra-intelligente come una macchina che può su-
perare di gran lunga tutte le attività intellettuali di qualsiasi uomo, per quanto 
intelligente. Poiché la progettazione di macchine è una di queste attività in-
tellettuali, una macchina ultra-intelligente potrebbe progettare macchine an-
cora migliori; ci sarebbe quindi senza dubbio una “esplosione di 
intelligenza” e l’intelligenza dell’uomo rimarrebbe molto indietro. Quindi la 
prima macchina ultra-intelligente è l’ultima invenzione che l’uomo avrà bi-
sogno di fare, a condizione che la macchina sia abbastanza docile da dirci 
come tenerla sotto controllo» (Good 1966). 
Il matematico oxoniense va comunque messo nel novero dei pensatori 
tecno-ottimisti. In un mondo sull’orlo dell’autodistruzione, a causa di una 
guerra fredda che minaccia di tramutarsi in olocausto nucleare in ogni istan-
te, è fermamente convinto che la stessa sopravvivenza dell’uomo dipenda in 
ultima istanza dalla costruzione di una macchina ultra-intelligente in grado 
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di risolvere i problemi dell’umanità. 
Se il concetto di singolarità è già presente negli scritti di von Neumann e 
Good, il più preciso termine “singolarità tecnologica” lo dobbiamo a Vernor 
Vinge, scrittore di fantascienza, nonché matematico e informatico alla San 
Diego State University. Nel 1983, in un articolo apparso sulla rivista Omni, 
Vinge annuncia l’evento come imminente: «Presto creeremo intelligenze più 
grandi delle nostre. Quando ciò accadrà, la storia umana avrà raggiunto una 
sorta di singolarità, una transizione intellettuale impenetrabile come lo spa-
zio-tempo annodato al centro di un buco nero, e il mondo andrà ben oltre la 
nostra comprensione. Questa singolarità, credo, tormenta già un certo nume-
ro di scrittori di fantascienza. Essa rende impossibile un’estrapolazione reali-
stica a riguardo di un futuro interstellare. Per scrivere una storia ambientata 
un secolo nel futuro, è necessario un conflitto nucleare nel frattempo... affin-
ché il mondo rimanga intelligibile» (Vinge 1983: 10). 
Vinge lega strettamente il concetto di singolarità allo sviluppo 
dell’intelligenza artificiale e fa riferimento alla metafora astronomica, più 
che all’accezione biologica del termine, anche se la questione riguarda in 
qualche modo anche l’evoluzione della specie. Come si può notare, in questo 
primo scritto, lo studioso denomina l’evento “una sorta di singolarità” (a 
kind of singularity), lasciando fuori l’aggettivo “tecnologica”. La singolarità 
ritorna in un suo romanzo di fantascienza, Marooned in Realtime, dato alle 
stampe nel 1986 e premiato con il prestigioso Hugo Award. Tuttavia, la tap-
pa più importante del percorso storico dell’idea di singolarità tecnologica è 
un simposio organizzato dalla NASA nel 1993, nel corso del quale Vinge 
presenta un articolo in cui l’avvento di «entità con intelligenza superiore a 
quella umana» è ora indicato con il termine “Technological Singularity”. 
L’importanza dello scritto non è, però, legata solo alla completezza del ter-
mine. Fino a quel momento erano state prodotte solo frasi o brevi scritti di-
vulgativi in cui si faceva riferimento al concetto. Il paper presentato da 
Vinge alla conferenza della NASA è il primo studio davvero sistematico del-
la questione. Lo studioso americano deve, dunque, essere annoverato tra i 
principali artefici della teoria della singolarità tecnologica. 
6. IL PARADIGMA ROBOTICO 
In questa categoria va fatto spazio anche all’ingegnere robotico Hans Mora-
vec, autore di libri e articoli spesso citati dai teorici del transumanesimo. Nel 
1988, lo studioso pubblica Mind Children, nel cui prologo si dice convinto 
che l’orizzonte degli eventi non sarà segnato dall’olocausto nucleare. Ciò 
che, secondo Moravec (1988: 1), ci attende «non è l’oblio ma piuttosto un 




“postbiologico” o addirittura “soprannaturale”. È un mondo in cui la razza 
umana è stata spazzata via dall’onda del cambiamento culturale, usurpata 
dalla sua stessa progenie artificiale». Le conseguenze finali di questo proces-
so sono sconosciute. Tuttavia, molti passaggi intermedi non sono solo pre-
vedibili, sono già osservabili. Moravec precisa che, «oggi, le nostre 
macchine sono ancora semplici creazioni che richiedono l’attenzione dei ge-
nitori». Sono come neonati che prestano attenzione al mondo circostante, ma 
ancora non ne hanno piena coscienza. Anche se parliamo di “intelligenza ar-
tificiale”, i computer e i robot costruiti dall’uomo ancora non sono degni di 
essere definiti “intelligenti”. Ma è solo questione di tempo. Secondo 
l’ingegnere, «entro il prossimo secolo [i robot] matureranno in entità com-
plesse come noi stessi e, infine, in qualcosa che trascende tutto ciò che cono-
sciamo, qualcosa di cui potremo dirci orgogliosi, quando si riferiranno a se 
stessi come i nostri discendenti». In altre parole, dobbiamo imparare a vede-
re i robot del futuro come i nostri “eredi evolutivi”, ovvero come macchine 
che erediteranno le nostre capacità cognitive, condivideranno i nostri obietti-
vi, decideranno in base ai nostri valori. Perciò, possiamo propriamente chia-
marli figli della nostra mente. 
Nell’articolo The Age of Robots, presentato a una conferenza nel 1993 e 
pubblicato l’anno successivo, Moravec giunge alla conclusione che i robot 
acquisteranno coscienza e si espanderanno oltre la Terra, colonizzeranno 
l’universo, trasformeranno ulteriore materia inerte in macchine pensanti, fino 
a fare acquisire coscienza all’intero universo. 
Di Moravec, merita una menzione anche il libro Robot: Mere Machine to 
Transcendent Mind, pubblicato nel 1999. Il testo può essere visto come il 
seguito di Mind Children. L’autore porta nuovi elementi a supporto della 
previsione che le macchine acquisteranno coscienza. Prevede che esse rag-
giungeranno livelli umani di intelligenza entro il 2040 e che entro il 2050 ci 
supereranno. La sua, però, è tutt’altro che una visione desolante. Al contrario 
dei luddisti intellettuali, Moravec dà il proprio benvenuto a un futuro in cui 
saranno le macchine e non gli esseri umani a dominare il mondo. Dal mo-
mento che i robot intelligenti sono i nostri figli, noi saremo ben felici nel ve-
derci superare da loro. Ma, in un certo senso, noi saremo loro, perché non 
pochi umani, guidati da un desiderio di immortalità, quando la tecnologia lo 
renderà possibile, decideranno di lasciare i propri corpi mortali e caricare le 
proprie coscienze in computer avanzati. Non sarà, dunque, più possibile 
tracciare una linea divisoria, sul piano ontologico, tra “ex umani” e “macchi-
ne coscienti”. 
L’aspetto interessante di queste speculazioni, sotto il profilo teorico, è 
che Moravec prende a riferimento lo sviluppo del paradigma robotico, visto 
in certa misura come indipendente da quello della cibernetica e 
dell’intelligenza artificiale. 
IL CULTO DELLA SINGOLARITÀ 
 
105 
6. IL PARADIGMA IBRIDO 
Nell’immaginario popolare, il concetto di singolarità tecnologica è comun-
que legato alla figura dell’imprenditore e futurologo americano Raymond 
Kurzweil. Sebbene non sia stato da questi coniato, è innegabile che Kurzweil 
sia l’uomo che lo ha reso popolare, attraverso la pubblicazione, nel 2005, del 
libro The Singularity is near. Il libro è rapidamente diventato un best seller, 
è stato tradotto in molte lingue (incluso l’italiano), e ha ispirato anche film di 
fantascienza, videogiochi e documentari. 
Nel libro, l’autore non manca di riconoscere il proprio debito intellettuale 
nei confronti degli studiosi che lo hanno preceduto nella teorizzazione della 
singolarità tecnologica. Oltre a citare alcuni dei lavori che abbiamo appena 
discusso, Kurzweil parla di due libri, entrambi intitolati The Spike, apparsi 
nel 1997 e nel 2001, a firma dello studioso australiano Damien Broderick, 
che analizzano «l’impatto pervasivo della fase estrema dell’accelerazione 
tecnologica prevista entro alcuni decenni». Inoltre, il futurista americano 
menziona la vasta serie di scritti di John Smart, che descrivono la singolarità 
«come il risultato inevitabile di quella che chiama compressione “MEST” 
(materia, energia, spazio e tempo)». Quindi ricorda i suoi stessi contributi 
antecedenti alla fortunata pubblicazione del 2005. In particolare, cita il libro 
The Age of Intelligent Machines, del 1990, in cui presenta un futuro popolato 
da macchine dotate di intelligenza superiore a quella umana. Un futuro die-
tro l’angolo, locato nella prima metà del XXI secolo. Quindi, racconta che il 
suo libro del 1999, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed 
Human Intelligence, «descrive la connessione sempre più intima tra la nostra 
intelligenza biologica e l’intelligenza artificiale che stiamo creando». 
L’accento è dunque sull’aspetto ibrido del postumano che farà seguito 
all’umano. 
Arriviamo, così, alla definizione di singolarità proposta dallo stesso 
Kurzweil. Secondo lo studioso americano, è «un periodo futuro durante il 
quale il ritmo del cambiamento tecnologico sarà così rapido, il suo impatto 
così profondo, che la vita umana sarà trasformata in modo irreversibile. Pur 
essendo né utopica né distopica, questa epoca trasformerà i concetti cui fac-
ciamo riferimento per dare significato alle nostre vite, dai nostri modelli di 
business al ciclo della vita umana, inclusa la morte stessa» (Kurzweil 2005). 
Sebbene possa sembrare che l’accento sulla tecnologia abbia decisamente 
spostato la questione sul versante secolare, in realtà anche il contributo di 
Kurzweil si sviluppa nel solco del dibattito nato per dare all’umanità una 
nuova religione. Nel libro The Singularity is Near, compare infatti un dialo-
go tra l’autore e Bill Gates che mostra come il connotato religioso della sin-
golarità sia tutt’altro che accidentale. Commentando le speculazioni 




nove percento. Quello che mi piace delle tue idee è che sono basate sulla 
scienza, ma il tuo ottimismo è quasi una fede religiosa. Sono anch’io ottimi-
sta». Kurzweil risponde così: «Sì, beh, abbiamo bisogno di una nuova reli-
gione. Un ruolo principale della religione è stato quello di razionalizzare la 
morte, poiché fino a poco tempo fa c’era poco altro che potessimo fare a ri-
guardo». Al che, il fondatore di Microsoft chiede quali sarebbero i principi 
della nuova religione. Il futurologo chiarisce che si dovranno mantenere 
fermi due principi: uno radicato nella religione tradizionale e uno provenien-
te dalle arti e dalle scienze laiche. La nuova religione terrà fermo il rispetto 
per la coscienza umana che già si trova nelle religioni tradizionali, ovvero 
l’idea che è immorale infliggere sofferenza a entità coscienti, e nel contempo 
acquisirà senza riserve il rispetto per la conoscenza artistica e scientifica che 
si trova nel pensiero laico o secolare. 
Bill Gates annuisce e aggiunge che la nuova religione dovrà prendere le 
distanze dalle strane e intricate storie che caratterizzano le religioni ereditate 
dal passato, per concentrarsi su alcuni semplici messaggi. I due dialoganti 
dissentono però sulla necessità di un leader carismatico per diffondere il 
nuovo credo tra gli uomini. Un nuovo profeta, o un messia, sarebbe necessa-
rio secondo Gates, mentre farebbe parte del vecchio modello religioso se-
condo Kurzweil. Dopo una prima fase di dissenso, i due convergono 
sull’idea che un supercomputer o un sistema operativo avanzato possono 
svolgere egregiamente la funzione di leader carismatico. 
La discussione si sposta quindi sulla dimensione teologica. Gates doman-
da: «C’è un Dio in questa religione?». Kurzweil risponde: «Non ancora, ma 
ci sarà. Quando avremo saturato la materia e l’energia dell’universo con 
l’intelligenza, si “sveglierà”, sarà cosciente e sublimemente intelligente. Un 
universo cosciente è l’immagine più vicina a Dio che io possa immaginare». 
La religione della singolarità è dunque basata sull’idea che la creazione 
sia ancora in corso e che riguardi Dio stesso, un entità di cui tutti saremmo 
parte. Dio chiede agli uomini di dargli un corpo, di farlo entrare nella mate-
ria. Le coscienze umane che si sono svegliate nel mondo materiale, nel corso 
dell’evoluzione cosmica, sono in realtà i primi avamposti della divinità. 
Questo è un tema che troviamo già nel pensiero di Pierre Teilhard de Char-
din e di Julian Huxley. 
La singolarità tecnologica rappresenta dunque l’avvento, la parusia, la re-
denzione. Che altro è un’intelligenza che tende all’infinito se non Dio stes-
so? Abbiamo visto che, quando si chiede al teorico della singolarità se Dio 
esiste, la risposta non è semplicemente un «sì» o un «no». La risposta è: 
«Non ancora». Kurzweil è dunque ateo e credente allo stesso tempo. È ateo 
dal punto di vista delle tre grandi religioni monoteistiche tradizionali, per le 
quali la divinità è un Deus revelatus. È invece credente, se si assume, alla 
maniera di certo paganesimo platonizzante, di certo gnosticismo, o della teo-
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logia cristiana più raffinata, che la divinità sia un Deus absconditus. Per 
Kurzweil, Dio esiste in potenza, a livello ideale, nelle nostre menti e nelle 
possibilità fisiche dell’universo, ma non si è ancora manifestato in tutta la 
sua grandezza. La redenzione, la salvezza dell’uomo, il compimento della 
storia, non verrebbero quindi dalla grazia di un Dio personale che ha stretto 
un’alleanza con un popolo o si è sacrificato sulla croce, ma dall’imitatio Dei. 
Se fede c’è, essa è nella potenza delle idee, ovvero nella capacità dell’uomo 
di trasformare le idee in fatti. 
Kurzweil svela che questa sua visione del mondo è radicata 
nell’educazione che ha ricevuto da bambino e che ha preso corpo in seno alla 
Chiesa Unitariana. Alla domanda: «Chi sono io? Che cosa sono io?», rispon-
de – tra le altre cose – «YRUU», un acronimo che sta per “Young Religious 
Unitarian Universalist”. L’unitarianismo, pur essendo un movimento religio-
so nato in Europa circa mezzo millennio fa, ha avuto maggiore fortuna ol-
treoceano. Giova allora ricordare brevemente ai lettori i cardini di questa 
dottrina. A fondare l’unitarianismo furono perlopiù esuli italiani a Cracovia, 
riparati nella capitale del Regno di Polonia all’epoca della Riforma, per 
sfuggire alla Santa Inquisizione. In particolare, contribuì all’espansione del 
movimento l’opera di Fausto Sozzini, detto Socinus, tanto che i primi unita-
riani sono detti anche sociniani (Szczucki 2005). L’unitarianismo è un credo 
antitrinitario che, pur essendosi sviluppato nell’alveo del cristianesimo, rifiu-
ta tutti i dogmi cristiani non confermati dalla ragione. Tra le altre cose, i so-
ciniani non credevano nella divinità di Cristo, nella funzione redentrice del 
suo sacrificio sulla croce, nell’infallibilità delle Scritture, nell’inferno, nel 
peccato originale, nella predestinazione e nel parto verginale di Maria. Il so-
cinianesimo era, in altre parole, un’eresia assimilabile per certi aspetti 
all’arianesimo dell’antichità e, per altri, al deismo dell’era moderna. 
Conseguenza diretta dell’approccio razionalistico dell’unitarianismo è la 
tolleranza religiosa, ovvero l’idea che in tutte le religioni c’è un grano di ve-
rità nascosto tra molti dogmi contorti e di dubbia utilità. Per tale ragione, gli 
unitariani partecipano alle attività liturgiche delle altre chiese, alla ricerca di 
ciò che unisce. Kurzweil racconta così la sua esperienza giovanile: «Trascor-
revamo sei mesi a studiare una religione – andavamo alle sue liturgie, legge-
vamo i suoi libri, avevamo dialoghi con i suoi leader – per poi passare alla 
successiva. Il tema era: «Sono molte le vie alla verità». Ho notato, natural-
mente, molti paralleli tra le tradizioni religiose del mondo, ma anche le in-
congruenze erano illuminanti. Mi è apparso chiaro che le verità fondamentali 
erano abbastanza profonde da trascendere apparenti contraddizioni». 
Per farla breve, se Cristo dice «Io sono la via, la verità, la vita» (Gv 14:6), 
gli unitariani non contestano questo assunto, si limitano a togliere l’articolo 
determinativo. Le vie del Signore sono molte, forse infinite. Per Kurzweil, 




7. LA CHIUSURA DEL CERCHIO 
L’esigenza di fondare una nuova religione universale, capace di conciliare la 
tensione all’infinito inscritta nell’uomo con la visione scientifica del mondo, 
si manifesta in diverse iniziative nell’ambito del movimento transumanista. 
Una delle più rimarcabili è la recente fondazione della Chiesa di Turing (Tu-
ring Church), che conta già un migliaio di aderenti. Uno dei suoi membri di 
spicco, Giulio Prisco, fisico teorico per formazione e transumanista della 
prima ora per vocazione, ha recentemente scritto un libro di riferimento, Ta-
les of the Turing Church, la cui versione preliminare è accessibile in rete. Si-
gnificativo è il tentativo di superare la religiosità del passato, mantenendo 
però con essa una sorta di continuità. Questo l’incipit dell’opera: «Questa 
non è la religione di tuo nonno. La scienza e la tecnologia del futuro permet-
teranno di giocare con gli elementi costitutivi dello spaziotempo, della mate-
ria, dell’energia e della vita in modi che oggi possiamo solo chiamare magici 
e soprannaturali. Un giorno o l’altro in futuro, tu e i tuoi cari sarete risuscita-
ti da una scienza e una tecnologia molto avanzate. Intelligenze inconcepi-
bilmente avanzate sono là fuori tra le stelle. Esseri ancora più simili a Dio 
operano nel tessuto della realtà al di sotto dello spaziotempo, o al di là dello 
spaziotempo, e controllano l’universo. La scienza futura ci permetterà di tro-
varli e diventare come loro». 
La credenza alla base della “dottrina” della Chiesa di Turing è che «i no-
stri discendenti nel lontano futuro si uniranno alla comunità di esseri simili a 
Dio tra le stelle e oltre, e useranno la tecnologia trascendente per resuscitare 
i morti e rifare l’universo». Questa visione può risultare spiazzante, visiona-
ria, persino folle, per chi non ha seguito lo sviluppo del pensiero transumani-
sta, partendo da Teilhard de Chardin e Huxley, per arrivare a Kurzweil, 
passando attraverso von Neumann, Gold, Vinge e Moravec. Di questo, i fon-
datori della Turing Church sono perfettamente coscienti. Prisco mostra que-
sta consapevolezza rimarcando, retoricamente: «Scienza? Spaziotempo? 
Alieni? Tecnologia del futuro? Ti avevo avvertito, questa non è la religione 
di tua nonna». Eppure, relazioni con le religioni del passato non mancano. E, 
dopo aver creato un senso di estraniazione, l’autore sottolinea la continuità 
sottotraccia con la tradizione: «Semplifica ciò che ho detto e riformulalo 
come: Dio esiste, controlla la realtà, resusciterà i morti e rifarà l’universo. 
Suona familiare? Scommetto di sì. Quindi forse questa è la religione dei no-
stri nonni, in parole diverse». 
In conclusione, abbiamo adottato la prospettiva della storia delle idee, per 
mostrare che da alcuni secoli è in atto un tentativo di fondare una nuova reli-
gione universale, “al passo coi tempi”. Detto tra parentesi, la storia delle idee 
è una disciplina nata per attraversare tutte le discipline, tutti i paradigmi, 
proprio come l’unitarianismo è una religione nata per attraversare tutte le re-
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ligioni. E non è forse un caso che la storia delle idee sia stata fondata da un 
altro illustre membro della Chiesa unitariana: Arthur Lovejoy. 
La fede nella singolarità tecnologica è forse il tentativo più ardito e spre-
giudicato per chiudere il cerchio. C’è, da un lato, la convinzione che il cri-
stianesimo abbia svolto una funzione importante in passato e, dall’altro, la 
consapevolezza che il mondo contemporaneo si estende ben oltre 
l’Occidente e le sue ex colonie cristianizzate. Quella che è stata per secoli 
un’idea unificante, almeno in linea di principio e al netto delle persecuzioni e 
delle guerre religiose, che pure non sono mancate, è diventata un fattore 
concreto di divisione. Il termine “cattolica” significa “universale”, ma è oggi 
impensabile pensare alla conversione al cristianesimo dell’intera umanità. 
Miliardi di esseri umani, cresciuti nel mondo islamico, in India, in Cina, o in 
Giappone, fanno riferimento a orizzonti religiosi e culturali diversi. Eppure, 
tutti parlano il linguaggio della scienza e usano le stesse tecnologie. Da que-
sta base, i transumanisti singolaritariani vogliono partire per edificare una 
spiritualità comune e finalmente unificante. La convinzione profonda è che i 
popoli della Terra possono tutti comprendere e abbracciare l’idea di singola-
rità. Se non lo faranno, sarà comunque la Singolarità ad abbracciare loro. 
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ABSTRACT 
The question of philosophical background for educational currents is still vivid in 
education studies. Idealism used to be one of the most influential for education, 
especially since the Enlightenment period. This article aims at outlining basic crite-
ria for the identification of educational ideas and currents in the scope of idealism. 
The main focus is put on principal elements of education: its subjects, forms rela-
tionships, curricula, didactics, fundamental ideas, values, and main objectives. By 
outlining their characteristics in the context of idealism, this article also proposes a 
prospect for developing further methodology in this subject matter. 
 
 
Punktem wyjścia dla wskazania możliwości identyfikacji nurtów pedago-
gicznych w obrębie idealizmu jest związek filozofii z pedagogiką. O ile sa-
ma edukacja może ograniczać się jedynie do poszukiwania coraz 
skuteczniejszych metod przyswajania wiedzy, rozwijania kompetencji czy 
umiejętności, tak pedagogika rozumiana jako nauka uwzględnia również 
pewną wizję świata, porządek normatywny (Leś, 2011, 48) stojący za tym, 
co ma być nauczane i przekazywane kolejnym pokoleniom. Sławomir Szto-
bryn wskazuję także na bogate tradycje tzw. pedagogiki filozoficznej (Szto-
bryn, 2016). Mimo, iż filozofie w rozumieniu systemów momentami 
znacznie od siebie się różniły, powyższy związek między tymi dyscyplinami 
zdaje się być niezaprzeczalny. Co więcej, refleksja o charakterze filozoficz-
nym winna uwzględniać konsekwencje praktyczne (pedagogiczne), a ta 
stricte pedagogiczna nie może zapominać o fundamentalnych podstawach 
teoretycznych (filozoficznych).  
Pośród wielu ról, jakie filozofia pełni w refleksji pedagogicznej, Sztobryn 
wyróżnia siedem zasadniczych elementów idealizmu, istotnych dla poniż-
szych rozważań: idealizm 1) to określona koncepcja człowieka, świata i ich 
wzajemnych relacji; 2) „stwarza określoną koncepcję aksjologiczną będącą 
podstawą teleologii, [podczas gdy] epistemologia i logika służą dydaktyce, 
etyka teorii wychowania moralnego, estetyka teorii wychowania estetyczne-
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go, filozofia prawa i państwa podbudowuje koncepcje wychowania obywa-
telskiego, filozofia religii jest podstawą wychowania religijnego, historia fi-
lozofii wraz z metodologią wskazują drogę historii pedagogiki, prakseologia 
stanowi przesłankę skutecznej metodyki”; 3) idealizm „formułuje konkretne 
idee, które pedagogika z różnym stopniem krytycyzmu podejmuje”; 4) „jest 
źródłem metodologii”; 5) „bada podstawowe dychotomie, które mają swoją 
postać na gruncie koncepcji pedagogicznych” – na przykład aprioryzm vs. 
aposterioryzm; 6) idealizm przekłada się na definiowanie pojęć; 7) a przede 
wszystkim „filozofia może inspirować kierunek badań empirycznych” 
(Sztobryn, 2003, 25-39). Jest to jedna z istotniejszych propozycji zestawie-
nia powiązań idealizmu z pedagogiką, jednak na szczególną uwagę zasługu-
je punkt trzeci, dotyczący idei, oraz ostatni, odnoszący się do badań 
empirycznych. Sposób, w jaki pedagogika może podejmować idee filozo-
ficzne ma konsekwencje nie tylko dla samej teorii, ale właśnie praktyki pro-
cesu wychowania. W odróżnieniu od filozofii, pozostającej głównie w sferze 
koncepcyjnej, teoretycznej, pomimo silnego teoretycznego zaplecza, przed-
miotem zainteresowania pedagogiki jest też aspekt praktyczny. Obejmuje on 
konkretne metody, metodyki i sposoby oddziaływań, instytucjonalizację czy 
mniej lub bardziej sformalizowane procedury. Za rozwiązaniami praktycz-
nymi stoją min. określone wizje świata (Weltanschauung), systemy wartości, 
potrzeby społeczne, uwarunkowania ekonomiczne czy kontekst osiągnięć i 
rozwoju nauki w pozostałych dyscyplinach. W obszarze praxis pojawiają się 
konkretne pedagogie, w ramach których identyfikowalne są pomniejsze nur-
ty (Jaworska-Witkowska, 2011). Dlatego tak ważne jest dokładne poznanie 
idei czy też wartości leżących u podstaw poszczególnych nurtów pedago-
gicznych, oraz filozoficznych inspiracji z jakich one wynikają, z których 
czerpią. Wielość definicji oraz punktów widzenia na normatywność pedago-
giki, jak również różnorodność form i odmian samego idealizmu sprawia, że 
tym trudniej o zidentyfikowanie nurtów sięgających bezpośrednio do ideali-
zmu. Określenie twardych kryteriów wymagałoby powtórnego zredefinio-
wania podstawowych pojęć, dokonania gruntownej charakterystyki 
fenomenów przestrzeni wychowawczej oraz zaplecza teoretycznego nurtów 
pedagogicznych, a przynajmniej zestawienia polisemicznych kategorii jakie 
tworzą w ramach pedagogii. Te potrafią się skrajnie różnić, dlatego jest to 
zadanie właściwie graniczące z budową kolejnego systemu myślowego. Dla-
tego też niniejszy tekst ogranicza się jedynie do wskazania pewnych zasad-
niczych tropów, na jakie być może warto zwracać uwagę, przystępując do 
analizy idei i nurtów pedagogicznych.  
 
Pomijając protoplastów klasycznego idealizmu (jak np. Anaksagoras), głów-
nym przedstawicielem tego nurtu w myśli zachodniej jest Sokrates (autor 




tycznej) oraz Platon, który zakładał istnienie bytów doskonałych, bardziej 
pierwotnych od tych poznawalnych zmysłowo. Na przestrzeni dziejów moż-
na wymienić szereg filozofów podejmujących zagadnienie idealizmu: Plo-
tyn, Immanuel Kant, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (i XIX-wieczni idealiści niemieccy), z nurtu anglosaskiego min. Geo-
rge Berkeley, Thomas Green, Bertrand Russell, czy Francis Bradley i wielu 
innych. Często idealizm rozważano w opozycji do takich nurtów, jak prag-
matyzm i realizm, kontrastujących w podstawowych założeniach: ontolo-
gicznych, poznawczych czy aksjologicznych. Historycznie rzecz ujmując, 
można wyróżnić idealizm platoński, zakładający istnienie świata doskonałe-
go – świata idei, oraz świata ich cieni, w którym żyje ludzkość. Ten typ od-
zwierciedla się również w pismach Hegla – w postaci idealizmu 
obiektywnego (lub inaczej – absolutnego), zakładającego istnienie idei nie-
zależnej od podmiotu czy materii, jak również jednego rozumu (ducha), w 
którym dokonuje się poznanie rzeczywistości (Inwood, 2002). Dalej wyróż-
nia się kantowski idealizm transcendentalny odrzucający poznanie rzeczy 
samych w sobie, gdzie przedmioty zależne są od indywidualnego poznania. 
Następnie, wyróżnia się idealizm subiektywny (charakterystyczny min. dla 
Berkeley’a), u którego podstaw leży zaasada esse est principi, oznaczająca 
bycie, coś, co wyznacza percepcja. Berkeley utożsamiał bycie z percepcją, 
poznaniem indywidualnym (Cedeno, 2003, 87). Dla przykładu: książka nie 
może istnieć, jeśli nie jest odbierana zmysłowo, ale też jeśli nie istnieje w 
intelekcie, pod postacią idei.  
Inny podział idealizmów zaproponował Józef Bocheński (Bocheński, 
2008). Pierwszym, który wymienia jest idealizm moralny, jako postawa wy-
rażająca się wiarą w ideały moralne. Następnie wymienia on idealizm onto-
logiczny (typowy dla Platona), który obok przedmiotów realnych, uznaje 
istnienie bytów idealnych. Jako przykład daje wartości czy prawa matema-
tyczne. Kolejny to idealizm teoriopoznawczy podmiotowy, polegający na 
tym, iż człowiek może poznać jedynie swoje idee, a poza umysłem czy psy-
chiką nie ma nic innego. Jako czwarty typ, Bocheński wymienia typ trans-
cendentalny – gdzie przedmioty poznania zależą a priori od tak zwanych 
transcendentalnych form poznania. Z punktu widzenia filozofii, najczęściej 
spotyka się podział idealizmu na epistemologiczny i metafizyczny. Episte-
mologiczny dzieli się dalej na immanentny i transcendentny, zaś metafi-
zyczny – na subiektywny i obiektywny, przy czym dopiero subiektywny 
uznaje podział na immanentny i transcendentny (Ajdukiewicz, 2004).  
Pomijając krytykę i obszerną debatę wokół tych idealizmów, jak również 
zważając na fakt, iż kolejnych rodzajów i typologii można by mnożyć w za-
leżności od poszczególnych teoretyków, filozofów przyjmujących tę orien-
tację poznawczą i ontologiczną (np. Wschodni i Zachodni, przyjmujący 
kryterium kultury, czy typologie zależne od konkretnych gałęzi filozofii), za 
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cechę wspólną większości można wskazać twierdzenie, iż idee i wytwory 
intelektu są rzeczywiste. W zależności od nurtu, zmieniają się akcenty kła-
dzione na idee (boga, jednostki czy rzeczywistości). Przykładowo, persona-
lizm – w odróżnieniu od absolutu Hegla czy subiektywizmu Berkeley’a – 
kładzie nacisk na pojmowanie i rolę jednostki w taki sposób, żeby nie zosta-
ła wchłonięta przez ideę boga (Flawelling, 1953, 100-110). Flawelling do-
chodzi do wniosku, że idealizm jest raczej kategorią systemów 
filozoficznych, obejmującą poszczególne nurty czy szkoły filozoficzne. Tym 
samym właściwsze byłoby odnosić nurty pedagogiczne ściśle do konkret-
nych szkół i nurtów filozoficznych, lub do określonych typów idealizmu. 
Dynamiczny rozwój różnorodnych form idealizmu w nowożytnej odsło-
nie zawdzięcza się między innymi wspomnianym wcześniej: Kartezjuszowi, 
Berkeley’owi czy Kantowi. W momencie rozwoju niemieckiej, XIX-
wiecznej wersji dość zradykalizowanego idealizmu, reprezentowanego przez 
Johanna Gottlieba Fichtego, Friedricha Schellinga i Georga Wilhelma Hegla, 
istotny dla niniejszej refleksji zdaje się być fakt, iż niemal od stulecia funk-
cjonował wtedy obowiązek szkolny. Wdrożony przez Fryderyka I, bardzo 
skrupulatnie był egzekwowany na terenach ówczesnych Prus. Wtedy też, 
dość transparentnie ujawniała się refleksja idealistyczna w kontekście peda-
gogicznym. Wiek XIX odznacza się szczególną intensyfikacją wpływu idea-
lizmu na ten obszar tak w obszarze teoretycznym, programowym, jak i w 
sposobach organizowania szkolnictwa. Wyrazem była wszechobecna, suro-
wa dyscyplina i karność, egzekwowane przy równoczesnym poszanowaniu 
autorytetu nauczyciela. Był on figurą wysoko postawioną i znaczącą w hie-
rarchii szkolnej XIX-wiecznego, pruskiego modelu kształcenia. Nie tylko 
miał nieposzlakowaną opinię, dobre imię, autorytet i posłuch wśród 
uczniów, kompetencje i umiejętności dydaktyczne, ale też odgrywał szcze-
gólną rolę w procesie wychowawczym dziecka, prezentując postawę do na-
śladowania, kształtując odpowiedni system wartości.  
Ponadto, niemiecki idealizm stanowił silną inspirację dla tego, co działo 
się w owym czasie w szkolnictwie także poza granicami Starego Kontynentu 
– głównie w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Szczególnie na gruncie amerykańskim 
wdrażano do edukacji strategie i rozwiązania inspirowane idealizmem. 
Transcendentalista Amos Bronson Alcott, jako najważniejsze zadanie edu-
kacji wskazywał kształtowanie charakteru, do realizacji czego stosował me-
tody sokratejskie w edukacji najmłodszych. Miała temu służyć również 
analiza treści biblijnych oraz rozmaitych problemów społecznych, poprzez 
odpowiednio moderowaną dyskusję. Przy okazji, działania te miały zapo-
znawać dzieci i młodzież z treściami wcześniej wyselekcjonowanymi przez 
Alcotta, co w dużej mierze realizowane było na wzór platońskiej akademii 





We wstępie do jednego z pierwszych nowożytnych dzieł w całości poświę-
conemu procesom wychowania, tj. O pedagogice, Immanuel Kant zwraca 
uwagę na to, że tylko człowiek potrzebuje wychowania. Te zaś składa się z 
następujących elementów: opieka i żywienie, dyscyplina oraz nauczanie – 
rozumiane jako Bildung, czyli wraz z kształtowaniem (formowaniem) i wy-
chowaniem moralnym (Kant, 2003, I). Definicja ta dość trafnie identyfikuje 
elementy składowe wychowania, o których mowa również współcześnie. 
Pośród wielu definicji proponowanych przez różne nurty pedagogiczne, cha-
rakteryzujące się odmiennymi założeniami i paradygmatami, zauważa się 
niemalże stałą obecność takich elementów, jak: podmioty pedagogiczne, 
przez które rozumie się osobę wychowanka, grupy wychowanków czy 
uczniów, rodziców, formalne oraz nieformalne instytucje i organizacje nie 
tylko w swych celach i założeniach realizujące zadania edukacyjne i wy-
chowawcze, ale też posiadające taki potencjał (gdy efekty wychowawcze są 
poboczne, nie są stawiane na pierwszym miejscu), jak również dziś coraz 
silniej zaangażowane w kształcenie – media. Następnie wymienia się rela-
cję, jako spotkanie podmiotów edukacyjnych – tak istotne chociażby dla per-
sonalizmu. W dalszej kolejności mówi się o kształceniu, które można 
rozumieć zarówno poprzez przekazywanie i utrwalanie wiedzy, kształcenie u 
wychowanków pewnych zdolności, umiejętności, rozwijanie talentów, jak 
również przystosowywanie do postępowania zgodnie z określonymi warto-
ściami porządkującymi postrzeganie i funkcjonowanie w świecie. Tym sa-
mym, by mówić o wychowaniu, w odróżnieniu od zwykłego treningu czy 
tresury, szczególną uwagę poświęca się wartościom, które mają być przeka-
zywane czy „transmitowane” oraz internalizowane przez wychowanków. 
Zwraca się uwagę na niebagatelną rolę uwarunkowań środowiskowych jako 
przestrzeni, pewnego społeczno-kulturowego kontekstu, millieu w którym 
podmioty edukacyjne funkcjonują: poprzez interakcje, konfrontacje i szereg 
innych form relacji.  
Poszukiwania konkretnych przykładów odniesień filozofów idealizmu do 
wychowania sprowadzają w pierwszej kolejności do Platona, który z eduka-
cji uczynił jeden z kluczowych elementów budowania swojego idealnego 
Państwa. Edukacja miała za zadanie kształcić w celu poszukiwania i dopro-
wadzania do prawdziwych idei. Idąc dalej wspomnianymi przykładami, dla 
Alcotta, a jeszcze wcześniej do Kanta i Johna Horne’a, edukacja miała na 
celu dać społeczeństwu nie tylko człowieka wykształconego, ale dobrego w 
sensie moralnym (Ibid., 20). Istotność idei w sensie intelektualnym kieruje 
edukację w stronę przedmiotów wymagających myślenia abstrakcyjnego, 
zatem głównie ścisłych, matematycznych, humanistycznych, aniżeli z obsza-
ru nauk naturalnych. Stąd do wymienianych elementów wychowania należa-
łoby włączyć również charakter treści nauczania. Według idealizmu, uwaga 
człowieka nie koncentruje się na znalezieniu prawdy, ale ciągłym jej poszu-
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kiwaniu – podług heglowskiej koncepcji prawdy zakładającej jej postępującą 
złożoność w miarę poszukiwania na drodze dialektyki. Ponadto, bardziej od 
wycinkowego badania rzeczywistości, ważniejsze jest spojrzenie uniwersal-
ne, holistyczne, dotyczące kwestii i problemów ogólnych (Ibid., 21). Spro-
wadzając to do przykładu: ważniejsze dla idealistów jest zrozumienie czym 
jest sprawiedliwość czy odwaga, od poznania formalnych składników sytua-
cji rzeczywistej, w której idee te będą się wyrażały. Stąd pośród najważniej-
szych zadań edukacyjnych dla idealizmu – oprócz poznania idei – jest 
(krytyczne i samodzielne) myślenie. Nie w sensie pozyskiwania informacji, a 
ich przetwarzania, zadawania pytań: dlaczego, w jakim celu, z jakiej przy-
czyny? Stąd sentencja kartezjańska Cogito ergo sum może wyznaczać pry-
marny cel dla edukacji. Przy okazji, to bodaj najjaskrawsze kryterium 
odróżniające nurt pedagogiczny w obrębie idealizmu od zwykłej ideologii. 
Pomimo subiektywizmu charakterystycznego dla idealizmu, poznanie i dą-
żenie do prawdy odbywają się zawsze w jakimś kontekście. Mowa tu o roli 
„symbiotycznej” relacji jednostki z Innymi, tym samym ze światem. Relację 
czy spotkanie darzyli dużą uwagą zarówno Platon, Augustyn, jak i Hegel, 
który za klucz do zrozumienia siebie uważał odniesienie do totalności istnie-
nia, do kosmosu (Ibid.). Echa powyższych rozważań odnajduje się także 
współcześnie w roli, jaką przypisuje się społeczeństwu obywatelskiemu w 
ramach zachodnich demokracji, jak też samorealizacji i samokształcenia w 
ramach takiego społeczeństwa.  
Za rzeczonymi podwalinami teoretycznymi idą konkretne metody nau-
czania, czy też sposoby organizacji korelacji pomiędzy wymienionymi ele-
mentami procesu wychowania. Podejście holistyczne, uznające 
przyczynowość następujących po sobie faktów wymaga sporej wiedzy histo-
rycznej. Platońska wizja rozumienia en toto implikuje z kolei metodę dialek-
tyczną (rozwiniętą potem przez Hegla w formule teza–antyteza–synteza) i 
krytyczne myślenie. Stosowanie podobnych rozwiązań metodycznych 
szczególnie zauważalne było jeszcze w średniowieczu, uzupełniane przez 
augustiańską metodę poznania intuitywnego. Stąd między innymi zakony 
kontemplacyjne, gdzie niektóre z nich odrzucają nawet pieśni religijne jako 
dekoncentrujące w kontemplacji. W przypadku akademii inspiracje tego ro-
dzaju można znaleźć w formie seminaryjnej. By ta była skuteczna, na po-
przedzających etapach należy kłaść nacisk na kształtowanie takich cech 
charakteru, jak lojalność, wytrzymałość, dociekliwość, tolerancja czy pra-
cowitość, które umożliwią późniejsze, bardziej wnikliwe i wymagające stu-
dia. Kształcenie charakteru odbywa się między innymi poprzez 
naśladowanie autorytetów oraz wzorów moralnych. Pośród metod przygo-
towujących uczniów i studentów do tych zadań będzie zatem analiza tekstu, 
metoda projektowa oraz kwerendy biblioteczne. Ponadto, dużą popularno-




i zapamiętywanie przez imitację. Natomiast, cel idealizmu w postaci samo-
realizacji będzie miał na uwadze zdolność do samokształcenia i samodziel-
ność w prowadzonej pracy. Do tego potrzebne jest kształcenie powszechne – 
realizowane przez pryzmat racjonalności, co teoretycznie ma uchronić od 
ideologizacji (w sensie porządkowania wartości wbrew zasadom logicznym 
czy racjonalnym na rzecz afektu czy zabobonu). Nacisk położony jest zatem 
na rozwój wewnętrzny (duchowy) jednostki, który dokonuje się w procesie 
transmisji wartości, dziedzictwa kulturowego oraz ich promowania, przy 
czym szczególnie ważne są wartości moralne – w odróżnieniu od etycznych, 
mają charakter ogólnoludzki, a nie jedynie kontekstualny, jak ma to miejsce 
w przypadku kodeksów zawodowych lekarzy, prawników i podobnych grup. 
W myśl pielęgnowania racjonalności, szczególnie istotne jest ćwiczenie i 
rozwijanie inteligencji, jak i łączenie sztuki (w sensie Arts) z nauką (Scien-
ce) – zwłaszcza w curriculach. Obok decydentów „systemowych”, by nie 
rzec politycznych, to w zależności od samych nauczycieli, którzy winni po 
kantowskiemu wyprowadzać z dzieciństwa ku dorosłości, czyli samodziel-
nego myślenia, zależy ich ostateczny kształt. Pośród przedmiotów curricu-
lum stworzonego w duchu idealizmu można by wymienić kolejno filozofię z 
etyką, historię, wiedzę o religiach, sztukę, literaturę, języki obce, ale i sport 
– w myśl zasady „w zdrowym ciele zdrowy duch”. Rolą nauczyciela będzie 
zarówno sokratejska asysta w rozwoju ucznia, ale też stanowienie dlań mo-
ralnego modelu postępowania i partnera do rozmów maksymalnie zbliżają-
cego relację do equilibrium. Przypomina to relację „mistrz—uczeń”, gdzie 
oprócz prostego nauczania umiejętności i przekazywania wiedzy, transmi-
towane są również pewne idee, wartości. W myśl idealizmu, nauczyciel po-
stępuje według ściśle określonych zasad, natomiast będzie potrafił 
improwizować i dostosowywać się do nowych, niespodziewanych sytuacji. 
Pozostając wciąż autorytetem, może stosować szereg kar i nagród celem 
rozwoju wewnętrznej dyscypliny u wychowanka czy ucznia, a nie tylko ze-
wnątrzsterownej karności. Jest to podejście nieco odmienne od chociażby 
orientacji naturalistycznej, gdzie uczniowi przysługuje pełna swoboda w do-
borze treści nauczania oraz trudno o karność czy kształtowanie dyscypliny z 
tak istotnym udziałem wychowawcy. Celem idealizmu we wdrażaniu dyscy-
pliny jest przede wszystkim samorozwój i samopoznanie jednostki, co w 
efekcie końcowym ma skutkować świadomym, samodzielnym i racjonalnym 
zarządzaniem własnym dalszym rozwojem.  
Tego rodzaju podejście do edukacji znajduje również krytyków, zwłasz-
cza wśród realistów, którzy uważają je za nieadekwatne do współczesnego, 
materialistycznego świata, jak również stwarzające zagrożenie w postaci re-
latywizacji i dogmatyzacji pewnych idei. Krytycy idealizmu w edukacji za-
rzucają brak rozwoju konkretnych umiejętności, a jedynie spojrzenie ogólne, 
nieszczegółowe, tym samym oderwane od rzeczywistości i nieprzygotowu-
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jące do współczesnego, dynamicznie zmieniającego się świata. Przecenia się 
rolę matematyki mówiąc o przeintelektualizowaniu stosując metody pamię-
ciowe, które w XXI wieku zresztą nie należą do najbardziej faworyzowa-
nych. Wiele informacji jest dostępnych na wyciągnięcie ręki, tudzież kilka 
kliknięć klawiatury. Czy jednak ma to oznaczać postępujące zubażanie za-
sobów podstawowej wiedzy uczniów na rzecz wyposażania ich kolejne ze-
stawy praktycznych umiejętności? – to już problem do rozważań w ramach 
innego artykułu. Niektóre popularne strategie wychowawcze, jak np. autor-
stwa Marii Montessori, stawiają dziecko w centrum zainteresowania i uwagi 
ograniczając rolę nauczyciela, co stoi w jawnej opozycji do idealizmu peda-
gogicznego. Jednym z rodzimych krytyków pedagogiki idealistycznej jest 
Mieczysław Gogacz, który nie widzi różnicy w „kierowaniu ludzi do idea-
łów i wzorców” a kierowaniu do „światopoglądów i ideologii”, ponieważ 
„nie kieruje do osób [...]. Wyznacza tylko nigdy niespełnione dążenia” (Go-
gacz, 1985, 85). Podobny ton przyjmuje Mikołaj Krasnodębski sprowadzają-
cy pedagogikę idealistyczną do pedagogiki kary i nagrody, a rola 
nauczyciela spłycona jest do stróża prawa (Krasnodębski, 2009, 324sq). 
Prawdopodobnie, wynika to z koncentracji na aspekcie społecznym – na 
spotkaniu i budowaniu relacji osobowych. Niemniej, inne aspekty idealizmu 
w pedagogice wymienione wyżej, zarówno u Gogacza jak i Krasnodębskie-
go wydają się przemilczane. Paradoksalnie, zarzuty stawiane przez Krasno-
dębskiego można wysunąć także wobec faworyzowanej przezeń pedagogiki 
realistycznej, która w praktyce stawiając min. na rozwój, wykorzystanie no-
wych technologii, praktyczne umiejętności i rozwiązywanie problemów, w 
podobnym stopniu narażona jest na występowanie instrumentalizmu, mate-
rializmu czy stosowania etyki sytuacyjnej, zastępując chociażby moralność 
prawami natury.  
 
Obszernej analizy i podsumowania funkcjonujących dotychczas nurtów wy-
chowania dokonał min. Bogusław Śliwerski (Współczesne teorie i nurty wy-
chowania, 1998). Autor nie uwzględnia tam systemów para-pedagogicznych 
powstałych w totalitaryzmach, na przykład pedagogiki nazistowskiej, która 
pomimo założeń dziś nie do przyjęcia stanowiła relatywnie spójny system, 
którego kryteria odpowiadałyby wcześniej wymienionym składowym wy-
chowania. Prawdopodobnie, dzięki temu możliwe było stworzenie dobrze 
zorganizowanego systemu edukacji i indoktrynacji w ramach Hitlerjugend. 
Pośród autorów, raczej mało znanych na gruncie polskim, tematem tym zaj-
mowali się min. Ernst Krieck (Völkischer Gesamtstaat und nationale Erzie-
hung) jako teoretyk pedagogiki nazistowskiej w latach trzydziestych, a już 
po wojnie, krytyczne opracowania znajdujemy u Hansa-Jochen Gamma 
(Fuhrung und Verfuhrung. Pedagogik im Nazionalsozialismus, 1964) czy 




Press – Growing Up Female in Nazi Germany. Również w pedagogiach tota-
litarnych dokonywała się transmisja specyficznych wartości. Można było 
mówić o szczególnej roli nauczyciela, treściach i metodach kształcenia, jak 
również środowiskowo uwarunkowanej relacji pomiędzy podmiotami edu-
kacyjnymi. Co jednak odróżniało pedagogie totalitarne, to przyjęcie za nad-
rzędne idei, założeń i przekonań o charakterze ideowym, politycznym, nie 
zaś naukowym. Czy jednak współcześnie również nie dokonuje się pewnych 
założeń: w religii w postaci dogmatów, w nauce w postaci paradygmatów, a 
w polityce założeń o rozmaitym podłożu aksjologicznym? Dopiero zesta-
wiwszy ze sobą skrajne nurty, prądy, koncepcje i pedagogie, na zasadzie ne-
gacji łatwiejsze może się okazać wskazanie, które z nich nie spełniają 
kryteriów idealizmu. Należy przy tym nadmienić, iż obecnie, min. akademi-
kom amerykańskim i niemieckim trudno stosować termin pedagogika czy 
Pädagogik, która często jest kojarzona z okresem panowania i semantyczne-
go zawłaszczenia przez Trzecią Rzeszę, podobnie jak ta uczyniła to z hindu-
istycznym symbolem szczęścia. Stąd też wachlarz koncepcji wychowania 
trzeba rozszerzyć o tradycje anglosaskie i francuskie związane z pojęciem 
Education.  
Akceptacja jednej doktryny lub ideologii, jak miało to miejsce w ustro-
jach totalitarnych, byłaby w tym przypadku wskaźnikiem niespełnienia zało-
żeń idealizmu. Z przykładów mniej radykalnych, pedagogika 
psychobiologiczna Herbarta Spencera mogłaby się kłócić w pewnych zało-
żeniach z idealizmem, z uwagi na naturalistyczne i pragmatyczne podejście 
do świata. Nie dotyczy to już treści dotyczących samorozwoju wychowanka, 
ponieważ w tym zakresie występuje względna zgodność, co dodatkowo 
utrudnia jednoznaczną ocenę danego nurtu. Należy przy tym pamiętać, iż 
pedagogika ze względu na mnogość nurtów i kierunków jest poliwalentna, 
stąd poza ogólnym charakterem idealizmu per se, na przeszkodzie stoi wie-
lokierunkowość i przenikanie się różnych myśli w pedagogice, uniemożli-
wiających sądy kategoryczne.  
  Podsumowując powyższe, wyróżniki jakie można by wymienić w 
pierwszej kolejności powinny być raczej orientacyjne. Właściwie byłyby 
wskazówkami, punktami zwrotnymi, aniżeli strukturami kategoryzującymi. 
Pośród nich znalazłyby się takie, jak: 1) rola wychowawcy / nauczyciela: 
wspomagający i wydobywający potencjał z człowieka czy nauczający jedy-
nie sprawności? W tym przypadku trudniejsze wydaje się wydobywanie po-
tencjałów, ponieważ wiąże się z uprzednią koniecznością ich identyfikacji, 
czyli poznania ucznia – nie tylko w zakresie jego umiejętności (lub ich bra-
ku), ale też często pozaprzedmiotowych atrybutów. Co za tym idzie, to 2) 
specyfika relacji uczeń-nauczyciel / wychowawca-wychowanek; czy nau-
czyciel to autorytet czy partner? Ktoś wymagający i będący wzorem postę-
powania moralnego dla młodego człowieka czy może specjalista i technik 
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niezaangażowany moralnie? W świetle zjawiska erozji autorytetu, kiedy 
uczniowie czy studenci coraz częściej podpisują umowy przypominające 
umowy handlowe na świadczenie pewnych usług lub produktów, salomo-
nowe rozwiązanie zdaje się leżeć gdzieś pośrodku tej skali. Oczywiście 
ważne są umiejętności i kształcenie kompetencji odpowiadających najnow-
szym wymaganiom współczesności, ale proces ten jest zdecydowanie ła-
twiejszy przy wzajemnym poszanowaniu… i pewnej dyscyplinie. Następnie 
pojawiają się 3) treści nauczania: czy koncentruję się wokół zagadnień hu-
manistycznych, społecznych, artystycznych, kulturowych, czy może wokół 
zagadnień technicznych, praktycznych, fizycznych i biologicznych? I to py-
tanie nie powinno pozostawać rozstrzygające – np. biolog replikujący ludzki 
genom powinien znać chociażby podstawowe kwestie etyczne związane z 
potencjalnym klonowaniem człowieka, a dalej implikacje biologiczne, psy-
chiczne i społeczne. Za treściami nauczania stoją 4) wcześniej zarysowane 
metody dydaktyczne. Następny wyróżnik to 5) obecność i transmisja w po-
wyższych treściach określonych idei, wartości i wychowanie do nich w du-
chu rywalizacji (przy poszanowaniu pluralizmu i tolerancji względem 
innych sposobów postrzegania świata), czy raczej wychowanie do relacji, 
komunikacji, współżycia społecznego bez rywalizacji? Pojawia się pytanie o 
6) cel wychowania i kształcenia. Każda pedagogia definiuje je na swój spo-
sób i nie jest to miejsce by je wszystkie przytaczać, natomiast możliwe wy-
daje się nakreślenie pewnego spektrum: czy będzie to krytyczne i racjonalne 
myślenie zwieńczone zdolnością do samorealizacji i dokonywaniem postę-
pów w indywidualnym rozwoju (jak również formowanie charakteru i krę-
gosłupa moralnego na podstawie naśladowania bohaterów i autorytetów), 
czy też pozostawanie w „życzliwych nacechowanych otwartością i ufnych 
odniesieniach do osób”, mądrości i miłości (Ibid. 326) – oparte nie na indy-
widualności, a kolektywie, nie na rygorze, a swobodzie i samorzutnym roz-
woju. Konsekwentnie należałoby rozstrzygnąć: a) czy uwzględniona jest rola 
uwarunkowań środowiskowych – czy dany prąd pedagogiczny uwzględnia 
odniesienie do szerszego kontekstu? (np. globalnego) oraz b) czy wśród sa-
mych założeń procesu wychowawczego uwzględnia się samorealizację, sa-
mokształcenie, samowychowanie? Znane są bowiem systemy oparte ściśle 
na kolektywnym wychowaniu, zwłaszcza w obszarze pedagogiki specjalnej 
– resocjalizacji. Wreszcie najbardziej oczywiste, czyli 7) jakie są deklarowa-
ne versus rzeczywiste korzenie filozoficzne badanych nurtów pedagogicz-
nych? 
KONKLUZJE 




szych badań w tym kierunku, niemniej chociażby przez wzgląd na odrzuce-
nie przez wielu idealistów dualizmu, w kontekście wychowania problema-
tyczne może być skontrastowanie idealizmu z naturalizmem, realizmem, 
egzystencjalizmem czy pragmatyzmem. Niechęć do dualistycznego rozu-
mowania może utrudniać jednoznaczne rozróżnienia, przez co niemożliwe 
stają się dychotomie: idealizm = nauczyciel wspomagający, mistrz, partner 
do rozmów, przewodnik duchowy; realizm = nauczyciel uczący konkretnej 
umiejętności, niezaangażowany moralnie, funkcjonariusz państwa; czy też 
treści nauczania – w idealizmie nauki humanistyczne i formalne, w realizmie 
zaś przyrodnicze. Bezpośrednio przekłada się to na odniesienia do idealizmu 
nurtów pedagogicznych. Problemem mogą się okazać również odmienne 
znaczenia terminów: edukacja, wychowanie, kształcenie, samorealizacja, 
zwłaszcza w odmiennych kręgach kulturowych i językowych. Kolejno, dla 
głębszej analizy należałoby przytoczyć definicje wychowania dla poszcze-
gólnych orientacji filozoficznych, określić kryteria klasyfikacji poszczegól-
nych pedagogii jako nurtów, by dopiero potem weryfikować je na podstawie 
wskaźników wyodrębnionych z całej gamy rodzajów idealizmu. Można 
również ten problem postawić nieco inaczej: na jakim poziomie pedagogiki 
możliwe jest wskazanie elementów wynikających z idealizmu, lub zbadać 
dzieła poszczególnych filozofów z obrębu idealizmu pod kątem odniesień do 
wychowania i edukacji, zwłaszcza w wymiarze praktyki wychowania. Tego 
rodzaju analiza szczegółowa wybranych dzieł filozofów i pedagogów mo-
głaby stanowić intermedium obszerniejszej metaanalizy umożliwiającej bar-
dziej kompleksowe klasyfikacje. Na co natomiast warto z pewnością 
zwrócić uwagę, to występowanie określonego zespołu idei, wartości, a co za 
tym idzie – koncepcji człowieka, wizji świata oraz finalnego efektu procesu 
kształcenia i wychowania. Nie bez znaczenia pozostaje też specyficzna rela-
cja podmiotów uczestniczących w tym procesie, występowanie dyscypliny, 
karności, określone wyżej treści i przedmioty zawarte w curriculach, nacisk 
kładziony na racjonalność i rolę kształtowania intelektu (zwłaszcza zdolno-
ści rozumowania), a także złożone, wieloaspektowe, holistyczne spojrzenie 
na proces wyprowadzania dziecka ku dorosłości.  
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